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Advisor: Richard Alba 
Much attention has been devoted to the presumed negative effect of diversity 
growth on various dimensions of attitudes and interaction between different racial 
and ethnic groups. However, whether the claims hold true is unclear- there is a 
considerable controversy over the impact of changing diversity on societal 
behavior. With ongoing migration, the United States are becoming more and more 
ethnically diverse but a sound debate on racial and ethnic composition and its 
consequences for inter-group interactions and attitudes towards others has not yet 
been possible due to a lack of causally-oriented panel studies.   
In this study, two important features are tested: on the one hand, friendships to 
racial or ethnic out-group members (Chapter IV), and on the other, attitudes 
towards these people (Chapter V). To my knowledge, this study deploys one of 
the first U.S. panel designs measuring diversity effect using two waves of panel 
data from the Portraits of American Life Survey (2006-2012). Using different 
measures of inter-group socializing and attitudes towards out-group members, this 
	
									
study explores whether changes in community diversity lead to changes in out-
group attitudes and contact across racial lines.  
This study distinguishes whether the contextual effects take place on the tract or 
city level, and whether individuals experiencing increases in diversity initially 
lived in low, medium or high heterogeneity. Furthermore, separate results are 
presented for non-Hispanic white and non-white respondents. The analysis on 
attitudes differentiates whether the treatment (the change rate in diversity) is due 
to changes in neighborhood composition for stayers and or to neighborhood 
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DIVERSITY GROWTH AS A CONTESTED TOPIC 
 
Much controversy has surrounded the diversification of the U.S. population. Whether 
diversification poses a social, economic, cultural and political threat to the U.S. continues 
to be a contested topic. The election of Donald Trump, which is partially built on his 
blatantly depreciative attitudes towards immigrants and racial and ethnic outsiders, has 
facilitated negative out-group attitudes on the conservative right. Arguable studies such 
as the famous analysis of social capital and diversity by Robert Putnam (2007) add fuel to 
the flames by demonstrating that ethnically heterogeneous cities and regions show lower 
levels of commitment to voluntary activities and other forms of solidarity behavior. 
Residents of ethnically heterogeneous regions, according to Putnam, retreat into their 
private life, offering an example of the conflicts that are inherent to immigration. 
Nevertheless, it is assumed that the positive inter-group relations and attitudes are of 
central importance for a successful coexistence under the conditions of increasing 
cultural, religious and ethnic variety. Reducing negative stereotypes is just as crucial as 
increasing empathetic ties and contact to racial and ethnic out-group members in diverse 
neighborhoods and cities.  
Huge demographic changes are taking place in the U.S. as a consequence of immigration 
and the resulting racial and ethnic composition of the population. In demographic 
analyses of the present and near future of U.S. race and ethnicity, it is often assumed that 




cohorts, pointing towards a postracial society (Perez & Hirschman, 2009). It has been 
widely reported that half of the children born in the U.S. have at least one minority 
parent, more and more global neighborhoods are developing (Logan & Zhang, 2010), and 
destination areas with little history of immigration now face increasing influx by migrants 
(Johnson & Lichter, 2010; Lichter, 2013a). But what do these changes mean? What effect 
will the third demographic transition (Alba, 2012; Coleman, 2006) have besides 
representational demographics?  
While there are tendencies of growing tolerance towards individuals with a different 
ethnic or racial background and of increasing interethnic engagement (Marsden, 2012) 
there is a substantial part of academia arguing that diversity growth has detrimental 
effects for community. As a distinguished voice in this debate, Robert Putnam (2007) 
claims to have shown that ethnically diverse neighborhoods’ residents have lower trust, 
community cooperation and fewer friendships, both within and between different racial 
and ethnic groups. He argues that large immigrant groups or rapid immigration growth 
rates tend to incite a feeling of threat and competition between ethnic groups – an 
observation that traces back to Blalock (1967) and has been supported by current authors 
like De Souza (2007), Greif (2009) and Alesina and LaFerrara (2000), amongst others. 
These observations also have support from outside the US, for instance by the 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), that has conducted an "Ethnic 
Diversity and Collective Action Survey" (Schaeffer, Koopmans, Veit, Wagner, & 
Wiedner, 2011) and confirms the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and 




While the general tone of research has been rather negative about diversity’s communal 
effects, there is much research that has demonstrated a positive association among 
community, city-level ethnic diversity, and features of interethnic attitudes and 
interaction. This research shows that increasing numbers of children will be exposed to 
more diverse schools and neighborhoods, have a more diverse set of friends, will eat 
more diverse food and watch more diverse TV programming. In line with the contact 
hypothesis (Allport, 1979a; Sigelman & Welch, 1993), these heightened levels of 
interethnic contact are associated with more harmonious inter-group relations, at least if 
particular conditions are fulfilled. Additionally, intermarriages are on the rise and higher 
rates of multiracial and multiethnic self-identification suggest that there is some degree of 
blending of races and a “blurring of the color line” (Alba, 2012). 
The report is divided into six major parts. Mainly relying on insights from the inter-group 
contact and group threat theory, Chapter I discusses the theoretical framework underlying 
the analytical approach discussed in Chapter II. The analytical description of this study 
focuses on the benefits of panel data including two time points, the decision to evaluate 
diversity effects by initial level of diversity and the two different levels of geography 
employed in the evaluation. In Chapter III contextual diversity will be analyzed through a 
demographic lens, adding to our spatial understanding of diversification for movers and 
stayers and whites and non-whites. Building on the theoretical framework and this 
demographic discussion, the following chapters deal with the question of how ethnic and 
racial diversity affects contact across racial lines (Chapter IV) and the attitudes towards 




movers and stayers. Finally, the results are summarized and policy recommendations for 
action are formulated in Chapter VI. 
 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE: DIVERSITY, OUT-GROUP ATTITUDES AND 
INTER-GROUP INTERACTION  
 
In the following, the research is briefly explained from a theoretical perspective, after 
which the data used and methodological approach are presented (Chapter II). Theories 
that explain why diversity evokes certain kind of reactions are multiple and divergent. 
There are two distinctive broad literatures that describe diverging effects of diversity on 
immigration attitudes.  
On the one hand, threat theories such as “inter-group competition,” “defended 
neighborhoods,” and “disorganization” predict that increased diversity and out-group 
presence decrease inter-group trust, give rise to racial and ethnic stereotypes and lead to 
detrimental attitudes towards out-groups, including immigrants. On the other hand, the 
contact hypothesis is the basis for arguments that diversity growth leads to higher 
chances of contact across racial lines in schools, at work or in the neighborhood, which 
reduces out-group hostility.  
According to a meta-analysis, about half of the U.S.-based studies are mainly in line with 
the threat-hypothesis, 20 percent are not and 30 percent show mixed evidence (Meer & 
Tolsma, 2014). Theories range from the individual- to the macro-level, and encompass 




macro-level out-group threat and inter-group contact theory, followed by three additional 
theories that explain individual xenophobia. 
 
Out-Group Threat Perspective 
	
Much of the literature presents a pessimistic image of how shifting diversity impacts 
communities. In general, studies based on a threat-perspective show that higher levels of 
diversity have detrimental effects on out-group perception and attitudes towards 
immigrants. One of the main reasons is that people do not “like” racial and ethnic 
outsiders. Instead, people prefer their “own kind” and “flock together” on that basis. This 
preference is visible with regards to intimate relationships, like dating, marriage and 
friendship choice (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). But even on less intimate 
levels, people tend to prefer being around the likes of themselves. For instance, studies 
have found that individuals participated more and felt more comfortable in church when 
they belonged to the majority group (Martinez & Dougherty, 2013). Similarly, they also 
have a better impression of customer service administered by someone of their own race 
(Montoya & Briggs, 2013).  
Scholars offer numerous explanations for the stimulation of exclusionary and xenophobic 
attitudes in the face of increasing diversity. The most widely used theories are “inter-
group competition” and “defended neighborhoods,” which focus on out-group 
proportions, out-group in-migration, or ethno-racial polarization. Furthermore, theories of 




widely used to explain changes in neighborhood relations and a general deterioration of 
interaction. 
Proponents of inter-group competition theories have long argued that higher percentages 
of racial and ethnic outsiders stir conflict and social tensions. They state that long-term 
inhabitants feel threatened by the presence of out-group members due to real or perceived 
competition between ethno-racial groups for scarce resources (Krysan, 2000; Quillian, 
1995). The argument refers to competition over economic interests such as jobs or access 
to housing or non-material issues such as political representation or the prevailing way of 
life (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).  
In a similar vein, the “defended neighborhoods” theory states that fears of out-group in-
migration from adjacent areas triggers defensive behavior among members of the 
dominant group to preserve a neighborhood’s way of life, which they feel is threatened 
by the newcomers (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; B. J. Newman, 2013). This 
argument is borne out in ethnographic studies of white urban neighborhoods, which 
report that their residents share a sense of community identity that is based on closure to 
other ethno-racial groups and the protection of acquired privileges. This has been 
tellingly demonstrated in research conducted in Canarsie, New York (Rieder, 1987), 
where inhabitants viewed their neighborhood as a "closed place" and a “safe haven” for 
its inhabitants while keeping African-Americans out during the 1960’s and 1970’s.  
A second classical line of research focuses on general community erosion and 
disorganization as resulting from declines in social control (R. J. Sampson & Groves, 




approach argues that ethno-racial heterogeneity results in reduced social interactions 
among neighbors, which again lowers overall levels of social control, efficacy and 
capacities to solve community problems collectively. Typical work in this area focuses 
on neighborhood disorder (R. J. Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999), whereby authors 
emphasize that community erosion and disorganization boost overall rates of crime 
(Hipp, Tita, & Boggess, 2009).  
A frequent starting point for this line of research is Putnam’s (2001) widely used 
distinction between "bridging" and "bonding" social capital. Bridging is the act of 
transferring trust across group boundaries, whereas "bonding" fosters social cohesion as 
well as identity and trust within the group, but not towards outsiders. Putnam’s research 
encompasses some of the places in the U.S. with the highest overall trust scores, such as 
New Hampshire and Montana, rural areas in West Virginia and East Tennessee, and 
cities such as Bismarck, North Dakota and Fremont, Michigan, which tend to be 
homogenously white. It also includes some of the least trusting places, such as Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, and Houston, which are highly diverse cities. Even after 
controlling for other variables such as civic participation, age, education, crime rates, 
etc., a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital persisted. This 
led Putnam to the conclusion that diversity actually causes certain community problems. 
He notes that whilst the observed withdrawal from society is universal, it is particularly 
evident in disadvantaged, high crime, ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods. In 
Putnam‘s view, ethnic diversity itself seems to encourage withdrawal from communal 
life (2007) and it is this “hunkering down” that he considers the most proximate 




In a random experiment, Enos (2014) tests what happens to out-group attitudes when 
individuals of different ethnic backgrounds meet in urban contexts. For a short period, 
he exposed members of homogenous white communities in Boston to a simulated 
demographic change at their train station by assigning groups of Spanish-speaking 
individuals to mingle on the platform. Astonishingly, he finds heightened levels of 
exclusionary attitudes as a reaction to this minimal change in daily exposure to what 
people perceive as “others,” broadly confirming the statements of the inter-group threat 
perspective. 
 
Inter-Group Contact Perspective 
	
Inter-group contact theory posits that exposure to racial and ethnic out-group members 
can decrease conflict, stereotyping and prejudice (Allport, 1979a). Allport also points 
out that such contact only leads to a reduction of prejudices when four conditions are 
met:  
1. The contact should be between individuals with the same status. 
2. Individuals should have common goals. 
3. Individuals should cooperate to reach these goals. 
4. The inter-group contact should be supported by authorities. 
 
This idea has ancestry in the sociological founders, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber and 
Georg Simmel, who stressed early on that modern societies did not necessarily need to 
be homogenous. These early sociologists argued that heterogeneity, brought upon 




social cohesion, but introduce opportunities for new kinds of networks and cooperation. 
For both Ferdinand Tönnies and Émile Durkheim, the city is seen as the main center of 
modernization processes. They agree that the traditional form of social integration was 
bound to local space: the family, the neighborhood and the village. Both focus on 
contrasting urban and rural life in order to illustrate the change in the nature and quality 
of human relations in the transition to modernity. What sets them apart, is that for 
Tönnies the spread of modern cities is a sign that the modern age of society 
(Gesellschaft) has replaced the age of the community (Gemeinschaft) and will inevitably 
lead to an artificial and self-centered coexistance in anonymity. While Tönnies 
represents this culturally pessimistic position, Durkheim represents a positive, hopeful 
assessment of the integrative potential of modern societies. For Durkheim, it is precisely 
the modern Gesellschaft based on the division of labor, which he compares with a 
functioning organism, while the Gemeinschaft is an close-knit community bound 
together by mechanical solidarity. Durkheim celebrates the loosening traditional bonds 
as a liberation from oppressive narrowness. Very much in line with Durkheim, Georg 
Simmel demonstrated how changes in group composition can lead to altered group 
processes that are not inherently inferior to traditional forms of social cohesion in pre-
modern times. 
 
Research shows that individuals with low levels of inter-ethnic and inter-racial ties are 
more likely to develop an in-group bias. This preference goes hand in hand with hesitant 
contact across racial lines or hostility propelled by stereotypes and prejudices. Inter-
group contact theorists argue that much of the observed worsening of out-group attitudes 




communication rather than the level of heterogeneity per se (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 
2008). Laurence (2014) finds that the negative effects of diversity on inter-ethnic 
attitudes only hold true for those individuals that do not have previous ties to members 
of the out-group. Relying on the European Social Survey, researchers from the Berlin 
Social Science Center (WZB) demonstrate that ethnic diversity has negative effects on 
out-group perception when there is no actual inter-ethnic contact, supporting both group 
threat and contact theory (Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010).  
Inter-group contact theory suggests that when such contact takes place in form of 
communication and interaction xenophobic attitudes towards racial and ethnic outsiders 
decrease. However, diversity and actual exposure/interaction should not be treated 
equally. In fact, prior research has shown, that diversity growth can in some cases lead 
to higher segregation (Wright, Ellis, Holloway, & Wong, 2014), especially for non-
Hispanic whites, Hispanics and Asians, while it has only beneficially decreased 
segregation for blacks (Iceland, 2004a).  
Apart from contact as a mediator, ethnic and racial diversity can also decrease out-group 
hostility and stereotypes. Logan and Zhang’s “Global Neighborhood” (2010) concept 
posits that increasing number of individuals, including whites, live in highly diverse 
neighborhoods. In the most diverse of these neighborhoods, Asians and Hispanics create 
buffers that allow for growth in the black population.  Accordingly, blacks and whites 
come into increasing exposure to one another, possibly decreasing racial animosity.  
Further, a group of authors from Marburg, Hagen, Göttingen (Germany), Oxford 




and Singapore investigated how contact between members of different ethnic and racial 
groups affects mutual attitudes by means of surveys from Germany, various European 
countries, the USA, Great Britain and South Africa (Christ et al., 2014). They show that 
residential communities with a high proportion of migrants exhibit lower levels of 
prejudices than residential districts where few people with migration background live. 
Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that this effect is not only triggered by personal 
contact. Prejudices are also demonstrably reduced if contacts between ethnic groups are 
maintained in the environment in which respondents live, regardless of whether the 
respondents themselves have contact.  
Other research in this area focuses on diversity and friendship in schools and 
universities. Chang’s (1996) multi-institutional study of inter-racial interaction proposes 
that greater racial diversity in the student population leads to greater frequency of 
socialization across race. Furthermore, students with few out-group friends are more 
likely to make friendship decisions based on people’s skin color (Martin, Trego, & 
Nakayama, 2010). Closely related, Fischer (2011) states that the contact hypothesis 
applies to college students, especially with regard to white attitudes towards black 
students.  
In general, studies in school settings and work places differ from diversity effects in 
more unstructured settings such as neighborhoods or cities. A potential explanation is 
that the effect of diversity on out-group attitudes and contact across ethnoracial lines 
mainly is a positive one when the interaction between the different racial and ethnic 
groups takes place in a formal setting that relies on mutual recognition and cooperation 




unknown races and ethnicities under certain circumstances among which institutional 
support, equal social standing and exposure stand out the most. Thus, it is equally 
important to look at diversity effects in social units where individuals can avoid inter-
group contacts (neighborhoods) and in social units where inter-group contacts cannot be 
avoided such as classrooms or workplaces (Marschall & Stolle, 2004; Pettigrew & 




In the debate over how diversity impacts xenophobic attitudes towards racial and ethnic 
outsiders and minorities, several authors have found perceptions to be impacted by the 
underlying socioeconomic context (Eric Oliver & Wong, 2003; Portes & Vickstrom, 
2011, 2011; Tam Cho & Baer, 2011). While some scholars find negative effects of 
increasing levels of diversity, they oftentimes conclude that the lower social interaction 
and trust associated with rising ethnic diversity are due to the social disadvantage tied to 
the neighborhood itself. This resource-driven approach stands in contrast to the “Putnam 
camp,” because diversity as such is not seen as the actual driver of attitudes. Research 
reveals that residents living in disadvantaged communities are significantly more likely 
to distrust their community than those living in middle-class neighborhoods (Uslaner & 
Brown, 2005). Living in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods creates fear, which 
often translates into fear of racial and ethnic outsiders. Individuals living in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods experience powerlessness and a lack of social support and 




xenophobic attitudes towards outsiders. Furthermore, residents might be exposed to 
higher levels of urban decay and violence and perceive threat and competition more 
severely if they live in an area marked by low economic resources.   
 
Individual-Level Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigrants 
	
In addition to macro-level threat and inter-group contact theories, individual-level 
explanations of immigration-related attitudes focus on levels of education (human 
capital theory), interpersonal trust (societal integration theory) and feeling of threat 
(individual threat theory).  
Human capital theory proposes that individuals benefitting from higher education tend 
to have more positive attitudes towards out-groups or minorities. In general, the 
perception of racial and ethnic others is often based on whether they are perceived as 
competitive or complementary workers. When low-skilled immigrants migrate to the 
United States, low-skilled native workers will likely have more negative attitudes due to 
the threat of job displacement and unemployment, which higher-educated natives fear at 
a lesser extent. More highly educated workers often actually gain from the immigration 
of low-skilled workers because various services, like landscaping and childcare, become 
less expensive. Furthermore, education has been shown to positively influence tolerance 
towards out-groups, either through an internalization of immigrant-friendly values or 
through learning processes that dismantle racial and ethnic stereotypes (Jenssen & 




While human capital theory certainly is an important explanatory determinant shaping 
individual attitudes towards immigration, other crucial features influence individual 
perception. With growing interest in the socio-psychological nature of xenophobia and 
racial and ethnic stereotypes, perceived cultural threats are incorporated into this study 
to explain the formation of immigrant-friendly and immigrant-rejecting attitudes. 
Research has shown that some people feel that immigrants and local inter-group contact 
are undermining their country’s culture and thus their own identity, and therefore hold 
negative attitudes towards immigration. If you define yourself through national identity 
and pride, you easily feel threatened by others. If the only aspect of life you identify 
with is your racial or ethnic group, minorities or out-group members are more likely to 
be perceived as a danger. Whether this is a negative attitude towards the unknown or 
even the participation in a right-wing extremist group - anything that promises to bolster 
one’s own identity looks tempting. A study by Sniderman et al. (2004) shows that it is 
not only economic threats that form individuals’ attitudes towards immigration, but 
rather “culturally threatening cues,” such as people speaking a different language, that 
form negative out-group perception.  
Interpersonal trust theory proposes that individuals with higher network trust, higher 
trust in friends, neighbors and their family members tend to be more open-minded 
towards those who are different from them. Interpersonal trust is crucial in facilitating 
the cooperation and social coordination between individuals and is established through 
regular face-to-face-interaction.  
The following research plan delineates how both out-group threat and inter-group 




into account both macro-level moderators (tract- or city-level socio-economic status) 
and micro-level determinants like individual-level human capital theory, interpersonal 
trust and individual threat.  
As I will point out below, this study focuses on whether diversity growth in 
neighborhoods and cities triggers feelings of threat in individuals, which will be 
measured through the willingness to interact with racial out-group members (Chapter 
IV) and attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Chapter V). It is difficult to discern if 
attitudes towards others influence out-group interaction, or if the interaction actually 
shapes attitudes. On the one hand, inter-group contact theory asserts that an individual’s 
out-group attitude is influenced by the interaction and contacts with racial and ethnic 
others. In fact, scholars have found that friendship and interethnic contact are important 
prerequisites for positive outward perception and attitudes (Martin et al., 2010). On the 
other hand, attitudes towards racial and ethnic out-group members might impact the 
likelihood of having out-group contact in the first place. Scholars have also provided 
evidence that racial and ethnic socialization and the way a person has learned to perceive 
racial and ethnic others influence interracial and interethnic interaction and friendship. 
This school of thought applies well to school settings, where students’ choice of friends 
is often reflected in the attitudes towards others inflicted by their families’ attitudes. 
Researchers find that children of parents with negative racial attitudes tend to adopt this 
perception, which then detrimentally affects cross-group friendships (Edmonds & 





Geographical Level of Analysis 
	
An issue to be addressed in the analysis concerns geographical level. Research on the 
interaction between an area’s level of diversity and out-group attitudes and interaction 
has been conducted on different levels of analysis, ranging from census tract (Eric 
Oliver & Wong, 2003; Stolle et al., 2008) to county-level analysis (Branton & Jones, 
2005). Rather than relying on one level of analysis, this study extends the research by 
analyzing diversity effects for both tract and CBSA-level, which allows us to draw 
potentially different conclusions.  
Diversity has different effects on individuals when measured at different geographies (J. 
E. Oliver, 2010). In a recently published paper using accurate measures of the ethnic 
diversity in the 80 meters surrounding each individual’s residence, Dinesen and 
Sønderskov (2015) find that ethnic diversity on the micro-level affects trust 
detrimentally, while the effect levels off at higher geographic units. In contrast, other 
papers show that city-wide or higher-level analysis reveals a detrimental effect of 
heterogeneity growth, while at the neighborhood level an increased propensity of 
individuals to engage with others and out-group members and higher rates of social 
cohesion in general occur (Kaufmann & Harris, 2015). In a meta-analysis of previous 
research Kaufmann and Harris find that 75 percent of relevant papers relate 
neighborhood diversity to improving perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants and 
minorities, while diversity growth at the metropolitan level is linked to higher feelings of 
threat and animosity. There has been no sound explanation as to why these differences 




analysis level. Since I have both tract- and city-level data, I will analyze both to see if 
Kaufmann and Harris’ observations are supported.  
Tract-level analysis pertains to fine-grained contexts that individuals live in and gets 
closer to what we perceive as a “neighborhoods” and might depict what the racial and 
ethnic makeup of living contexts looks like. Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA), 
which consist of both metro- and micropolitan areas, on the contrary, reflect higher-level 
political and social processes and might be affected in social policies. Even though 
metropolitan areas typically include multiple political units, issues like housing and 
employment are often administered and overseen at the metropolitan level, and 
resources are (re)distributed by the city government (Wong, 1990).  
Summing up, the present study investigates whether individuals’ reactions to 
increases in diversity are in line with macro-level threat or inter-group contact 
theories, controlling for individual-level human capital, interpersonal trust and threat 
theory. However, the crux of the matter is that the analysis will be conducted for 













The analysis relies on the Portraits of American Life Study (PALS),1 which is an 
extensive, nationally representative panel study (see Map 1 below for the location of 
counties included in the sample2) originally focused on religion in the U.S. Given the 
relationship of race and ethnicity to religion in the U.S., the survey also collected data on 
ethnic and racial diversity and inter-group relationships. In addition, the dataset includes 
a range of variables describing moral and social attitudes and racial and ethnic self-
assessment.  Geographic identifiers (tract-level information for both 2006 and 2012) in 
the confidential version of the data set were accessed through restricted-use files.  
At present, the PALS comprises of two waves, which were collected in 2006 and 2012 
and include 1,314 respondents who were interviewed in both years. Non-response 
weights were also included for Wave 2. The dataset includes a sample of the U.S. 
population above the age of 17 living in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who 
are not members of the U.S. Armed Forces or inmates in institutional facilities, such 
mental facilities, elderly homes or the U.S. prison system.  
RTI International (Research Triangle Institute), a not-for-profit research organization, 
helped the PALS researchers at Rice University to conduct five-stage sampling ensuring 
																																								 																				
1 Emerson, Michael O., David Sikkink, and Adele D. James. 2010. "The Panel Study on 
American Religion and Ethnicity: Background, Methods, and Selected Results." Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion 49(1): 162-171. 
2 Due to confidentiality requirements, the map does not include tract locations, but 




a randomized probability sample while also allowing for a racially diverse sample. The 
dataset differs from truly random sampling (where individuals constitute the primary 
sampling unit) in that researchers purchased residential addresses within 60 
predetermined primary sampling units (PSUs) (based on 3-digit US zip codes). 
Subsequently, approximately 120 5-digit zip codes were chosen from the initial 60 
PSU’s, from which 248 postal carrier routes were extracted. Ultimately, roughly 10,000 
addresses were selected through this multistage sampling procedure3.  
The Portraits of American Life Survey includes sampling weights, which were taken 
into account throughout the study. The weights are applied to align the sample with 
overall census demographics4.  
Based on the sampled addresses, interviewers visited households to conduct initial 
screening interviews selecting one respondent from each household. On average, the 
interviews took 75 minutes, were completed by 50 percent of those reached, who were 
rewarded with an incentive of 50 Dollars. In 2006, 2610 interviews were completed with 
population oversamples for Asians, Hispanics, and African Americans.  
To provide contextual data for the respondents, community characteristics are taken 
from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Censuses. Neither wave 1 nor wave 2 are concurrent to the 
Census data, but were conducted 6 and 2 years after the respective census. A delayed 
measure of individual-level attitudes could be an advantage, as some time has passed for 
community changes in diversity to take effect.  
																																								 																				
3 Representativeness of the data will be established in Chapter III.   
4	Stata’s “svy” command was used to identify the sample as complex survey data. All 
regressions take into account the complex survey design and use weights to generalize to 
















KEY DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
As I have explained, the Portraits of American Life Survey offers the possibility to look 
at key dimensions of out-group attitudes and inter-group bridging over two time points. 
In the following, key variables derived from above-described theories will be presented.  
 
Key Dependent Variables  
	
This study proposes a two-step analysis to develop insights into how changing diversity 
levels impact interethnic and interracial relations: 
a) Diversity Effects on Changes in Out-Group Friendships  
b) Diversity Effects on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants 
Studying both inter-group friendships and out-group attitudes offers the possibility to 
understand diversity effects from different angles. Diversity growth might have a 
different effect on attitudes than on actual inter-group bridging and might shed light on 
the disaccord between the threat and contact theory. As pointed out in Chapter I, it is 
difficult to discern whether racial and ethnic attitudes shape interethnic contact or 
whether there is a reverse causality. In fact, there is little etiologic discussion on this 
topic and researchers often assume one causal direction or another. Authors such as 
Powers and Ellison (Powers & Ellison, 1995) point out that while they find the contact 
hypothesis to remain true empirically it also makes sense to switch the causal direction 




not to answer whether attitudes influence contact or contact influences attitudes – it is 
likely that causality operates in both directions – the above key variables are both 
included in this analysis in Chapter IV and V.  
While these two dependent variables should not be treated interchangeably, feelings 
towards racial outsiders and immigrants might be similar in light of increasing 
heterogeneity. One might even argue that diversity growth can trigger fear in 
individuals, who then lump attitudes towards immigrants and racial out-group members 
together. It has been shown that a feeling of threat towards “others” was conveyed 
through both restrictive attitudes towards immigrants and negative stances on racial out-
group members - through a portrayal of criminal blacks and Hispanics, for instance 
(Alba, Rumbaut, & Marotz, 2005). Alternatively, diversity growth might lead to 
improved attitudes towards immigrants and other races, or reactions could be different 
for both groups. In terms of geography, immigration and diversity are linked: Much of 
the increase in diversity stems from inflows of immigrants, which points to a coherence 
between attitudes towards immigrants and other races. In Chapter III, the link between 
ethno-racial diversity and immigration is explored at both the neighborhood and 
metropolitan level. 
a) Interaction with Racial Out-Group Members: Visiting or Inviting an Out-
group friend  
Instead of focusing solely on attitudes and perceptions, which are sentiments not 
necessarily leading to further action but rather connected to a perception of the 




“different” by analyzing how diversity influences interracial home visits. The first part 
of this study (Chapter IV) addresses contact across racial boundaries.  The outcome of 
interest is based on this PALS question: “In the past 12 months, about how many times 
have you been in the home of a friend of different race or had them in your home?” 
Numerous studies have relied on respondents’ reports on the racial and ethnic 
composition of their circle of friends (De Souza Briggs, 2007; Fischer, 2011; Levin, van 
Laar, & Sidanius, 2003; Martin et al., 2010).  Though these reports might misrepresent 
or exaggerate, it is important to call to mind that friendship is a measure that is not easily 
understood and captured, because it is subjective and thus difficult to interpret. Instead, 
this study focuses on the number of times interracial home visits take place. An 
invitation into the home of a racial or ethnic other represents the most intense form of 
bridging ties across ethno-racial divides. In other words, contact across racial lines at 
home is included in the model since this measure operationalizes an intimate experience 
of diversity in everyday life. Friendship ties are deliberate actions, compared to neighbor 
trust or even co-worker ties (that are involuntary), and they often involve regular or 
frequent face-to-face contact and communication. Friendship ties are important sources 
of emotional aid, companionship and assistance (Wellman & Wortley, 1990), and they 







b) Attitudes towards racial and ethnic out-group members: Perceptions of 
immigrants in the U.S. job market 
After having analyzed diversity effects on changes in out-group bridging, I study 
changes in attitudes towards immigrants and the way this is affected by changing 
patterns of diversity (Chapter V).  
The attitudinal measures will tell us little about the actual contact and interaction 
between members of different racial and ethnic groups. Instead, they inform us about 
how respondents feel, how they perceive the world around them and find their own 
social and political position in changing environments. While the quality and frequency 
of contact across racial lines certainly influence attitudes towards racial and ethnic 
others, attitudes towards and perceptions of individuals with an immigrant background 
are an important prerequisite before they can talk to and potentially even befriend each 
other.  
This part of the analysis relies on a key dimension of out-group attitudes: the belief that 
immigrants take away “native jobs.” The question asked to capture individuals’ attitudes 
towards immigrants is worded: “Immigrants coming into the U.S. are taking too many 
jobs away from other American citizens” offering interviewees a 1-5 response scale. My 
choice in outcome was limited by the over-time design of the study and the limited 
availability of variables measuring out-group attitudes over time. As I will demonstrate 
in the following, however, I am confident that the above outcome adequately represents 





Key Independent Variables  
	
Below, light will be shed on the independent variables that will be used as controls in 
the analysis of attitudes towards immigration and contact across racial lines. The main 
independent variables are diversity and diversity growth rates respectively. Furthermore, 
I adjust for education (human capital theory), interpersonal trust (societal integration 
theory) and feeling of threat (individual threat theory). There are additional independent 
variables that I will take into account. In the following, key potential confounders will 
be discussed that must be taken into account even though they might not be shown into 
the final models.  
 
I) Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Diversity Growth 
It is important to bear in mind that racial and ethnic diversity can be captured through 
various kinds of diversity measures in the literature. As I demonstrate in Chapter III, 
diversity can be assessed by focusing, merely, on the share of people belonging to a 
particular (majority or minority) ethnoracial group in a given area. With regards to race 
and ethnicity in the U.S., it can make sense to study the proportion of an area’s 
population that is foreign-born. In Chapter V, dealing with attitudes towards immigrants, 
such an approach is undertaken. While this might be sufficient in some regions that are 
mainly marked by the presence of two major groups, actual diversity cannot be 
measured this way. Instead, this study relies on measures of multi-group diversity.  
What is common to most of the measures of diversity is that a single value describes 




groups are) and richness (simple count of ethnoracial groups) of a neighborhood or city. 
While an increase in the relative or absolute size of each racial or ethnic group results in 
higher diversity score, different kinds of measures vary in their sensitivity to richness 
and evenness. In line with established scholars, this study relies on the Simpson 
diversity index, which is also referred to as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) or 
Blau Index in economics (Laurence, 2011; Schaeffer, 2013). This measure has been 
shown to be more susceptible to racial and ethnic evenness, but takes into account both 
the quantity of different races and ethnicities present and the number of individuals with 
each race or ethnicity5. The Simpson Diversity Index is a highly popular measure of 
fractionalization and concentration used by ecologists, biologists, ecologists, 
geographers, psychologists, economists, demographers and sociologists. Part of the 
popularity derives from it’s clear interpretation (the probability of two individuals 
belonging to different groups ranging from 0 to 1), while other indices are harder to 
grasp. Due to it’s intuitive interpretation, the Simpson Diversity index has been widely 
used in order to measure diversity, both in terms of evenness and richness. Within the 
field of sociology, the Simpson Diversity index has been heavily relied on to describe 
the effect of diversity on trust (Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015; Fisher Williamson, 
Abigail, 2013; Putnam, 2007), on ethnoracial conflict (Legewie & Schaeffer, 2016), 
social cohesion (Meer & Tolsma, 2014; Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Kuha, & Jackson, 
2014). Furthermore, Simpson diversity has been shown to be better for small sample 
sizes, because the relative standard variation is kept low when compared to other 
diversity measures (Magurran, 2003).  
																																								 																				
5 For a discussion of weaknesses and disadvantages associated with the Simpson 




Based on 2000 and 2010 Census data for both the CBSA and tract level five mutually 
exclusive racial and ethnic groups (non-Hispanic white, black, Hispanic, Asian, other) 
were used to calculate the Simpson's Diversity Index, which measures the probability of 
two randomly selected individuals belonging to a different race or ethnicity (Simpson, 
1949):  





!! = the total number of people of a particular race or ethnicity 
! = the total number of people of all groups 
 
There will be a score of 0 if all individuals in a tract belong to the same group, whereas 
1 means absolute heterogeneity. In the PALS sample, the diversity scores of all the tracts 
range from 0.0039 to 0.79, with the sample mean being 0.37.  
However, solely relying on the Simpson diversity index might result in a biased and 
oversimplified analysis. It might be useful to compare how different measures of 
heterogeneity relate to each other (Schaeffer, 2013). The Entropy score is another widely 
used diversity measure, and will be used as a cross-reference and sensitivity analysis in 
this study (Iceland, 2004b).  
As Iceland points out it is important to distinguish between the Entropy index and the 
Entropy score, two very different measures that are often used interchangeably. The 




neighborhoods with regard to the overall region’s entropy (and as such is a measure of 
segregation), while the score pertains to the overall entropy of a given region. It is 
calculated as 
 
, where p describes a particular group’s share of the total population in a given area. 
The entropy score ranges from 0 (when all individuals in an area belong to the same 
ethnoracial group) to infinite (relies on the number of groups included into the 
calculation). In this study, the maximum entropy is 1.609, as all five groups taken into 
consideration in this study would hypothetically make up an equal share of 20 percent. 
In fact, such a high level of diversity is not reached. U.S.-wide, the average Entropy 
score is .662, while the sample mean is similar at 0.621.  The maximum level of entropy 
recorded is 1.53 for the whole nation and 1.48 for the PALS sample.  In order to get a 
better understanding of how low-, medium- and high-diversity areas are composed and 
how the Simpson diversity and Entropy score relate to each other, three hypothetical 









Table 1. Hirschman/Herfindahl Index/Simpson Diversity and Entropy Score in 




Black Asian Other Hispanic HHI/S*  E** 
 
Spirit Lake, IA 
Micro Area 
16255 29 72 22 178 0.04 0.11 





2340577 185061 389309 65123 309476 0.47 0.96 





1810300 349895 994616 53968 938794 0.69 1.30 
 43.65% 8.44% 23.98% 1.30% 22.63%   
* HHI/S: Hirschman/Herfindahl Index/Simpson Diversity 
** Entropy Score 
Highlighted fields constitute majority groups (larger than 10 percent of the total 
population) 
 
Table 1 shows three examples from CBSA-level dataset that depict low-, medium- and 
high-level diversity as it is used in this study. As we can see, low diversity CBSAs (both 
in terms of Simpson diversity and Entropy score) are dominated by one particular 
ethnoracial group, while other groups are marginalized. Medium-level CBSAs, such as 
Seattle, most commonly have one dominant group, but the other groups are less 
marginalized and have stronger presence.  
What is noticeable from Table 1 is that Simpson diversity and the Entropy score seem to 
relate to each other, indicating collinear behavior. To test this assumption, a pairwise 
correlation between Simpson/Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the Entropy score was 




Figure 1. Scatterplot Entropy Score 2000 and Simpson Diversity Score 2000 
 
Figure 1 shows that the Simpson Diversity index and the Entropy index are associated at 
.989 (Adjusted R-squared = 0.979) at the tract-level. Due to the strong correlation and in 
order to avoid redundancy, the focus of this study lies on Simpson diversity, but some of 
the maps and analysis were conducted using the Entropy score.  
Based on the Simpson diversity scores for 2000 and 2010, diversity increase rates were 
calculated for the change-models. I decided to use diversity increase rates (growth rates), 
rather than differences between 2000 and 2012. It is important to remember that increase 
rates should always be seen relative to the size of the base diversity. The main reason for 
this decision was that diversity growth rates allow for better comparison across different 




Queens in New York have among the highest diversity scores in the nation, which 
makes it hard to compare diversity growth in such diverse places with diversity growth 
in low-diversity areas. Imagine two different tracts (Tract 1 and 2) experiencing 
diversity growth of 0.2 on the Simpson scales ranging from 0 to 1. If Tract 1 has an 
initial diversity score of 0.1 (rising to 0.3) and Tract 2 lies at 0.4 (rising to 0.6), then 
diversity would have grown 200 percent for the lower-diversity tract and 50 percent for 
the higher-diversity tract. In other words, low-diversity tracts and CBSAs oftentimes 
have smaller diversity gains, but diversification might be rising at a steeper rate the same 
absolute increase in high-diversity tracts in Queens, for instance. In that sense, growth 
rates are more sensitive to lower-diversity neighborhoods and cities, and level the 
playing field across the nation. I argue that increase rates do a better job of capturing the 
“felt” growth of diversity, especially for individuals in low-diversity neighborhoods and 
cities, for whom heterogenization might feel more intense and overwhelming than for 
individuals accustomed to these kinds of changes. The reliance on growth rates will be 
particularly beneficial when comparing reactions to diversification across low, medium 
and high initial diversity in Chapter IV and V.  
As I have pointed out before it is not sufficient to analyze diversity effects at one 
particular geographical level. In fact, prior research seems to indicate that some of the 
inconsistencies we find in the literature might be due to the use of different geographies. 
Therefore, I will construct contextual diversity measures for both the city and 
neighborhood level. Census tracts were used to approximate neighborhoods. These are 
relatively small geographic units with 4,000 inhabitants on average. The PALS sample 




literature to equate neighborhoods with census tracts, as they are the best available 
administrative geography at this scale. The larger urban context is approximated through 
Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), which cover both Metropolitan and Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas. There are 54 such areas in the sample.  
It is important to keep in mind that this analysis relies on administratively drawn tracts 
and Core Based Statistical Areas whose delimitations of area are therefore subject to 
boundary changes between censuses. The study uses 2010 Census tract and city 
boundaries filled with 2010 data and adjusted values for 2000 in order to make sure that 
neighborhood and city boundaries are comparable across time. NHGIS6 standardizes the 
2000 data in these time series tables to 2010 census geography in two steps, first 
allocating census counts from 2000 census blocks to 2010 census blocks and then 
summing the reallocated 2000 counts for all 2010 blocks that lie within each target 2010 
unit. Where a 2000 block intersects multiple 2010 blocks, NHGIS applies areal 
interpolation to estimate how the 2000 block characteristics are distributed among the 
intersecting 2010 blocks. 
II) Trust 
This analysis includes individual-level social trust, which is highly important for 
building cohesion and peaceful cooperation among different members of society 
(Morrone, Tontoranelli, & Ranuzzi, 2009). Newton and Zmerli (2011) distinguished 
between particular social trust – trust in known others (friends, family, neighbors) – and 
general social trust – trust in unknown others. Similarly to Newton and Zmerli’s work, 
																																								 																				
6 Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 11.0 




the present paper includes two condensed variables that will be referred to as “Trust 
towards Family and Relatives” (mainly family) and “General Trust towards others” 
(neighbors, friends and strangers) in the following. These measures were obtained 
through factor analysis (see varimax rotated outcomes below, Table 2) based on the 
PALS statements: R has completely trusted family/friends/neighbors/strangers in past 12 
months.  
Table 2. Types of trust created through Factor Analysis and Scoring Coefficients 
(based on Varimax Rotated Factors) 
Variable General Trust 
towards Others 
Trust towards Family 
and Relatives 
Complete Trust in Family 0.007 0.854 
Complete Trust Neighbors  0.526 0.129 
Complete Trust in Friends 0.444 0.138 
Complete Trust in Strangers 0.460 -0.455 
  
Since these two constructed scales tap the same underlying factors (family and 
general trust towards others), it is important to verify how good the scale is using 
Stata’s alpha command, which calculates scale reliability coefficient Cronbach’s 
Alpha. For trust in neighbors, friends and strangers, Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.71 
indicating that the correlation is fairly high. 
 
III) Human Capital 
As described in the theory section, less well-educated individuals tend to show more 
prejudices and xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants and racial and ethnic others; that 




qualified labor market segments. Educational advances and cognitive abilities, by 
contrast, weaken attitudes of this kind. In this study, four levels of education were taken 
into account: (a) less than or no High School Degree (reference category), (b) graduated 
from High School, (c) some College, (d) College degree and more.  
IV) Individual Threat Theory  
As explained before, threat is expected to be an important factor in shaping people’s 
attitudes towards and interaction with racial or ethnic outsiders. In this dissertation, 
individual-level threat is measured through both the 
(a) Feeling of safety in neighborhood measured through the question: 
How Often Has R Felt Unsafe In Current Neighborhood? (Recoded into never 
and once or more) and  
(b) Feeling that one’s own racial group is in- or decreasing in neighborhood 
(measured through the statement): 
Will Percent of R’s Race In This Neighborhood Increase Or Decrease In Future? 
(recoded into yes and no) 
 
The reason that these two variables were included is that it can be expected that 
individuals who feel their social being is threatened, either through unsafe neighborhoods 
or a relative decrease in the numbers of people like themselves will often blame outsiders 
for their loss of identity and orientation. While it is important to differentiate between 




accused of increasing real or perceived crime rates and violence, which detrimentally 
affects attitudes.  
 
V) Movers and Stayers 
As I will show in more detail in Chapter III, the diversity experiences of movers and 
stayers are inherently different. The origins of diversity changes are quite different for 
movers and stayers, which might reflect in differential reactions to changes in diversity.  
While changes in neighborhoods for stayers might disrupt familiar processes and 
introduce unknown dynamics, residential mobility is different in the sense that 
individuals leave their habitual living situations and networks and choose a new context. 
As research has shown (Oishi, 2010), individual residential mobility is closely related to 
decreases in social capital (the density of social networks marked by trust and 
cooperation) and collective efficacy (the ability to control neighborhood behavior through 
shared values and goals). In addition, living in the same neighborhood over extended 
periods of time has been shown to encourage prosocial behavior (Oishi et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, movers and stayers might initially be different in their likelihood to move 
based on their preferences for diversity. Stayers are expected to show either no significant 
reaction as those that do not approve of neighborhoods with increasing diversity could 
potentially move away, or negative reactions, as those that cannot move experience 
changes in their neighborhood. Reactions by movers are expected to be different: if 
individuals have different preferences for neighborhoods and decide to move based on 




new neighborhood might not fit their expectations. On the other hand, the assumption 
that movers take informed choices and relocate to neighborhoods that are in accordance 
with their racial and ethnic preferences could also imply that they react well to changes in 
neighborhood diversity.  
The analysis of out-group friendships in Chapter IV focuses on stayers only. People who 
move to new neighborhoods oftentimes lose trust in their friends, lose friends they trust, 
spend less time with people close to them (Oishi, 2010) and think of friendships as 
disposable (Gillath & Keefer, 2016). Hence, including movers could produce misleading 
results. While Chapter IV focuses only on stayers, Chapter V includes a careful 
distinction between movers (those individuals that moved to a new neighborhood 
between 2006 and 2012) and stayers (those that individuals that remained in their 
neighborhood between 2006 and 2012).  
 
VI) Socio-demographic controls 
I include data on the age and gender of a person. I also include ethno-racial background 
in the overall models. Despite the imprecision of the basic measure, separate models will 
be implemented that look at a broader White/non-White distinction as well.  
I expect different results for each racial and ethnic group, as different groups might feel 
more or less threatened and might experience different levels of diversity beforehand. 
Various scholars have demonstrated that diversity growth mainly effects whites’ attitudes 
detrimentally (Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2016; Stolle et al., 2008), triggers 




and converse only with other whites. Furthermore, diversity growth results in white 
respondents believing that the increased presence of minority residents (in particular 
black residents) leads to an anti-white bias (Rae, Newheiser, & Olson, 2015). 
Interestingly, scholars have drawn a distinction between those whites that are actually 
exposed to more diversity versus those white respondents who merely perceive the threat 
of an increasing minority population. While the feeling of threat through a seemingly 
expanding minority population is related to actual diversity, a discrepancy in “real” and 
“perceived” population composition might actually drive prejudice and fear of ethnic and 
racial minorities (Alba et al., 2005). Supporting this line of thinking, researchers have 
demonstrated in experiments that whites who read fake news paper articles titled “In a 
Generation, Ethnic Minorities May Be the U.S. Majority” reacted with higher racial bias 
than those respondents that read a more neutral article on U.S. demographics (Craig & 
Richeson, 2014). While these results are very insightful, it is important to evaluate also 
how people react to actual changes in the neighborhood and cities rather than focusing on 
the idea of increasing power of the minority population.  
 
While the bulk of research has been conducted on non-Hispanic white attitudes towards 
minorities and immigrants, there are a few papers that analyze black attitudes towards 
immigrants (Diamond, 1998), showing that the threat-perspective also holds true for this 
group but is less pronounced than for whites. However, it seems oversimplified to 
conclude that racial and ethnic xenophobia is a problem of mainly whites; in situations of 




in-group interaction could occur for any well-defined group (McClain, 2006; McClain & 
Tauber, 1998).  
VII) Length of residence 
Individuals who have lived in a given neighborhood for a long time are more likely to 
have more friends in general. Robert Sampson (1988) found that length of residence was 
positively linked to number of social ties and frequency of participation in social leisure 
activities at both the individual and neighborhood level. Furthermore, residential stability 
is related to more pro-social community and helping behavior (Oishi et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless it is reasonable to hypothesize that individuals who have lived in their 
neighborhood for a very long time are less comfortable with any changes and might react 
negatively to increases of diversity in their surroundings. 
VIII) Homeownership 
Homeownership could be of importance to the generation of interethnic bridges and 
might influence the perception towards and interaction with racial or ethnic others. 
Owners are more likely to live in one location for a long period of time and are more 
likely to have a sense of concern for the neighborhood due to their financial investment in 
their own home. Home ownership positively impacts residents’ life satisfaction, which is 
the same for quality of neighborhood, and has been shown to be an important individual 






X) Additional Macro-Control 
Alongside the analysis of racial and ethnic diversity, a neighborhood’s or CBSAs average 
socioeconomic status will be incorporated. In line with prior research this study measures 
socioeconomic status as the percentage of individuals above the age of 25 with a college 




There is no need to verify if diversity and individual attitudes towards and interaction 
with racial and ethnic outsiders are related. The existing positive association between 
racial and ethnic diversity and perception of and interaction with racial and ethnic others 
has been confirmed in countless research projects (Laurence, 2014; Martin et al., 2010; 
Stolle et al., 2008) and also holds true in the cross-sectional section of this project.  
While two time points are by no means sufficient for making a causal argument, the study 
takes an important step towards understanding the directionality of diversity effects. 
Rather than focusing on one type of social integration, this paper examines two different 
aspects: changes in friendships (Chapter IV) and changes in attitudes (Chapter V).  
As pointed out before, analyzing repeated cross-sections of data offers interesting insights 
into associations, but impedes causal statements. One of the major problems with the 
existing literature on neighborhood effects is that the apparent impacts identified in cross-
sectional research may not be causal but instead driven by selection bias. Selection bias is 




particular neighborhood is dependent on the outcome variable and therefore violates the 
assumption that an independent variable is uncorrelated with the error term in a 
regression equation. For instance, the effect of healthy food stores in the neighborhood 
might mistakenly be identified as a contextual effect on individual’s higher health 
outcomes when in fact individuals who attach more value to health decide to live in 
vicinities that offer them the food they seek. While scholars are aware of this problem 
and try to account for the bias through econometric modeling techniques, it is also 
important to focus on patterns of residential mobility and sorting into and out of 
neighborhoods. In our case this means: How do we know that those studies showing that 
increasing diversity is positively related to attitudes towards immigration and contact 
across racial boundaries are not biased by the fact that individuals with a preference and 
higher propensity to live in heterogeneous neighborhoods relocate to more diverse 
neighborhoods?  
Although it is known that selection bias can overstate neighborhood effects, few U.S.-
based papers have tested the causal assumptions that both contact theorists and group-
threat advocates have made with regard to out-group attitudes and interethnic bridging. 
Several studies from Germany, the Netherlands and Britain pose intriguing exceptions 
that address this causal inference problem. In the paper “Moving to Diversity: Residential 
Mobility, Changes in Ethnic Diversity, and Concerns About Immigration” Merlin 
Schaeffer and Bram Lancee (2015a) use longitudinal data from Germany and show that 
respondents who move to more diverse settings show worsening attitudes towards 
immigration over time, while those who stayed and those who moved to equally diverse 




(2015) use 20 years of longitudinal data to address the selection bias of those moving out 
of diverse neighborhoods, leaving behind a seemingly more tolerant population. Studying 
affective attachment to the community, Laurence and Bentley (2015) use 18 years of 
panel data – and very similarly to Schaeffer and Lancee – and use subgroups to determine 
whether the change rate in diversity stems from a community increasing in diversity 
around individuals who do not move (stayers) or individuals moving into more or less 
diverse communities (movers).  
To my knowledge, the only two causal U.S.-based papers were written by Enos (2014), 
testing effects of real-life diversity growth on train commuters in Boston, and Fischer 
Williamson (2013), who uses a natural experiment to demonstrate diversity effects on 
social capital. The place of investigation was Lewiston, Maine, which was a 
homogenously white city before the influx of Somalis in 2001. Partially supporting Enos’ 
observations, Fischer Williamson’s analysis shows that detrimental effects of 
concentrated Somali populations on trust and friendship was only measurable at the 
neighborhood-level, but not at the city-level. While scholars outside the U.S. support both 
the threat and contact theory, these two longitudinal papers convey a relatively dismal 
validation for the threat hypothesis.  
Multinomial logistic change-models will be implemented to examine following 
hypotheses:  
 H1a: Increasing levels of diversity produce higher levels of interethnic bridging 





 H1b: Initial level of diversity is expected to play an important role in determining 
‘movers’ attitudes and propensities to interact with ethnic or racial out-group 
members. Residents who move from heterogeneous communities to more diverse 
settings are expected to report an increase in interethnic bridging and improved 
attitudes towards “others” over time, while those people with low levels of prior 
experience with diversity might show less favorable attitudes.  
H1c: At the neighborhood level, increasing levels of diversity produce lower 
levels of interethnic bridging and worsening attitudes towards “others” for 




In the following description of the analytical approach, seven consecutive steps will 
contribute to an overarching understanding of diversity effects. Thereby, models will be 
dissected by movers and stayers, level of geography (CBSA and Census tract), White- 
and Non-White dichotomy and level of initial diversity.  
A) First Step- Cross-Sectional Models 
In the first step, cross-sectional association between racial and ethnic diversity and out-
group perceptions and inter-group bridging for both 2006 and 2012 are tested. In line 
with the theoretical discussion, contextual effects for both tracts and metropolitan areas 
are measured. Hierarchical modeling was not used in the analysis, because 30 percent of 




the sample. In other words, the variance within many tracts is 0. Regular multinomial 
logistic regression models are estimated to predict the independent effects of ethnic and 
racial diversity on out-group perception and interaction.  
B) Second Step- Using Panel Data 
The analysis must still confront the problem that communities are dynamic environments 
and a cross-sectional approach to this analysis will tell us more about geographical 
covariation of social cohesion and diversity rather than about effects of changes in 
diversity on changes in attitudes or interaction. Therefore, examining relationships 
through two-time point panel data is a critical step towards establishing causality.  
To examine whether diversity has a positive or negative effect on changes in attitudes and 
contact across ethnoracial frontiers, I regress changes in out-group perception and out-
group interaction on changes in diversity. This study posits that if diversity does have an 
effect on individuals’ outward perception and interaction with “others,” owing to threat, 
anomie, contact etc., then a change in the level of diversity should elicit a change in an 
individual’s behavior and attitude. 
C) Third Step- Preliminary Analysis of Movers and Stayers 
As pointed out before, the analysis of out-group friendships in Chapter IV will only deal 
with stayers, because movers relocating to new neighborhoods might differ in the 
perception of friendship and often change their friendship behavior due to the move itself, 




In Chapter V, the mover/stayer distinction is included for the tract-level analysis, because 
attitudes can be taken to a new neighborhood and do not necessarily change due to the 
move. A CBSA-level distinction between movers and stayers will not be implemented, as 
only eight percent of the sample relocated from one CBSA to another between 2006 and 
2012; instead, 34 percent of the respondents moved to a new census tract, usually within 
the CBSAs boundaries. In order to state which consequences a change in diversity will 
have on changes in individual attitudes in Chapter V, an interaction of change in diversity 
with the mover/stayer dichotomy will be included.  
By including interaction effects for movers and stayers, this study distinguishes between 
different sources of diversity growth. This step is crucial because people who remain in 
their (changing) neighborhoods between 2006 and 2012 are expected to be inherently 
different from people who decide to move. 
D) Fourth Step- Subgroup Analysis by Level of Geography 
Finally, the same models will be constructed for CBSA-level diversity. As studies have 
revealed differences in diversity effects between various levels of geography, 
geographical units should be varied to see if the results observed at the census tract level 
also hold true for the CBSA level. However, this is not done in most studies and instead 
the geographic level of the context units is mainly determined by data availability. By 
implementing separate models by geographic level, I hope to discuss the postulated 






E) Fifth Step- Subgroup Analysis by White and Non-White Dichotomy 
Just as important as separate analysis by geographical level is the distinction between 
non-Hispanic white and non-white respondents who are anticipated to experience 
diversity growth very differently (see theoretical discussion). Whites have been shown to 
react negatively to increases in diversity in their social contexts, as discussed previously. 
While the virulence and extent of white xenophobia and racism have declined, the feeling 
of out-group threat and a preference for in-group socialization has been shown to be 
present among many whites (Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015).  
Furthermore, non-Hispanic whites generally live in less diverse neighborhoods and are 
therefore less familiar with diversity. As shown in Table 3, on average, whites live in 
neighborhoods with a 33 percent chance of randomly encountering two tract inhabitants 
that are different from each other either ethnically or racially. These chances are higher 
for black individuals (42 percent), Hispanic individuals (47 percent) and Asian 
individuals (51 percent). In other words, Asians have a 20-percentage-point higher 
likelihood of randomly coming across two different people when compared to white 
respondents. This difference in initial level of diversity might translate into different 
reactions to changes in diversity for movers and stayers.   
Table 3. Diversity by Individuals' Race and Ethnicity 









F) Sixth Step- Subgroup Analysis by Initial Level of Diversity 
Besides the prior discussed benefits of two time points, panel data are also useful for 
addressing individual transitions into different kinds of neighborhoods, which makes it 
possible to dissect different initial levels of diversity. Based on the theoretical discussion, 
it is likely that the effect of a change in diversity depends on previous experiences with 
diversity. Larger shares of the immigrant population have been found to be both 
positively (via inter-group contact) and negatively (via group threat) correlated with anti-
immigrant attitudes simultaneously. A person’s background and original place of 
residence (origin category) could explain such opposing results. Increasing diversity 
might be threatening for those who previously lived in homogeneity, because little 
contact across racial lines is made in homogenous areas. Individuals moving from 
moderate or high levels of diversity in their neighborhood to a higher-diversity 
neighborhood may be more accustomed to diversity and might see growing diversity as 













CHANGES IN DIVERSITY 
 
The following demographic analysis centers on changing diversity patterns in the U.S., 
diversity growth by initial level of diversity and the role of immigration in generating 
changes in diversity.  
Chapter IV and V deal with the effect of changes in diversity on two dependent variables: 
attitudes towards immigrants and interracial bridging. While these two measures might at 
first deal with seemingly different topics, the following section connects the two different 
objects of my dependent variables, one in terms of immigration and the other in terms of 
race and ethnicity. I argue that feelings about immigration and race are directly 
connected, both socially (Chapter II) and geographically and, in combination, offer a 
broader insight into the effect of diversity growth. In the following, I establish that 
diversity and immigration are linked through a strong connection at the neighborhood and 
metropolitan levels between growing ethno-racial diversity and a growing immigrant 
presence. 
Furthermore, this chapter explores particularities regarding the diversity in the PALS 
dataset and includes an analysis of changes in diversity for movers and stayers, and 






Changes in the Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Population 
	
Over the past 50 years the U.S. have witnessed an immense growth of the non-white 
population leading to an overall growth in diversity (Frey, 2014). In addition, 
demographic analyses of the present and near future have shown that the non-white 
population has diversified both in terms of racial and ethnic composition as well as 
geography – while immigration and diversity used to be characteristic traits of traditional 
gateway cities and port of entries (Singer, 2004), they have spread to many more cities 
and neighborhoods. Research on diversity shows that since 1970 there has been a steep 
increase both in the size of the foreign-born population (10 million resident immigrants to 
roughly 43 million in 2015) and its relative percentage (4.7 percent in 1970 to 13.5 
percent in 2015)7 and an associated diversification in the population of racial and ethnic 
backgrounds, particularly in areas that are not traditional immigrant gateways (Massey, 
2010) and in rural parts of the country (Lichter, 2012). 
With the 1965 immigration law, the national-origins quota system and the racist limits on 
Asian immigration were finally abolished, paving the way—unintentionally--for a more 
extensive immigration from Asia, Latin America and other non-European regions. Rather 
then immigration stemming from Southern and Eastern European countries, as the 
legislators devising the 1965 law anticipated, immigrants from Asia and Latin America 
are the new front-runners among immigrants (Massey, 2010). As Frank D. Bean, Jennifer 
Lee, Jeanne Batalova, and Mark Leach (2004) point out there are several states that can 
either be categorized as Hispanic-white-states or states with significant shares of the 
																																								 																				
7 Migration Policy Institute (MPI) tabulation of data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-




population that are non-white (which includes southern states that are divided between 
whites and blacks). Individuals in this fourth wave of immigration were more educated 
and more likely to belong to the middle class, and due to better technology and 
transportation within the U.S. people were no longer bound to urban cores and were able 
to migrate out. In line with spatial assimilation theory, a high income, the use of English 
language and the embedment in an Anglo-American social context makes the move into 
an English-speaking neighborhood more likely. American citizenship and the duration of 
living in the U.S. has been shown to correlate positively with geographic mobility to 
English-speaking neighborhoods, while the contact with their own ethical group was 
negatively correlated with this form of mobility. Pushed out of the city by gentrification 
and high housing prices, immigrants and minorities in general increasingly venture out in 
search for better living contexts and schools. Richard Alba and Nancy Denton (Foner & 
Fredrickson, 2005) point out that immigrants tend to move to ethnic enclaves with their 
family once they arrive in the United States. In line with general assimilation theory 
minorities in general want to translate their gain social and economic capital into 
improved residential locations after having lived in the U.S. for several years (Massey, 
1985), thus leading to a spread of migration out of gateways of immigration into low-
diversity residential suburbs and rural areas (Lichter, 2012). 
Using entropy measures to record changes in ethnoracial diversity, Lee, Farrell and 
Iceland demonstrate that entropy (a measure of whether all ethnoracial groups have equal 
representation in a specific geographic area) has continuously climbed between 1980 and 
2010 (2014). While non-Hispanic Whites still constitute the biggest part of the U.S. 




ethnicities and is marked by an aging population. Hispanic and Asian population 
proportions have been fueled by an influx of young immigrants, coupled with higher birth 
rates of these in-migrants (Johnson & Lichter, 2010). What has been labeled the third 
demographic transition refers to the natural decline in the native majority population and 
its rising average age leading to a need for migration, which goes far beyond the current 
figures because of the shortage of labor (Coleman 2006). At the same time, 
diversification has been identified as an important strategic area for action, so that cities 
and regions remain competitive in the global "space of the flows" (Castells, 1996). 
 
A) Diversity on the Tract-Level  
In the following, the empirical material will be organized into separate sections on 
diversity at different geographic scales (Census tract and Core-Based Statistical area). I 
am using the Simpson index to trace the growth and spread of diversity. In order to make 
sure that the Simpson diversity index constitutes an appropriate measure of diversity, the 
following maps were also replicated using the Entropy score. As shown in the Appendix, 









Map 2. Simpson Diversity in 2010, Tract-Level (see Appendix (Map A) for the same 
map using Entropy Score) 
 
 
Overall, the 2010 Simpson diversity score is 34.07 and has increased by almost four 
percentage points in just a decade, since 2000. In other words, in 2010 there is a 34 
percent chance that two individuals who were chosen at random from an average tract’s 
population would belong to different races or ethnicities. A look at Map 2 reveals that 
there are a wide variety of diversity levels in 2010. On the one hand, wide swaths 
throughout the Midwest, Northeast and the northern part of the West are still highly 
homogeneous at the tract level. States like Missouri or Maine are extreme examples of 




exception and consistently show high levels of diversity. In addition, the south and 
coastal regions are highly heterogeneous as well.  
While varying levels of diversity undoubtedly bring out different inter-group behavior in 
people, it is more meaningful to study changes in diversity that individuals are exposed 
to over time. It is known that diversity is rapidly increasing (Johnson & Lichter, 2010; 
Lichter, 2013b; Parisi, Lichter, & Taquino, 2015), massively changing the way people 
live, work and interact together and also influencing people’s perceptions of each other. 
As the scatterplot in Figure 2 shows, there is a strong trend towards racial and ethnic 
diversity growth at the tract level (most of the tracts lie above the red line, indicating 
diversity growth). The Simpson Diversity Index (the chance that two individuals chosen 
at random belong to a different racial or ethnic group) has risen for 71 percent of the 
Census tracts between 2000 and 2010. Map 3 gives us a better idea of where increases 











Figure 2. Scatterplot Simpson Diversity in 2000 and 2010, Tract 
 
Map 3. Change Rate Simpson Diversity, Tract-Level (see Appendix (Map B) for the 





While the overall growth in diversity is substantial, it may be more momentous that 
ethnic and racial heterogeneity is sprawling far beyond the coasts, diversifying areas that 
have long been unexplored by immigrant and minority populations. Map 3 confirms 
prior research showing that diversity is gradually spreading into smaller communities, 
like suburbs and villages (Frey, 2014). The dark orange tracts experience the greatest 
rate of change between 2000 and 2010. While much of the growth in diversity takes 
place in traditional areas of immigration and multiracial population makeup, some of 
these areas are traditionally white areas with little to no diversity in the first place. This 
is particularly true for some Midwestern states like Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin. 
Zooming in to the map reveals that much of the diversity growth stems from 
diversifying suburbs and outlying areas surrounding Metro- and Micropolitan cities. 
Since it is complicated to really define which tracts are ‘rural’ versus ‘urban’, I applied 
rural-urban commuting area (RUCA) codes to the tracts which offers a multidimensional 
measurement of urban/rural status that take into account what percentage of people 
commute into the urban core. Using RUCA codes8 to group Census tracts into a rural-
urban scheme ranging from 1 to 10, we can see that diversity change rates between 2000 
and 2010 are similarly high across all categories in Table 4. Thus, tract-level 
diversification is not an intrinsically urban phenomenon. However, it is interesting to 
note that areas with a low percentage of people that commute to an urban core (both in 
small cities and metropolitan areas) also have lower diversity growths. I conclude that 
minorities and immigrants are increasingly present in rural neighborhoods and suburbs 











Classification Mean Change Rate 
Diversity (Tract) in % 
1 Metropolitan area core 27.3 
2 Metropolitan area high commuting 24.6 
3 Metropolitan area low commuting 16.4 
4 Micropolitan area core 24.6 
5 Micropolitan high commuting 21.2 
6 Micropolitan low commuting 15.1 
7 Small town core 26.0 
8 Small town high commuting 21.6 
9 Small town low commuting 16.1 
10  Rural areas 24.6 
 
Despite the general upward trend in diversity, dramatic contrasts are still apparent on the 
local level: clusters of tracts in Wyoming, West Virginia, Montana, Vermont, Kentucky 
and Missouri, for instance, remained heavily white between 2000 and 2010. 
Map 3 evidences that diversity has increased between 2000 and 2010 and shows that 
diversity growth is taking place in a variety of settings. More importantly for this study, 
diversity growth occurs in low-, medium- and high diversity settings. Relying on the 
Simpson diversity scores for each tract in 2000 a new categorical variable was 
constructed that captures initial high, medium and low diversity. As is to be seen on 
Map 4, low diversity scores range from 0 - 24.3, medium-diversity ranges from 24.4 - 
49.04 and high diversity ranges from 49.05 – 74.5. These three groups lay the ground for 
the subgroup models in Chapter IV and V, offering three different scenarios of how 
people react to changes in heterogeneity.  




gateways and urban cores, the following map focuses on whether low-, medium- and 
high-diversity tracts experience increases or decreases in diversity. While this is a fairly 
crude breakdown, it gives us the opportunity to quantify and map diversity growth and 
declines by initial level of diversity.  
The blue tracts were scarcely diverse in 2000, but darker blue ones are experiencing 
increases in diversity while light blue tracts became even more homogenous between 
2000 and 2010. Increases in low-diversity areas constitute more than a third of all tracts 
in the U.S. (see Table 5 below Map 4) and are evident in northern New England through 
vast parts of the Midwest. These are mainly areas that were almost entirely white but 
now have begun to show greater heterogeneity. However, it is also evident that parts of 
the Mid-Atlantic show clusters of decreasing diversity in already low-diversity tracts. 
Consulting the earlier map, this is a part of the country that remains nearly completely 
white. Furthermore, clusters of tracts in Montana, Oregon and Wyoming did not see 
diversity growth as well. Low-diversity-low-increase tracts take up only 8.7 percent of 
the whole nation.  
The red and purple parts of Map 4 below are made of tracts that are already very diverse 
(red) and somewhat diverse (purple). Darker red indicates diversity growth in high-
diversity tracts, and orange tracts represent decreasing diversity in high-diversity tracts. 
24 percent of all tracts have high diversity, while 30 percent have medium diversity. 
Since the Simpson Diversity Index ranges from 0 to 1, it has an inherent cap, so very 
diverse places like parts of New York City or San Francisco do not necessarily diversify 
even more. However, measuring diversification still makes sense, as there is no 




York has a 79.4 percent chance of randomly selecting two individuals of different race 
and ethnicity). 
A part of the medium- and high-diversity belt includes big cities, which are highly 
attractive for immigrants and minority populations. The Southeast comprises tracts with 
white and black neighborhoods, but also tracts in states like North and South Carolina, 
and Georgia, where Hispanics have risen in number. Quite differently from the 
Southeast, the Southwest is mainly Hispanic and white. The Pacific Coast also has a 
mixed population, including Hispanics, whites and an increasing presence of Asians.   
What is most remarkable is that high-diversity neighborhoods show a nearly equal share 
of increase (12.42 percent) and decrease (11.5 percent) between 2000 and 2010. In fact, 
many of the high-diversity tracts that experience decreases in heterogeneity (orange) are 
located in states like Texas, and have a majority Hispanic population leading to less 
diverse population composition. In contrast, the majority of medium- and low-diversity 
tracts experience heterogenization: between 2000 and 2010, only 24 percent of all 
medium-diversity neighborhoods and 18 percent of all high-diversity neighborhoods 
showed declining diversity scores.  
Thus, we can state that U.S. tracts are diversifying across the whole country, with a 










Map 4. Increase or Decrease in Diversity by Initial Level of Diversity, Tract 
 
Table 5. Diversity increase and decrease (2000-2010) by initial level of diversity in 
2000 




Increase 5,983 12.42 52.0 
Decrease 5,540 11.5 48.0 
Medium Initial 
Diversity 
Increase 10,956 22.75 76.2 
Decrease 3,436 7.14 23.8 
Low Initial 
Diversity 
Increase 18,178 37.75 81.7 








B) Diversity on the CBSA-Level (Core Based Statistical Area) 
At the CBSA-level, the increase in diversity between 2000 and 2010 is even more 
pronounced than for the tract-level, with only a small share of cities showing diversity 
declines (Figure 3). In fact, compared to 71 percent of all tracts, 90 percent of all CBSA’s 
underwent diversity growth. 









Map 5. Simpson Diversity, City-Level 
	
 
Map 5 replicates Map 4, but diversity is measured for Core Based Statistical Areas 
(CBSA). As a reminder, a CBSA is a designated geographic boundary, which usually 
consists of several counties conjoined by an urban center of not less than 10,000 
residents.  
As the Map 5 demonstrates, high levels of diversity on the micro- and metropolitan level 
are mainly concentrated at the southern border and in coastal regions, with many of the 
CBSAs in these regions having a higher than 50 percent chance of two randomly drawn 




CBSAs around traditional gateway cities of high-immigration. Among the 100 biggest 
metropolitan areas, San Jose had the highest diversity rates, followed by New York City.  
As I have pointed out before, cross-sectional snapshots of diversity across the country are 
helpful in understanding racial and ethnic out-group perceptions and behavior; however, 
similar to the above tract-level demographic analysis, CBSA-level diversity growth rates 
are the focus of this study. Overall, diversity in micropolitan areas (containing between 
10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants) increased by 21.47 percent, while that in metropolitan 
areas (containing more than 50,000 inhabitants) increased by 26.31 percent. This 
indicates that it is not just large metropolitan areas that are subject to diversification, but 
also smaller ones.  
While CBSA and tract-level maps look similar, we see interesting discrepancies between 
the maps depicting diversity change rates between 2000 and 2010. Tract-level changes in 
diversity were spread across the Unites States in both non-traditional areas of migration 
like Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin (many of which have change rates of 70-250 percent), 
and traditional areas of migration like vast areas in New York and California (Map 3). 
However, the map clearly shows that there are many tracts that experienced decreases or 
no changes in diversity, too, and they were mainly centered in the Mountain, Southwest 
and Mid-Atlantic region of the U.S.. In terms of CBSAs (Map 6), however, decreases in 
diversity or no change in diversity are mostly visible for the Southern states (excluding 
Florida), while increases in diversity were more pronounced for the East and West Great 
Lakes, North and Central Appalachia, Florida, Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. Similar to 




also a substantial share of CBSAs with diversity growth the Midwest, Northeast and the 
northern part of the West (Maine, in particular).   
Map 6. Change Rate Simpson Diversity, CBSA-Level 
 
 
In correspondence with the demographic analysis of tracts (a), the Map 7 illustrates three 
initial levels for all of the CBSAs broken down by whether there was an increase in 
diversity or a decrease (or rather no change). Bear in mind that red CBSAs mark high 
initial diversity, purple CBSAs medium initial diversity and blue CBSAs low initial 




denote increases. While the map is evocative of the tract-level map, it is noticeable that 
there was almost no diversity reduction in CBSAs between 2000 and 2010—just 10 
percent overall (Table 6). In fact, the highest diversity decrease was observed for high-
diversity cities (3.66 percent of all tracts). In other terms, just 22.9 percent of high-
diversity CBSAs became more homogenous. Of all CBSAs only 1.05 percent 
experienced homogeneity decreases in medium-level diversity and 0.84 percent in low-
diversity contexts.  








Table 6.  Diversity increase and decrease (2000-2010) by initial level of diversity in 
2000, CBSA 





Increase 236 24.71 87.1 
Decrease 35 3.66 22.9 
Medium Initial 
Diversity 
Increase 282 29.53 96.6 
Decrease 10 1.05 3.4 
Low Initial 
Diversity 
Increase 384 40.21 98 
Decrease 8 0.84 2 
 
Summing up, there are two main insights we can derive from this part of the demographic 
analysis of diversity: 
a) The map and tables underline that nearly three quarters of all tracts and almost 96 
percent of the CBSAs in the U.S. experience diversity growths. Increases in diversity 
do not just pertain to traditional cities of in-migration and diversity, but were actually 
most pronounced in low-diversity cities and tracts. This result stresses that much of 
the current increase in diversity is happening in America’s rural areas, suburbs and 
low-diversity communities, which is why subsequent analysis of individual reactions 
to heterogenization need to be broken down by initial level of diversity.  
b) It is equally important to study diversity at the CBSA and tract-level. CBSA and 
tract-level changes in diversity do not necessarily overlap. Diversity reduction was 
generally more prevailing for tracts than for CBSAs. Overall, only 5.5 percent of all 
CBSAs homogenized between 2000 and 2010, while almost a quarter of all tracts in 




Although attention will be paid to both CBSAs and tracts, the analysis in the 
following two chapters will focus more on the tract-level as a proxy for people’s 
neighborhoods. The level of heterogeneity that individuals experience on a day-to-
day basis depends on how heterogeneous their immediate living context is. As the 
maps illustrate, diverse micro- and metropolitan areas might be marked by 
microsegregation that is not captured through such highly aggregated boundaries 
(Lichter, Parisi, & Taquino, 2015). 
 
 
Diversity and Immigrant Dispersion in the U.S. 
 
In this section, I examine the geographic relationship between the rising share of 
immigrants in the population and changing ethno-racial diversity. 
In the past 50 years, migrants have become an important part of the American social 
structure. In 1960, roughly 9.7 immigrants lived in the U.S.. This group accounted for 
only about 5.4 percent of the population. According to the last census, in 2010, the U.S. 
has about 40 million immigrants (12.9 percent). The immigrant segment of American 
social structure has thus increased almost fourfold since 1960. The U.S. is becoming 
increasingly more mixed, as nearly a quarter of the population either is a first- or second-
generation immigrant. It is foreseeable that the migrant population will continue to grow 




Map 8. Immigrant Share by Tract, 2010 
 




Similar to diversity, migrants are not evenly spread across the country, but are concentrated 
in large cities and industrial agglomeration centers (Map 8 and 9). In particular, areas like 
the Boston-New York-Washington Corridor, southern Florida, Seattle, Chicago, Miami, San 
Francisco and Los Angeles have high immigrant concentrations. However, immigrants have 
increasingly moved to rural and suburban areas in the United States (Lichter, 2012). For 
instance, there are high concentrations of immigrants in rural areas of Idaho, Texas and 
Kansas.  
Doubtlessly, immigration increases diversity. The increased presence of immigrants and 
their children has diversified the racial makeup of the country, especially with regards to 
Hispanic and Asian population shares. According to Census data for 2010, approximately a 
quarter of the immigrant population is Asian, while more than half is Hispanic. A scatterplot 
(Figure 4) and simple correlation manifest this relationship as highly significant for the 
tract-level: diversity and migrant share are positively associated. Roughly 25 percent of the 
variability in Simpson diversity scores can be attributed to the percentage of immigrants in 
2000, while the adjusted R-Square for 2010 is 0.23. For both 2000 and 2010, a one percent 
higher immigration share is associated with a 0.6 higher score on the Simpson Diversity 
Index. For CBSAs, this relationship is similar (Figure 5): Explaining 22 percent of the 
variability, a one-unit increase in immigrant percentage is significantly associated with 0.42 










Figure 4. Scatterplot Diversity and Immigration, 2000 and 2010, Tract 
  
 
Figure 5. Scatterplot Diversity and Immigration, 2000 and 2010, CBSA 
 
 
With regard to the change score scatterplot (Figure 6), we can state that changes in diversity 
between 2000 and 2010 is substantially associated with the logged change scores in 




variance at the tract-level, a one-percent increase in logged immigration percentage is 
associated with an increase of 0.19 on the Simpson Diversity Index between the two time 
points. For the CBSA-level scatterplot (Figure 7), a one-unit increase in logged immigration 
percentage is associated with an increase of 0.45.  
 
Figure 6. Change-Score Scatterplot Diversity and Immigration, 2000 and 2010, Tract 
 






Nevertheless, immigration and diversity should not be treated as identical (Wright et al., 
2014). Since the association between diversity and immigration explains roughly a quarter 
of the overall variability, there remains a substantial divide between the two factors. The 
following maps (Maps 10 and 11) are bivariate choropleth maps, which display both the 
immigrant share and diversity score in 2010 on one map. Map 10 measures these variables 
at the tract-level, and Map 11 at the CBSA-level. To distinguish between the two variables 
different sets of color were used to show the different levels of relationships. The red shades 
represent the percentage of immigrants and the blue colors represent the Simpson diversity 
score. Both maps show that there is considerable overlap in diversity and immigration, for 
instance along the California coast, parts of Texas and Florida. The coincidence is most 
obvious for the CBSA-map.  
However, not all high-immigration tracts have high levels of diversity, too. This becomes 
particularly clear when looking at the tract-level map. Zooming into New York City, for 
instance, we can see that the city itself is dark purple/brown, pointing to both high diversity 
and high concentrations of immigrants. Interestingly, tracts surrounding New York City, in 
New Jersey for example, are not very diverse, but display high levels of immigrants living 
there (percentages between 5-20 percent). In the tracts surrounding Morris Town, NJ, for 
instance, the relatively high levels of immigration result mostly from its large Hispanic 
population. In this case, the low diversity score stems from the low presence of blacks and 
Asians. In Spokane, WA, 82 percent of the population is white, but 38 percent of its 




such discrepancy is the southern tip of Texas: Many tracts here show very high immigrant 
shares; however, diversity is quite low as most of these tracts are majority-Hispanic. In Rio 
Grande city, for instance, the likelihood of randomly selecting a person with a different race 
or ethnicity is only 8 percent (94.3 percent of the population identify as Hispanic), while the 
overall city has an immigrant percentage of 30 percent in 2010. 
Having said that, high-diversity tracts and CBSAs do not necessarily imply high 
immigration, either. In fact, many tracts are only blue (high diversity only), especially from 
the coastal area of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, along the Mississippi and into 
Louisiana. Cities like Baton Rouge (3.5 percent immigrants, but 50 percent of randomly 
selecting a person outside of own race or ethnicity) have a less than 10 percent Hispanic 
population and very low immigration, but states like Georgia, North and South Carolina 
have seen a rise in Hispanic population share. Many areas in the U.S. historically have an 
ethnically and racially mixed population, with large shares of African-Americans and 









In conclusion, diversity and immigration are highly correlated, but do not always go hand in 
hand.  
Although the underlying hypothesis is that increasing shares of immigrants are connected 
with increasing diversity and immigrants spread out geographically in the 2000-2010 period, 
diversity growth does not only take place in areas of high immigration. While the U.S. as a 
whole has gotten more diverse, high increases in diversity are found particularly in many 
neighborhoods with low percentages of foreign-born population in 2000 (see Figure 8 
below). While diversity and immigrant percentage are correlated, diversity growth is most 
pronounced in low-level immigration tracts.  
Figure 8. Scatterplot of Simpson Diversity in 2000 and 2010, color-coded by immigrant 
percentage in 2000 (Tract) * 
 
* The red line indicates no change in tract diversity between 2000 and 2010 






Another way to show this is: 
 
Figure 9. Diversity increase rates (2000-2010) by immigrant percentage (2000) 
 
 
Summing up the link between immigration and diversity, there are two main results: 
1. While diversity has increased and the foreign-born population has undoubtedly 
contributed to that growth, diversity and immigration percentage should not be 
conflated. On the one hand, there is high diversity in low-immigration areas, because 
some minorities, such as African Americans and American Indians, do not have 
immigrant origins.  Furthermore, there are minorities including Asians and 
Hispanics, some of whose families have been in the U.S. for three or more 
generation and are therefore not counted towards recent immigrants. On the other 




concerns tracts with a disproportionately high immigrant share that have reached 
their “tipping point” and turned into a majority-minority tract. 
2. Furthermore, diversity mainly increases in areas of low-immigration percentages (in 
2000).  
3. Still, immigration and diversity are closely intertwined. Simpson diversity scores are 
highly correlated with the percentage of immigrants, and much of the diversification 
stems from immigration increases between 2000 and 2010. In line with trends we 
find for diversity, immigrants have also moved outside of traditional immigrant 
gateways further bolstering rural and suburban heterogenization.   
 
 
Changes in the Racial and Ethnic Composition in the PALS Dataset 
 
The study has several limitations that will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI of this 
dissertation. However, the relatively small sample size of only 1,314 respondents that were 
followed across wave 1 and wave 2 and the use of predetermined primary sampling units 
(PSUs) as the basis for random sampling need to be discussed here in order to establish 
national representativeness of the data. As explained earlier, the sample selection process is 
based on 60 PSUs, which might also cause the sample to not represent U.S. demographics. 
Furthermore, the study oversampled ethnoracial minorities. Using complex survey weights 
provided by the PALS researchers (accounting for nonresponse, clustered sampling and 
selection probability bias), the following weighted table was constructed comparing PALS 




Table 7. Comparison of PALS and national averages, unweighted and weighted (Total 
number of tracts and CBSA's in brackets) 


































































Weighted 23.42 23.12 
 
The eye-catching difference between national and unweighted PALS-means is due to the 
selectivity bias in the survey design: On average, PALS overrepresents ethnoracial 
minorities, who tend to live in more diverse neighborhoods, to achieve an adequate quantity 
of respondents in those groups. While there were 63.7 percent non-Hispanic whites in 2010, 
the sample contains only 48.4 percent non-Hispanic whites.  
After the survey weights were applied, the main demographic variables in the PALS sample 
can be said to be representative of national CBSA- and tract-level diversity, immigration 
percentages in 2010 and changes in diversity scores for both CBSAs and tracts between 




Changes in Diversity by Mover-Stayer-Status 
 
Much of the following tract-level analysis will separate outcomes by movers (34 percent of 
the sample) and stayers (66 percent) as these two groups might experience changes in 
diversity differently. As pointed out before, the CBSA-level analysis does not contain a 
distinction between movers and stayers, because movers who relocated from one CBSA to 
another made up only 8 percent of the sample. Put differently, most movers changed 
residences within CBSA-boundaries. For the tract-level, there are many explanations why 
we might expect different effects of diversity for movers and stayers, four of which I will 
focus on below.  
1. First of all, movers might be moving away from diversity. In general, most studies have 
demonstrated that diverse areas are less coveted than areas with low diversity, especially by 
whites (Krysan, Couper, Farley, & Forman, 2009). In particular, families with children try 
to avoid heterogeneous neighborhoods, as contextual diversity is often equated with lower 
school quality (Owens, 2017). Furthermore, diverse neighborhoods are often associated with 
negative characteristics, such as higher perceived crime rates and lower socioeconomic 
status (Quillian & Pager, 2001). However, concluding that movers always move to less 
diverse and “better” neighborhoods is oversimplified, as the table shows. I hypothesize that 
while some individual movers try to make moves to better neighborhoods or housing, others 
might be forced to move due to eviction, foreclosures or other involuntary push factors 
(Desmond, 2017; R. J. Sampson & Sharkey, 2008). 
While we can assume that increases in diversity are perceived more positively by movers 




not necessarily a choice based on preference. While research has demonstrated that the main 
intention behind individuals’ relocations is to improve their living situation by moving into 
less disadvantaged, less dense and better-educated neighborhoods9, individuals might face 
constraints that make such an “upward” move unattainable. Similarly, people that 
experience diversity growth in their neighborhoods might find themselves unable to move 
due to financial constraints. These hypotheses will be tested towards the end of Chapter V 
through income-subgroups arguing that individuals with higher incomes might be less likely 
to relocate involuntarily when compared to low-income movers.  
2. Secondly, movers and stayers might experience a different quality of diversity. Increases 
in diversity for stayers might feel more gradual than for movers, who move to an entirely 
new neighborhood. As a reminder, the Simpson diversity index, by construction, does not 
capture the presence of all five racial and ethnic groups included in this study (white, black, 
Asian, Hispanic, other), but the likelihood of two randomly chosen individuals to be 
different from each other. Thus, moving from a 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian 
neighborhood to a 50 percent Hispanic and 50 percent black neighborhood might feel very 
different for movers, but will not differ in terms of diversity level.   
Moreover, the quantity of change is not comparable for movers and stayers. In fact, Figure 
10 and Table 8 show that diversity experiences differ strongly for movers and stayers. 
Overall, stayers experience a 15.2 percent increase in diversity between 2000 and 2010, 
while movers increase rates are at 28.3 percent.  
																																								 																				
9 https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-574.pdf 
David Ihrke, Reason for Moving: 2012 to 2013 (Population Characteristics), U.S. 





Figure 10. Scatterplot Simpson Diversity by Mover/Stayer 
 
 
The mover-stayer difference varies by in low, medium and high initial diversity settings as 
well. Movers have a higher percentage of people initially living in high-diversity 
neighborhoods (36 percent). Those movers who initially lived in highly heterogeneous 
contexts moved to neighborhoods that were 18 percent less diverse, pointing to an out-
migration into more homogeneity. In comparison, stayers living in high-diversity 
neighborhoods experienced a -5.6% drop in diversity between 2006 and 2012. As I have 
pointed out before, the biggest gains in diversity can be observed for movers and stayers in 
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neighborhoods with more than double the initial diversity rate.  Stayers experienced a 58 
percent gain in diversity in low-diversity neighborhoods.  
 
Table 8. Movers and Stayers: Where do they go? (Tract-level), Percentage Rate 
Increase in Diversity by Mover/Stayer and Initial Level of Diversity 
STAYER Frequency Percent Diversity Change Rate  
OVERALL 
 
796 100 15.23% 
Low Initial Diversity 273 34.96 58.89% 
Medium Initial Diversity 259 33.16 12.29% 
High Initial Diversity 249 31.88 -5.56% 
    
MOVER Frequency Percent Diversity Change Rate  
OVERALL 
 










Medium Initial Diversity 142 33.81 14.31% 
High Initial Diversity 151 35.95 -18.02% 
 
3. Movers might be different from stayers in terms of their social capital. Studies point out 
that people with high levels of social capital show better attitudes towards immigrants, even 
if models control for income and education (Gordon & Maharaj, 2015; Herreros & Criado, 
2009). On the one hand, individuals with higher levels of social capital might be less likely 
to move in the first place, while movers might have fewer social ties and community 
involvement hindering them from relocating. Movers might be less “successful” at 
establishing ties than those individuals that remained in the neighborhood (Pettit & 
McLanahan, 2003). On the other hand, moving can also have a disruptive element to it 
(Briggs, 1997), as relocations to a new neighborhood decrease social capital even if movers 




4. Scholars have pointed out that people who move to diversity for whatever reasons might 
experience anticipation effects (Lancee & Schaeffer, 2015a). While most people move to 
find a living situation where they feel their needs and preferences are better met, movers to 
growing diversity might know that they are moving to a more heterogeneous neighborhood 
and anticipate threats to their social status. In general parlance, the change in attitudes does 
not necessarily happen after the relocation to the new neighborhood, but before: “People 
plan to move and thus know where they will live in the future. […] In other words, once 
people know that they are going to move to a more diverse neighborhood, the outlook of 
heightened competition over resources and conflicting ways of life might start to threaten 
them, resulting in increasing concerns prior to the event of moving itself” (ibid, p. 4).  
All in all, these four factors (nature of diversity, involuntary relocation, social capital 
differences for movers, and anticipation effects) reinforce the hypothesis that movers might 
show less minority-friendly attitudes and confirm the need for separate subgroup models.  
In order to establish beforehand if different reactions towards diversity growth might stem 
from differences in movers and stayers characteristics, it is crucial to look at the summary 









Table 9. Descriptive Statistics (Overall, Stayers, Movers), 2006 * 
  OVERALL STAYER MOVER 
Neighborhood Level Indicators  
  
 
Simpson Diversity 2010 0.38 0.37 0.40 
 
Simpson Diversity 2000 0.36 0.35 0.38 
 
Change Rate Simpson Diversity 
Rate 0.23 0.15 0.28 
 % Immigrants 2010 0.17 0.18 0.15 
 % Immigrants 2000 0.15 0.16 0.13 
 Change Rate % Immigrants 0.25 0.27 0.24 
     
 
Socioeconomic Status of 
Neighborhood (% College Degree, 
2006) 0.27 0.32 0.25 
 
Socioeconomic Status of 
Neighborhood (2012) 0.29 0.33 0.34 
Basic Demographics   
  
 
Age 43.31 46.95 36.44 
 
Male 0.38 0.40 0.35 
 
Parents Born in U.S.  0.71 0.70 0.72 
Education 
   
 
No High School 0.12 0.11 0.13 
 
High School 0.25 0.28 0.21 
 
College 0.23 0.21 0.25 
 
Bachelor 0.24 0.24 0.23 
 
More than a Master 0.15 0.14 0.16 
Complete Trust in  
  
 
Family 0.82 0.82 0.82 
 
Neighbors 0.17 0.19 0.11 
 
Friends 0.53 0.54 0.52 
 
Strangers 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Threat 
   
 
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood 0.37 0.39 0.33 
 
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood 
(2012) 0.37 0.39 0.32 
 
Decrease of Own Race in 
Neighborhood 0.22 0.23 0.20 





As shown in the preliminary statistics in Table 9, movers and stayers have similar levels of 
initial diversity. As pointed out before, diversity seems to have risen across both groups 
during that time span, although diversity increase rates are higher for movers than for 
stayers.  
On average, movers are 10 years younger and have a five-percentage point higher share of 
women than stayers. Furthermore, they seem to live in neighborhoods with a lower 
socioeconomic status (measured as the percentage of above-25-year-olds who finished at 
least college). The difference in socio-economic status between movers and stayers is still 
evident after the move: While stayers lived in neighborhoods with an average 58 percent of 
college-educated adults, movers relocated to neighborhoods with a 12 percentage points 
lower socioeconomic status in 2012. This observation partially confirms that movers might 
not end up relocating to “better” neighborhoods, but might find themselves unable to move 
to more affluent contexts.  
Seventy-one percent of all parents were born in the U.S., which does not differ substantially 
across subgroups. Human capital, which is measured through education, does not show any 
peculiarities, either. Trust did not differ much for movers and stayers, except for movers’ 
lower trust in neighbors, which points to lower social capital. Interestingly, 39 percent of 
stayers felt unsafe in their neighborhood, which was only true for 33 percent of the movers. 
After the relocation, these percentages had not changed substantially. The fear of the own 
race declining in the neighborhood was equally present in both groups. On average, movers 




In order to find out whether the stayers are significantly different from the movers, a logit 
model for the probability of a person remaining or leaving his or her neighborhood as a 
function of the following explanatory variables was implemented:  
Table 10. Logistic Regression Mover/Stayer (0,1) 2012, predicted by 2006 controls 
Predicting the Likelihood that an Individual moved between 2006 and 2012 
 Odds Ratio (z) 
Age 





Male 0.851 -0.18 
(No High School Diploma)   
High School 0.538** -1.81 
College 0.998 0.39 






General Trust towards Others 0.825* -0.34 
Trust towards Family and Relatives 0.900* -1.12 
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood 0.626*** -4.00 
Decrease of Own Race in 
Neighborhood 
1.048 0.69 






Constant 5.522*** 1.775 
 
 
Table 10 shows that higher ages make an individual less likely to move, broadly confirming 
the summary statistics above. In other words, movers tend to be significantly younger. 
Whether someone was white or non-white was not significantly associated with a higher 
propensity to move or remain in the same neighborhood. Furthermore, general trust towards 
others and trust towards family and relatives is associated with a lower likelihood of moving 
out of the current neighborhood, which adds to the earlier observation that movers have 
lower trust in family and neighbors, both before and after the move. Educational status did 




to move than people without high school diplomas and individuals with college education. 
Income was negatively associated with an individual’s likelihood to move, meaning that 
movers tend to have lower incomes. Stayers feel less safe in their neighborhood when 
compared to movers, even after income is controlled. Individuals with parents born in the 
U.S. are more likely to move when compared to individuals with foreign-born parents.   
In the following, the same analysis is conducted amended by Simpson diversity scores 
(interacted with non-Hispanic white/non-white status) for 2000 to test whether movers are 
fleeing diversity in 2000. As shown in Table 11, there was also no significant relationship 
between the propensity to move for whites and non-whites in relation to local diversity 
rates. However, this does not mean that whites do not avoid high-diversity neighborhoods. 
Similar to the selection bias in and out of diverse areas discussed earlier, those whites and 
non-whites living in high-diversity might have chosen to move here based on a preference 
for diversity.  
Table 12, on the other hand, shows that whites tend to move as diversity increases between 
2000 and 2010. This confirms the findings of countless studies showing that whites are 
more reluctant to live in racially and ethnically mixed neighborhoods and still prefer to live 
in traditionally white residential contexts (Crowder & South, 2008; Lichter et al., 2015; 






Table 11. Logistic Regression Mover/Stayer (0,1), predicted by 2006 controls, including 
Simpson Diversity (ranging from 0 to 1) 
Predicting the Likelihood that an Individual moved between 2006 and 2012 
	 Odds Ratio (z) 
Interaction (Diversity 2000 * White) 1.88 0.85 
Interaction (Diversity 2000 * Non-White) 0.78 0.56 
Age 0.949*** -10.43 
Male 0.97 -0.18 
(No High School Diploma) 
High School 0.631* -1.82 
College 1.104 0.38 
More than College 1.145 0.53 
Income 0.924*** -4.48 
General Trust in Others 0.975 -0.33 
Trust towards Family and Relatives 0.913 -1.24 
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood 0.546*** -4.06 
Decrease of Own Race in Neighborhood 1.077 0.41 
Parents born in U.S.  1.313 1.51 
Constant 11.944*** 5.91 
 
 
Table 12. Logistic Regression Mover/Stayer (0,1) 2012, predicted by 2006 controls, 
including Growth Rate Simpson Diversity (2000-2010) 
Predicting the Likelihood that an Individual moved between 2006 and 2012 
 
Odds Ratio (z) 
Interaction (Diversity INCREASE 2000-2010 * White) 1.002** 2.17 
Interaction (Diversity INCREASE 2000-2010 * Non-White) 0.955 -0.27 
Age 0.944*** -10.63 
Male 0.981 -0.13 
(No High School Diploma) 
  High School 0.628* -1.82 
College 1.067 0.25 
More than College 1.145 0.53 
Income 0.926*** -4.24 
General Trust in Others 0.971 -0.38 
Trust towards Family and Relatives 0.903 -1.39 
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood 0.556*** -3.87 
Decrease of Own Race in Neighborhood 1.155 0.82 
Parents born in U.S.  1.263 1.34 





Summing up, we can expect different reactions for movers and stayers, because the quality 
and quantity of diversity change differs dramatically on all levels of initial diversity. Since 
diversity change rates are typically lower for stayers and the overall change is subtler, I 
hypothesize that stayers react more positively to diversity growth.  
Furthermore, there are significant differences between movers and stayers that deserve 
closer attention. Most importantly, movers live in neighborhoods with lower socioeconomic 
statuses and seem to have lower incomes (which might be due to their younger ages). These 
factors might lead to less minority-friendly attitudes as diversity increases. To rule out that 
differences in movers and stayers stem from unequal socioeconomic backgrounds, separate 
income models (high, medium and low income) will be implemented. These models will 
help us understand if movers’ and stayers’ out-group attitudes are influenced by their 
resources and by their ability to move to neighborhoods that meet their needs and 
ethnoracial preferences.  
 
Changes in Diversity by White and Non-White 
 
While diversity and diversity increase rates need to be analyzed separately for movers and 
stayers, it is important to incorporate a distinction by non-Hispanic white and non-white 
respondents as well. As we have seen in the model above whites show a higher propensity 
of relocating in the face of diversity growth.  




whites generally cluster on the higher end of the spectrum (high diversity living contexts in 
both 2006 and 2012), while whites concentrate in low-diversity settings.  
 
Figure 11. Scatterplot Simpson Diversity by White/Non-White Dichotomy 
 
 
While there is an overall increase in diversity, the change is much higher for movers than 
for stayers.  In addition, diversity change also differs substantially for white and non-white 
movers and stayers. As shown in Table 13, there is considerable variation in white and non-
white increase rates: On average, stayers experience diversity growth of roughly 15 percent. 
White stayers’ neighborhoods undergo an increase of 26 percent, while non-whites’ 
neighborhoods change only by 9 percent, which seems to be due to differences in initial 
diversity. As a reminder, initial diversity scores for non-whites are 0.47 and for whites 0.29. 




levels of initial diversity do not differ much, but since there is a higher percentage of non-
white stayers the overall increase rate is suppressed.  
For movers, the overall picture is similar but more drastic. Overall, movers relocated to 
neighborhoods that were almost 1.6 times as diverse as their previous neighborhood. 
Growth rates were 83 percent for white movers and 33 percent for non-white movers. This 
overall discrepancy mainly stems from higher percentages of non-whites in high-diversity 
tracts.  
Overall, we can conclude that the dynamics behind diversity increases are similar for whites 
and non-whites. However, overall whites see more dramatic increases in diversity between 
2000 and 2010, because they start off in more homogeneous neighborhoods when compared 
to non-whites.  
 





OVERALL 26.16% 9.04% 15.21% 
Low Initial Diversity 60.48% 54.02% 58.89% 
Medium Initial Diversity 12.32% 12.25% 12.29% 
High Initial Diversity -4.74% -6.02% -5.56% 




OVERALL 83.62% 33.56% 28.34% 
Low Initial Diversity 208.47% 174.41% 75.06% 
Medium Initial Diversity 15.85% 12.45% 14.31% 








Based on the insights from Chapter III, there are several conclusions that need to be drawn 
for the operationalization of the analysis in Chapter IV and V: 
1. Diversity increase rates at various levels of measurement show similar geographic 
patterns across the U.S., but should not be conflated. Instead, the analysis should be 
carefully dissected by CBSA- and tract-level. Overall, diversity increase is much more 
pronounced at the micro- and metropolitan level when compared to tracts.  
2. Diversity growth rates are highest in low-diversity contexts. Therefore, the analysis 
needs to be broken down into separate levels of initial diversity.  
3. Diversity increase rates and their effects should be studied separately for movers and 
stayers. Movers and stayers differ on a range of characteristics, including the quality and 
quantity of diversity increase experienced.  




















Relying on the contact and group threat narratives, the first analytic part of the dissertation 
examines the link between changing diversity levels in both tracts and CBSAs, on the one 
hand, and changes in friendship across racial boundaries, on the other.  
Out-group interaction frequency can be seen as an indicator of the presence and intensity of 
interethnic and interracial interactions. Lacking contact to racial and ethnic out-group 
members and out-group friends might be an indicator of limited interaction across racial 
lines and possibly also attitudinal impediments to contact. While diversity undoubtedly 
offers a bigger heterogeneous pool from which to chose someone to talk to or spend time 
with, the circumstances under which people who experience increasing heterogeneity in 
their day-to-day environment actually end up with more heterogeneous circles of friends 










For a long time researchers assumed that contact and friendships across racial boundaries 
were rare because the social separation between members of different ethnic and racial 
groups was too great. The segregation between members of different ethnoracial groups was 
seen as the major cause of low levels of interracial and interethnic bridging. The similarity 
of racial and/or ethnic origins in segregated communities was seen as the most important 
obstacle for building cross-ethnic relationships.  
Segregation in the U.S. is still high, but it has declined (Iceland, 2004a; Lichter, 2013b) 
giving way to higher levels of neighborhood diversity across the country. As diversity rises 
in neighborhoods, a major challenge lies in moving from numerical diversity (the presence 
of different races and ethnicities in one place) to interactional diversity (contact and 
friendship across group boundaries). As the U.S. is steadily diversifying, it is necessary to 
know if, and under which conditions, heightened levels of heterogeneity in communities and 
cities lead to more social contact. While attitudes towards racial and ethnic others and the 
willingness to form out-group bonds are undoubtedly related, scholars have focused on 
diversity causally impacting prejudice, while the analysis of contact as an outcome has been 
neglected and treated as a mediator rather than a dependent variable.  
As I have pointed out before, there is still no firm conclusion as to whether diversity 
increases or decreases racial and ethnic out-group interactions. Based on the idea that 
limited ethnoracial out-group exposure impedes the formation of inter-group bridges, higher 
levels of diversity should impact these ties positively. Today's younger generation 




compared to older generations (Lichter, 2013), which would support the hypothesis that 
growing diversity promotes cross-group contacts. Also, rising levels of intermarriage are 
consistent with this idea (Livingston & Brown, 2017).  
More generally, however, the relevant findings are rather controversial and suffer from the 
primary reliance of cross-sectional data, which prohibits the analysis of changes across 
different time periods and introduces a lack of directionality and selection bias. On the one 
hand, scholars have demonstrated that increases in contextual heterogeneity can lead to 
more positive contact, which then in turn increasing exposure will lead to more out-group 
empathy (Laurence, Schmid, & Hewstone, 2017). The term positive contact refers to 
interactions that serve a common goal or interest, while negative interactions mainly refer to 
instances of harassment and insult. Positive contact has mainly been observed in the school 
and college-context: Friendship segregation in schools is largely driven by residential 
segregation (Hallinan & Smith, 1985; Mouw & Entwisle, 2006) and seems to decrease if 
courses and extracurricular activities are inclusive to different races and ethnicities (Moody, 
2001).  In colleges and schools, interracial and interethnic dorms and learning settings have 
been shown to encourage adolescent friendships between members of different racial and 
ethnic groups (De Souza Briggs, 2007; Fischer, 2008; Gaither & Sommers, 2013; Moody, 
2001; Quillian, 2002; Stearns, Buchmann, & Bonneau, 2009). Outside of the school context, 
research shows that meaningful bridging across racial lines is more common for people in 
neighborhoods marked by high levels of heterogeneity (Vervoort, Flap, & Dagevos, 2011).  
On the other hand, diversity growth can also lead to a hunkering down of social networks in 




extensively covered in the theory section in Chapter I. Contradicting the literature above, 
scholars have demonstrated that there are fewer diverse friendships in classes with a high 
proportion of different cultural groups (Chan & Birman, 2009). It is a characteristic of peer 
relationships that they are within the same race and ethnicity, the same sex and also similar 
age (Hartup, 1996; Shrum, Cheek, & Hunter, 1988). Especially when it comes to best 
friends and intimate relationships, the diversification of friendships is overshadowed by the 
persisting color lines of in-group bridging. Recent research in the Netherlands has shown 
that social networks, such as Facebook, are segregated along lines of ethnicity (Hofstra, 
Corten, van Tubergen, & Ellison, 2017). In an analysis of a random selection of wedding 
pictures found online researchers found that most of the guests invited to weddings 
belonged to the same racial or ethnic group as the inviting couple, demonstrating that 
intimate interracial friendships still seem to be rare especially with regards to White-Black 
friendships (Berry, 2006).  
As stated in the theory section in Chapter I, many scholars present a negative image of how 
diversity impacts social networks. Previous research offers numerous explanations for the 
deterioration of communities and lower levels of interethnic racial and ethnic interaction, 
some of which focus on ethno-racial compositions such as ethnic polarization and 
heterogeneity. As a brief summary of the in-depth theoretical discussion in Chapter I, the 
most widely cited approaches are inter-group competition and defended neighborhoods 
theories, which focus on out-group proportions, out-group in-migration, or ethno-racial 
polarization. Furthermore, theories about general community erosion and disorganization in 
ethnically heterogeneous settings have been widely used to explain changes in 




As discussed above, there are several issues with prior research on diversity and out-group 
bridging. While there is a lot of research that describes the negative effect of increases in 
diversity on social cohesion, out-group trust, neighborhood attachment, xenophobia and 
prejudice, there is no research specifically analyzing if patterns of interaction change due to 
neighborhood or city changes in heterogeneity. While the effects of inter-group contact on 
outward perception and attitudes have been studied extensively (Christ et al., 2014; 
Edmonds & Killen, 2009; Powers & Ellison, 1995), the causal contextual diversity effects 
on contact have been largely disregarded in the U.S. One reason is the unavailability of 
panel data that can measure the changes in individuals’ interaction across ethnoracial lines.  
The second difficulty with the current state of research is the threat to external validity of 
conclusions from statistical analysis. Most of the research in this field has been conducted 
on the development of friendships in schools and colleges (Fischer, 2011; Levin et al., 2003; 
Martin et al., 2010) giving us an incomplete picture of the formation of out-group 
friendships and contacts in every-day life. While youth research is being increasingly 
discovered as an object of investigation and offers valuable insights into the characteristics 
and formation of interracial and interethnic peer relations, diverse friendships between 
adults have rarely been in the center of the interest. For this reason, little is still known about 
how interracial and interethnic friendships arise in neighborhoods and other non-
institutional contexts and which factors contribute to them.  
But why is the study of friendly contact across racial lines so important? First of all, 
friendships arise on a voluntary basis, bring a higher degree of closeness compared to 




Pettigrew (1998) has demonstrated that not every form of contact establishes bridges 
between different races and ethnicities, friendships are the most important for this purpose 
and therefore crucial to the understanding of the effects of shifting population makeups. 
Friendships between people of different races can also be seen as a mix between bonding 
and bridging social capital (Putnam 2001). Bonding describes close relationships within 
homogenous groups marked by high levels of emotionality and trust, while bridging refers 
to contacts that span boundaries such as racial and ethnic disparities and are oftentimes 
comparatively weaker.  
Secondly, the investigation of friendship is closely aligned with the theories explaining 
changing attitudes and patterns of interethnic and interracial interaction in light of increasing 
heterogeneity: following the contact hypothesis of Allport (Allport, 1979b), numerous 
analyses have been conducted on how interethnic and interracial interaction and friendship 
affect prejudices and xenophobia. Research has demonstrated that people who are exposed 
to cross-group friendships subsequently make more easily friends outside of their own racial 
and ethnic group and feel less anxious about ethnoracial others (Page-Gould, Mendoza-
Denton, & Tropp, 2008). Thus, increases in diversity might influence friendship patterns, 
and diverse friendships, in turn, have been shown to spur even more development of 
multiracial and multiethnic networks. As explained earlier, interethnic and interracial 
conversations and interactions are crucial for resulting attitudes, social capital and collective 
efficacy ( Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997) in neighborhoods. Psychologists Pettigrew 
and Tropp found a very robust relationship between contact and prejudices in their extensive 
meta-analysis on the basis of more than 500 studies with 250,000 participants (2006). The 




While the above studies demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between contact 
and prejudice, it remains unclear how out-group bridging positively reduces prejudice. 
Pettigrew and Tropp followed up on this question in 2008 in a meta-analysis, in which they 
investigated the mediating processes in which contact is transferred to more positive 
attitudes. The meta-analysis shows that it is primarily empathy towards the minority group 
that accelerates these processes. The reduction of anxiety towards the other group also plays 
a role, but it has a weaker effect than empathy. The increasing knowledge about the other 
group is of much lesser, but significant importance.  
Finally it is important to point out that interethnic and interracial friendships are associated 
with numerous positive characteristics. Adolescents who have diverse circles of friends have 
been shown to be more socially competent (Lease & Blake, 2005), and perform better 
academically (Wells, Fox, & Cordova-Cobo, 2016) when compared to people without such 
friendships. Above all, young people who are new to a country and who are part of the first 
generation of immigrants benefit from friendships to young people without an immigration 
background by learning the new culture and learning the language of the immigration 
country, and often show fewer social behavior problems and better school outcomes than 










While previous research has analyzed peer group composition and absolute or proportional 
number of best friends with a different racial or ethnic background (Doyle & Kao, 2007; 
Martin et al., 2010; Moody, 2001), this study focuses on the number of times a person 
visited an out-group friend’s home or invited them to their home. The question asked in the 
survey is: “About how many times in the past 12 months have you been in the home of a 
friend of a different race or had them in your home?” 
While we have no information on the intensity of the friendships, visiting someone at home 
or inviting someone home implies a higher level of commitment than talking to or spending 
time with an acquaintance. Home-based interaction suggests higher levels of trust and 
shows dedication in terms of time and effort. In fact, merely asking respondents if they have 
out-group friends and if so, how many, leaves too much room to interpretation and 
overstatement.  
Similar to research regarding outward perceptions and attitudes, there has been too little 
consistent attempt to assess the effect that diversity has on individual’s propensity to form 
out-group ties and relationships. By drawing on theoretical frameworks from inter-group 
contact and group threat perspectives, the first part of the present study relies on information 
of changes based on two time points of data (2006-2012) from the Portraits of American 
Life Survey. I analyze the effect of changing levels of ethnic and racial heterogeneity on 
changing levels and patterns of racial and ethnic out-group friendship in the U.S. Put 
differently, the analysis evaluates the impact that tract- and CBSA-level diversity in 2000 




interactional behavior between 2006 and 2012 panels. Bear in mind that an increase in the 
frequency of inviting or visiting an out-group friend at home might stem from a) overall 
growth in the number of out-group friends between 2006 and 2012 and/or b) an increase in 
the time spent inviting or visiting the same out-group friends. Or to put it this way: higher 
levels of out-group bridging must not necessarily stem from having gained more out-group 
friends, but might reflect spending more time together. Nonetheless, it is a strong measure 
of friendship intensity and bespeaks the willingness to interact and bond with ethnoracial 
out-group members.  
The major problem with cross-sectional studies of diversity effects is selection bias. A 
positive relationship between diversity and home-based interaction does not mean that 
diversity leads to more out-group bridging. Instead, it could be that people with interethnic 
friendships select into social spaces in which they are more likely to meet more out-group 
peers. This study attempts to overcome the limitations of previous cross-sectional studies, 
which generally overlook residential mobility and neighborhood sorting. By using panel 
data, this study attempts to limit selection bias. Measures of human capital, threat and trust 
were included into all of the models as key indicators of immigrant-related attitudes. 
There is no distinction into movers and stayers in Chapter III (but Chapter IV), because 
friendship patterns are not comparable for people who moved and those that remained in the 
same tract between 2006 and 2012. The decision to focus on stayers is also based on the 
observation that individuals have lower trust in friends and social relationships after 




out-group friends across time only makes sense for those people that remain in the same 
neighborhood between these two time points.  
The aim of the present chapter is to answer the following research questions: 
1. How are racial and ethnic diversity and the propensity to visit or invite an out-group 
friend associated? 
2. How are changes in racial and ethnic diversity and changes in the propensity to visit 
or invite an out-group friend associated across time? 
a. How do these results differ by geographical level of analysis? 
b. How do they differ by non-white and non-Hispanic white respondents?  















a) Preliminary Analysis of Dependent Variables 
Figure 12. Percentages: "About how many times have you been in the home of a friend 
of a different race or had them in your home in the past 12 months?", 2006 
 
 
In the first step, the percentage distribution of different frequencies of diverse friendships 
was calculated. Figure 12 shows that roughly 23 percent of the respondents in 2006 did not 
visit or invite any racial out-group friend during the whole year. Almost eight percent 
invited or visited an out-group friend’s home once, 20.4 percent twice and 16.4 percent five 
to nine times. Roughly a third of the respondents are “regular” visitors/inviters and spend 
time with an out-group friend between once a month and once a week.  
The same question was asked in 2012, but the results were coded continuously, ranging 





















more towards no visits per year. 31.5 percent of all respondents claimed to not have 
interacted with an out-group friend at home in the year prior to the interview in 2012 
compared to 23 percent in 2006. This decline in close friendship interactions could be due 
to a general decline in friendships over time (Brashears & Brashears, 2015). Furthermore, 
the sample interviewed in 2006 was 6 years older – research has demonstrated that age is 
negatively correlated with friendship (Bhattacharya, Ghosh, Monsivais, Dunbar, & Kaski, 
2016).  
Figure 13. Absolute numbers "Times visited or invited friend of other race", 2012 
 
 
For comparative purposes, I recoded the variables into the same categories. The results can 
be seen in Table 14. Between 2006 and 2012, the percentage of people that never visited or 
invited an out-group friend rose by almost 11 percentage points. All the other categories 
























































Table 14. Number of times visited or invited friend of other race in past 12 months 
 2006 2012 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Never 
 
253 22.8 375 31.5 
Once 86 7.7 70 5.8 
2-4 times 226 20.4 108 17.9 
5-9 times 182 16.4 155 13.0 
>=10 Times 360 32.5 377 31.6 
 
b) Cross-sectional Model 
Figure 14. Mean number of times visited or invited out-group friend by increasing 
level of diversity, 2012 
 
The data in Figure 14 indicates that, there is a positive relationship between Simpson 




friend at home in 201210. On average, people living in more diverse neighborhoods have a 
higher frequency of interacting with out-group friends.  




Although this study would have benefitted from sub-group analysis by all of the four racial 
and ethnic groups, small sample sizes compel me to treat race and ethnicity as a dichotomy: 
white and Non-white. While such a binary approach was necessary for statistical reasons, it 
is also defensible because the white majority and non-white minority show widely divergent 
reactions towards changes in diversity, as we will see in the following.  
																																								 																				
10 This serves as an example for the relationship between diversity and out-group home 
visits. Due to the categorical nature of the home-visit variable in 2006, the plot was only 




On average, non-Hispanic whites have 18 home visits a year with ethno-racial others, while 
non-whites have 24. Figure 15 illustrates that whites and non-whites do not differ much in 
the frequency of out-group association until diversity becomes high and whites propensity to 
conduct bridging contacts increases dramatically with neighborhood diversity. While the 
overall relationship between diversity and overall frequency of out-group home visits is a 
positive one, the positive link is strong for whites, while there seems to be no visible 
relationship for non-whites. The figure shows that whites’ social contacts are very sensitive 
to context. 	It appears that whites’ contacts are less diverse at lower levels of diversity but 
more diverse at higher levels, while there was no apparent relationship between diversity 
and out-group friends for non-whites. 
In the following cross-sectional analysis, a multinomial logistic regression measures the 
association between diversity and out-group visits adjusting for human capital, feelings of 
threat and trust as major drivers of willingness to interact with racial others. In line with the 
discussion above, the 2012 frequency of out-group home visits (never, once, 2-4 times, 5-9 
times, more than 10 times) is the outcome. “Never” was set as the reference group.  
Table 15 contains a multinomial logistic regression of how often an individual visited out-
group friend’s home in the past year. In line with the figures above, we see that higher 
diversity is significantly associated with higher rates of visiting or inviting racial out-group 
friends at least 2-4 times a year. Relative to no out-group home visits, a one-unit increase in 
the Simpson diversity score (ranging from lowest diversity (0) to highest diversity (1)) 
raises the odds of visiting an out-group friend 2-4 times (versus not visiting an out-group 




times the odds of having 5-9 friends and 7.54 the odds of having more than 10 friends when 
compared to the base outcome.  
Following Table 15, the predicted probabilities for diversity scores ranging from 0 to 0.9 
were calculated in increments of 0.1 by using Stata’s margin command. The values in 
Figure 16 are average predicted probabilities, which were calculated using the sample values 
of the other predictor variables. For instance, the mean predicted probability of visiting 
racial and ethnic out-group friends at home more than 10 times is 0.22 if one’s diversity 
score lies between 0.1 and 0.2 and rises to 0.45 if one’s diversity score is between 0.7 and 














Table 15. Relative risk ratios (cross-sectional), Multinomial Logistic Regression of how 
often visited or invited out-group friend in past year, 2012 (z-scores in brackets) 
 
REFERENCE GROUP: NEVER VISITED OR INVITED OUT-
GROUP FRIEND IN PAST 12 MONTHS  
 




































































Trust towards Family 
















Feeling that own race 
















Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001. Summary statistics: Pseudo-
R2 = .053, N = 1146 
* The model only shows major results of interest. In addition, the following characteristics 








Figure 16. Predictive Probability of out-group visits or invites 
 
 
While the main focus of the cross-sectional analysis lies on the association between 
diversity and predicting out-group interaction and friendship, it is interesting to look at the 
other control variables as well. Most strikingly, older respondents are less likely to visit out-
group friends’ homes when compared to younger respondents. General trust in others is 
associated with increased odds of visiting out-group friends. Trust towards closer family or 
friend was only significantly related with more than 10 visits or invites per year. While 
individual trust and human capital theory seem to hold true for this cross-sectional model, 
individual threat theory did not apply.  
As we see in the following model, there is considerable value in introducing an interaction 
term for whites and non-whites. As shown in Table 16 the positive association between 
diversity and frequency of out-group visits only holds true for whites, which confirms the 
















































show 5.8 times the odds of 5-9 out-group interactions and 13.7 times the odds of more than 
10 interactions for every step increase in diversity. It is remarkable how strong the 
association is for more than 10 out-group visits, proving the initial assumption that whites 
maintain less diverse friendships when living in low-diversity neighborhoods, while whites 
in high-diversity neighborhoods have more diverse friendships. Controlling for all the 
covariates below, the mean predicted probability of visiting racial and ethnic out-group 
friends more than 10 times is 0.18 for low diversity scores between 0.1 and 0.2, while 
whites in high-diversity (0.8-0.9) have almost three times the likelihood of being in this 
category (0.51) when compared to individuals in low-diversity neighborhoods (Figure 17). 
In contrast, the non-white interaction does not exhibit a significant relationship between 
diversity and out-group bridging. This is due to the fact that non-white initial friendships are 
less affected by varying levels of diversity. Plotting the predictive margins in Figure 18 
reveals that overall the likelihoods to spend time with out-group friends is high and there is 
little variation across the x-axis. In other words, whites have lower friendship diversity, but 
once they live in and self-select into diversity, the contextual composition is reflected in 
their friendship choices, while non-whites are less sensitive. Instead, non-whites have 
friendships that are more diverse in the first place and also live in more diverse places 







Table 16. Relative risk ratios (cross-sectional), including interaction White/Non-White, 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of out-group visits and invites in past year, 2012 * 
 
REFERENCE GROUP: NEVER VISITED OR INVITED OUT-
GROUP FRIEND IN PAST 12 MONTHS 
 
























































































Trust towards Family 
















Feeling that own race 
















Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001, Summary statistics: 
Pseudo R2 = .078 , N = 595  
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but not included in this table: years in the 





Figure 17. Predictive probability of out-group visits or invites, for Whites 
 























































































While increasing age influences out-group visits negatively, education does not play a role 
in predicting out-group bridging. Instead, neighborhood diversity, age and general trust were 
the most important factors affecting individual bridging behavior. Overall, trust (in 
particular towards strangers and neighbors) was highly predictive of having more than 5 
out-group home visits, while trust in family and close friends was strongly associated.  
In order to establish whether the Simpson diversity index is an adequate measure of 
heterogeneity for this study, the same analysis as above was conducted using the Entropy 
score in Table 17. The data in Table 17 indicates that the overall results are quite similar to 
Table 16, which leads me to the conclusion that the Simpson Diversity measure is an 
adequate measure of diversity for this study. Relative to no out-group home visits, whites 
have 3.583 times the odds of 5-9 out-group interactions and 7.379 times the odds of more 











Table 17. Relative risk ratios (cross-sectional), ENTROPY SCORE, Multinomial 
logistic regression of out-group visits and invites in past year, 2012 * 
		
REFERENCE GROUP: NEVER VISITED OR 
INVITED OUT-GROUP FRIEND IN PAST 12 
MONTHS 
		 Once 2-4 Times 5-9 Times >= 10 Times 
Entropy Score 2010  1.234 1.320 3.583** 7.379*** 
 (0.84) (1.68) (2.34) (3.89) 
Entropy Score 2010 *NON-WHITE 0.835 1.329 0.962 1.153 
	
(-0.85) (0.72) (-0.25) (0.98) 








Age 0.956* 0.946** 0.989*** 0.937*** (-1.98) (-2.97) (-2.70) (-2.99) 
Male 0.622 1.726 0.766 1.635 (-0.42) (0.63) (-0.87) (1.23) 
Parents born in US 1.526 1.059 1.836 1.764 (0.76) (0.89) (1.25) (0.63) 
High School 0.625 1.846 0.836 0.822 (-0.83) (0.52) (-0.54) (-0.51) 
College 0.947 1.735 1.156 1.544 (-0.19) (0.95) (0.84) (0.67) 
More than College 1.177 1.420 1.110 1.272 (1.57) (0.73) (0.75) (0.64) 
General Trust towards others 1.126* 1.048 1.171* 1.143** (1.84) (1.11) (1.89) (-1.98) 
Trust towards Family and Relatives 0.934 0.947 1.155* 1.265** (-0.33) (-0.83) (1.98) (2.33) 
Felt Unsafe in NH 1.626 1.159 0.935 0.982 (0.52) (0.99) (-0.721) (-0.54) 
Feeling that own race is decreasing 
0.947 1.063 0.957 1.043 
(-0.77) (0.83) (-1.03) (0.35) 
Constant 
0.321 0.625 0.999 1.324 
(-0.75) (-0.81) (-0.223) (0.27) 
Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001, Summary statistics: 
Pseudo R2 = .072 , N = 595  
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but not included in this table: years in the 






Summarizing the findings from this cross-sectional analysis leaves us with important 
insights for the ensuing panel models. In order to examine the associations between 
diversity and out-group bridging, multinomial logistic regression models were constructed 
predicting no, 2-4, 5-9 and more than 10 visits in the past 12 months with “no visits or 
invites” as the comparison group. The results should not be understood causally: more 
heterogeneity does not necessarily cause heterogeneous circles of friends for whites, but can 
be understood in terms of self-selection. Those whites with a preference for multiethnic and 
multiracial settings and diverse acquaintances might decide to move or stay consistent with 
this proclivity, while those people who are not content living in high-diversity contexts, 
might have out-migrated. Conversely, whites have been shown to have a general preference 
for in-group members and choose their neighborhood contexts based on this composition 
preference, which affects their mobility in and out of a particular neighborhood (Adelman, 
2005; Krysan et al., 2009). Thus, whites in low-diversity areas with homogenous friendship 
circles might be product of self-selective behavior out of diversity.  
Consequently, further analysis needs to account for the preference bias that could shape out-
group bridging. The following analysis attempts to look under the surface of these cross-
sectional results in order to understand how changes in diversity affect people’s propensity 
to bond outside of their own race. It is assumed that non-whites react better to higher 
diversity as they have a higher likelihood of living in diverse neighborhoods and feel more 
at ease with “other” minority members and whites. While some whites in high-diversity 
seem to be comfortable with their multiracial and multiethnic surrounding, most whites live 
in less diverse neighborhoods and are therefore more unfamiliar with diversity. While this 




more evidence of a causal relationship from contextual diversity to bridging behavior than 
cross-sectional analysis can. 
 
c) Panel Data Model  
As pointed out before, cross-sectional analyses have the disadvantage that causal processes 
are not identifiable. The positive relationship between ethnic and racial diversity and out-
group friendship that we observe above could in fact be due to selective mobility of 
respondents. Thus, the positive correlation between diversity and out-group bridging does 
not mean that higher of levels heterogeneity in neighborhoods bolster out-group bridging. 
Instead, people who value diverse friendships might in fact stay in neighborhoods where the 
residents are becoming more dissimilar. Therefore, two time points of data will be used to 
assess whether an increase in tract- or city-level diversity is linked to changes in individuals’ 
out-group interactions for stayers. While a strong causal conclusion can still not be drawn 
from two time points, such an analysis gives us more leverage in understanding changes that 
happen within the individual. 
i. Preliminary Analysis 
As people were interviewed both in 2006 and 2012 it is important to test if there is a 
substantial enough percentage of people that have changed their attitude between 2006 and 
2012. A Stuart Maxwell test was conducted to see if there was significant change between 
two time points (Table 18). The test was highly significant showing that a meaningful shift 




members in 2006, only 143 still fell into this category in 2012. While the overall number of 
individuals, who had never visited or invited a racial out-group friend, increased from 2006 
to 2012, the increase stems from respondents in all 2006 categories. 
Table 18. Stuart-Maxwell Test, Out-group bridging 
Immigrants take 




Times  5-9 Times 
More than 
10 Times Total 
WAVE 1          
Never 143 13 39 23 31 249 
Once 40 7 17 7 13 84 
2-4 Times  80 19 55 24 42 220 
5-9 Times 38 11 40 37 53 179 
More than 10 Times 44 2 42 50 214 352 
Total 345 52 193 141 353 1084 
    chi2 Df Prob>chi2     
Symmetry 52.97 10 0   
Marginal 46.66 4 0     
 
ii. Overall Panel Multinomial Logistic Regression 
For the change models, the primary measure of outcome is divided into five distinctive and 
similarly sized subgroups: (a) No visits and invites in both years, (b) Sometimes (1-9 times) 
in both years, (c) Often (more than 10 times) in both years, (d) Never to sometimes or often, 
Sometimes to often and (e) Often to sometimes or never, sometimes to never. 
Choosing this outcome was a lengthy process that involved testing several similar models 
with different outcomes to explore associations between diversity growth and change in out-
group bridging. The bottom line is that is important to define the optimal number of 




analysis using a 3-category measure including “no change”, “less out-group bridging” and 
“more out-group bridging”. However, this measure had one major flaw: It was not reliable 
because of ceiling and floor effects.  That is, those who are at either end of the response 
scale (never or more than 10 times) in 2006 cannot get more extreme. However, extreme 
negatives (never) are quite different from extreme positives (more than ten times) and 
should not be merged into “no change”.  Furthermore, I tested a 4-category-model that 
includes following categories: No visits and invites in both years (0,0), visits to no visits 
(1,0), no visits to visits (0,1), and visits to visits (1,1). The results were relatively consistent 
with the models below, but the five-category-model described above clearly outperforms it 
in terms of variance explained and significance. While the four-category-model relies on 
binary outcomes (Yes, No) in 2006 and 2012, the five-category-model draws more subtle 
distinctions between the different levels of out-group bridging. First of all, the decrease in 
out-group bridging is not just characterized by “visits to no visits”, but by individuals 
moving from “often to sometimes or never” and “sometimes to never”. An increase in 
interracial home visits is captured through both “never to sometimes or often” and 
“sometimes to often”. In addition, visits in both years were broken down into “sometimes in 
both years” and “often in both years”. Conflating these two groups would have led to an 







Table 19. Change in frequency of out-group visits or invites 2000-2010 
NO CHANGE Freq. Percent 
        a) No visits/invites in both years 143 13.19 
 b) Sometimes in both years (Once 
a week, 2-4 Times, 5-9 Times) 
217 20.02 
 c) Often in both years (More than 
10 times in past 12 months) 
214 19.74 
CHANGE   
 d) Never to sometimes or often, 
Sometimes to often 
214 19.74 
 e) Often to sometimes or never, 
sometimes to never 
296 27.31 
 Total 1,084 100 
 
As seen in Table 19, 53 percent of the sample did not change their behavior between 2006 
and 2012. Roughly 20 percent of the sample “improved” their behavior (moved from never 
visiting or inviting in 2006 to visiting or inviting sometimes in 2012, or moved from visiting 
or inviting sometimes in 2006 to often in 2012) and 27 percent decreased their out-group 
interaction (moved from visiting or inviting often in 2006 to sometimes or never in 2012).  
The following tables are multinomial regression analyses capturing the effect of a 
percentage change in tract- and CBSA-level diversity on changes in likelihood to visit or 
invite an out-group friend between 2006 and 2012. The results of the multinomial logistic 
regressions should be interpreted as relative risks of unchanged out-group bridging behavior 
in both years (sometimes visited or invited friend in 2006 and sometimes visited or invited 
friend in 2012, often visited or invited friend in 2006 and often visited or invited friend in 
2012), intensified visiting behavior (never to sometimes and often, sometimes to often), or 




categories need to be read in reference to being in the base category “No visits and invites in 
both years” (did not visit friend in 2006, and did not visit friend in 2012, either).  
While I tried several models, I decided to use “No visits and invites in both years” as the 
base category, because a) I am mainly interested in the groups that change between 2006 
and 2012 and b) this category is easiest to interpret in reference to the others because it is at 
one end of the “spectrum”. Rather then choosing the most normal outcome as the base 
(Often to sometimes or never, sometimes to never), seeing the change-categories in 
reference to “No visits and invites in both years” offers the most interesting contrast.  
I begin with a very simple model, which has only diversity change as an independent 
variable (Table 20). Against the assumption based of the cross-sectional results that 
diversity is positively related to out-group bridging, individuals experiencing diversity 
growth are most likely to fall into the category “No visits and invites in both years”.  
Table 20. Relative risk ratios, Effect Percentage Change in Simpson Diversity on 
Changes in Out-Group Interaction, 2006-2012 (Reference category: No visits or invites 
in 2006 and 2012) 
 RRR (z) 
Sometimes in Both Years 0.997** -2.060 
Often in Both Years 0.999*** -2.260 
Never to Sometimes/Often 0.999* -1.855 
Often to Sometimes/Never  0.996*** -2.320 
Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001,  
Summary statistics: Pseudo R2 = .019, N = 703 
* No additional controls. 
 
As seen in Figure 19, this result is confirmed in the full model. The full table (see Appendix, 




the categories “sometimes in both years”, “often in both years” and “often to 
sometimes/never”, even if additional controls are taken into account. 
Figure 19. Panel models for tract-level diversity changes (Table A in Appendix) 
 
Remarks about this and following figures: 
* As explained earlier, models in Chapter IV only include people that remained in the same 
neighborhood between 2006 and 2012. 
* The following models only show major results of interest. In addition, the following 
characteristics were controlled for in all of the models: age, gender, race, individual 
education, income, general trust in others and towards family and relatives, feeling of safety 
in neighborhood, feeling that own race is decreasing in neighborhood, length of residence, 
homeownership, tract-level socio-economic status. 
* For full models of any of the following figures, please see appendix.  
Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.  































Figure 20. Adjusted Predictions of Diversity Increase Rates (changerate_Div) by 
Category of Dependent Variable: (1) no visits in both years, (2) some visits in both 





As shown with the adjusted predictions of diversity increase rates (Figure 20), it is 
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increase. Especially those cases that have larger effect sizes show very broad confidence 
intervals, which are signs of an inadequate sample size. Since the spread of the errors is not 
constant across the levels of diversity growth, heteroskedasticity is present. However, the 
adjusted predictions still evidence that, except for “never to sometimes/often”, all scenarios 
are less likely to eventuate when compared to the base category.  
A closer look at the full regression model (see appendix, Table A) shows that higher age is 
significantly associated with a higher likelihood of having no out-group friends in both 
years. Education is particularly important in explaining changes in out-group interaction. 
Individuals with a college degree have 1.55 times the odds of visiting or inviting out-group 
friends sometimes in both years, while individuals with more than a college degree have 
1.633 times the odds and 2.533 times the odds of visiting or inviting out-group friends 
sometimes and often in both years, respectively. Higher income is significantly associated 
with more out-group bridging in both years (often and sometimes). While trust towards 
family and relatives was not meaningfully related to the outcome, general trust towards 
others is highly significant and positively related to out-group interaction in both years and 
improving interaction between 2006 and 2012.  
Similar to the cross-sectional model, the above analysis was broken down into subgroup 
models by white and non-white self-identification in the following figure based on the 
assumption that non-whites react more positively to changes in diversity as they have a 
higher likelihood of living in diverse neighborhoods in the first place. A multinomial 
logistic regression with interactions between diversity increase rates and white/non-white 




Figure 21. Panel Models for tract-level diversity changes (White/ Non-White), (Table B 
in Appendix) 
 
* White/Non-White Model (Including Interaction): N= 681, Pseudo-R2= .069 
 
iii. Panel Models by Level of Initial Diversity 
While the overall model (Figure 19) suggests that diversity growth affects individuals’ 
bridging behavior detrimentally, Figure 21 evidences that breaking the panel model down 
by white and non-white respondents shows major differences in likelihood to visit an out-
group friend’s home over time. In fact, the negative relationship between diversity growth 
and out-group bridging only holds true for non-whites. This comes as quite a surprise 
because non-whites were expected to respond more positively to growing diversity as they 



























showed a very positive association between higher diversity and more intergroup interaction 
among whites. However, the above results evidence the opposite. As I have pointed out 
earlier, the panel models show that a positive association for white interaction and diversity 
might not actually mean that diversity itself is driving the out-group bridging behavior. 
Instead, the cross-sectional results show whites’ propensity to self-select into diversity if 
they feel comfortable with ethnoracial outsiders.  
In order to understand what is driving the panel results, an analysis was run separately for 
tracts with high, medium and low initial levels of diversity (Figure 22). The following figure 
shows multinomial logistic regressions with interactions for white/non-white respondents by 
initial level of diversity.  
As shown in Figure 22 below, a separate analysis by initial level of diversity is crucial in 
teasing out differential reactions to growing diversity for both whites and non-whites. As a 
reminder, low diversity spans from 0 - 24.3, medium-diversity from 24.4 - 49.04 and high 
diversity from 49.05 – 74.5 on the Simpson diversity scale. In line with the above findings, 
the negative association between diversity growth and out-group friendship is particularly 
meaningful for non-whites at low- and medium-levels of diversity. For non-white 
individuals living in low diversity tracts, a one-percent rise in Simpson diversity decreases 
the odds of visiting an out-group friend often in both years by a factor of 0.876 (z= -2.390). 
For non-whites in low- and medium-level diversity, the odds of increasing out-group visits 
(never to sometimes or often) are decreased by factors of 0.889 (z=-3.170) and 0.915 (z=-
2.460), respectively. It is interesting to see how strong the effect of heterogenization on out-




drive the overall negative finding for non-whites. While these results are puzzling, I assume 
that non-whites in low-diversity experience heterogenization as a threat and withdraw from 
society as competition increases.  
This reaction is less dramatic for non-Hispanic whites, but similar: whites who live in low-
diversity neighborhoods react according to the threat hypothesis. Not having been exposed 
to diversity before, whites and non-whites in homogenous neighborhoods are more likely to 
have no out-group home visits both in 2006 and 2012, and are less likely to see increase in 
out-group bonds between 2006 and 2012.  
In contrast, for non-whites living in initial high diversity, a one-unit increase in the Simpson 
diversity raises the odds of increasing out-group interaction between 2006 and 2012 (versus 
not visiting an out-group friend in both years) by a significant factor of 1.132 (z=-2.06). For 
whites who initially live in in high diversity, the odds of increasing out-group interaction 





















Figure 22. Panel Models for tract-level diversity changes broken down by initial level 
of diversity and white/non-white status (Table C in Appendix) 
 
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 234, Pseudo-R2= .137 
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 229, Pseudo-R2= .108 
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 210, Pseudo-R2= .114 
 
To sum up, Figure 22 contradicts the general notion from Figure 21 that diversity growth 
generally holds negative effects for non-white stayers. Instead, when the results are broken 
down by initial level of diversity, we see that, in the context of diversity growth, both 
















































































initial diversity. Furthermore, both whites and non-whites in high-diversity contexts adapt 
their out-group friendships to the rising levels of heterogeneity.  
What does this tell us? First of all, white and non-white respondents might not be so 
different after all. For both groups, the level of diversity experienced a priori is highly 
important in determining whether diversity growth is experienced as a threat or an 
opportunity for contact. Individuals living in low-diversity contexts may have higher 
inhibition thresholds and may be more fearful of contact across racial lines. People living in 
high-diversity neighborhoods may be less reserved to meeting and befriending new out-
group members, which then helps to eradicate certain prejudices, encourages them to seek 
cultural exchange and cuts down anxieties of coming into contact with peers of the other 
culture. Furthermore, they might have self-selected into neighborhoods of rising diversity. 
Thus, for both whites and non-whites we find both the contact and threat hypothesis 
confirmed. For those respondents with prior experience with diversity, an increase in the 
heterogeneity of available out-group friends will lead to higher bridging. For those 
respondents with low diversity experience, heterogeneity growth might be perceived as a 
neighborhood threat.  
While prior analyses were conducted on the neighborhood-level, it is important to 
understand if these effects hold true across different geographical levels. As Kaufmann and 
Harris (2015) have demonstrated in their meta-analysis of diversity-effects, shifts to 
different geographical levels can have very different implications when analyzing 
individuals’ behaviors. The CBSA-level analysis in Figure 23 does not show any significant 




exposure to heterogeneity or not. While CBSA-level diversity will prove to be an important 
predictor of individual-level attitudes towards out-group members (see Chapter V), the same 
cannot be said for out-group interaction. Inter-group bridging is contingent on actual 
diversity in communities, while compositional changes in the city do not impact individuals 
likelihood to form out-group bridges. The CBSA scale is too large to affect social 
interaction patterns.  However, it is important to note that none of the bars seem to break the 
1-threshold.  
Figure 23. Panel Models for CBSA-level diversity changes broken down by initial level 
of diversity and white/non-white status 
 
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 234, Pseudo-R2= .095 
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 229, Pseudo-R2= .073 
























































By White/Non-White Status: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect % CBSA-














Workplaces, schools and universities are places where intercultural encounters are very 
common. While these kinds of contacts happen within a formal setting and have been shown 
to stimulate consequent formation of out-group bridges, neighborhood increases in diversity 
might not entail actual interaction across racial lines and have shown rather contrasting 
effects. Chapter IV focuses on the effect of diversity on out-group interaction and carefully 
dissects the analysis into subgroup studies of racial status, initial level of diversity and level 
of geography. Summing the results up in a nutshell, we can say that stayers in high-diversity 
contexts increase their out-group interaction when diversity increases, while the opposite 
effect was observed for inhabitants of low-diversity tracts. 
 
Four important lessons were drawn from this first part of the present study: 
1. On the one hand, the cross-sectional Figure 18 suggests that higher levels of 
diversity are associated with more out-group friendships for whites (while there was 
no effect for Non-Whites). While cross-sectional associations might seem 
meaningful, they do not necessarily depict the effects that diversity growth has 
within individuals across time but may reveal more about individual preferences and 
choices. What the cross-sectional findings mainly demonstrate is that whites, who 
feel comfortable with diversity and live in diverse neighborhoods, tend to befriend 
racial out-group members.  
2. However, further analysis based on two time points of data reveals that the overall 
model (not broken down by initial level of diversity or white/non-white status) did 




within the white individual, we find no significant changes.  As further analysis 
showed this is mainly due to the fact that whites, on average, start at lower levels of 
neighborhood diversity (Chapter III) and results strongly differ by initial level of 
diversity. For non-whites, the results were rather surprising: contradicting the cross-
sectional results and the hypothetical assumption that non-whites might embrace 
changes in diversity, changing levels of Simpson diversity do not exert an effect on 
out-group interaction for whites, while non-whites are more likely to not visit friends 
at all. This finding is puzzling and leaves room for further inquiry. In particular, 
these partial results show how important it is to break the analysis down by initial 
level of diversity. 
3. For this part of the study, initial level of diversity was the most important subgroup 
measure. For whites and non-whites, it is mainly individuals with substantial 
diversity experience in their everyday environments whose frequency of out-group 
visits and invites are positively impacted by further diversity growth. Contradicting 
the finding from the overall model (stating that heterogenization decreases out-group 
bridging), diversity growth raises the odds of both whites and non-whites living in 
high-level diversity to spend more time bonding with out-group friends. Prior 
experience with heterogeneity, I speculate, removes any threat effects of residing in 
an increasingly diverse neighborhood; instead, individuals who remain in 
heterogeneous tracts reflect the inter-group contact theory.  
Individuals in low-diversity environments were more likely to not visit or invite out-
group friends at all. Among the reasons individuals in low initial diversity do not 




that they are less experienced with diversity and might have stronger stereotypes and 
worse attitudes, which keep them from establishing new out-group ties. Furthermore, 
increasing levels of diversity might not actually mean that people have more 
exposure to each other, and this might be particularly true for low levels of diversity. 
In fact, various research has demonstrated that exposure to racial and ethnic others 
might be hindered through micro-level segregation or the mere fact that actual 
conversations and interactions are not taking place even if people of different races 
or ethnicities seem to live in close proximity (Wright et al., 2014).  
4. While geography plays an important role in Chapter V in understanding diversity-
effects on out-group attitudes, there was no effect from changes in city-level 
diversity on individual-propensity to visit out-group friends at home. While city-
level diversity negatively impacts perceptions of racial and ethnic outsiders (see 
Chapter V) due to perceived threat and competition for jobs and housing (amongst 
others), it does not seem to affect the propensity for contact across racial lines. As I 
have pointed out before, changes in diversity on the CBSA-level are too far removed 
from the everyday environments of individuals to change their behavior towards 

















Chapter V deals with the relationship of changes in diversity to changes in individuals’ 
attitudes towards immigrants. So far, no conclusion has been reached as to whether diversity 
reduces or pushes hostile feelings and stereotypes towards immigrants.  
Based on two time points of data (2006-2012) from the Portraits of American Life Survey, 
the second part of the present study concerns the effect of ethnic and racial diversity growth 
on changes in attitudes towards immigrants in the U.S. by drawing on insights from group 
threat and inter-group contact theory. Changes in Simpson Diversity are measured at two 
levels of geography: the CBSA- and tract-level. Based on the hypothetical assumption that 
the results will differ for movers and stayers, interaction effects by subgroup are included. 
Furthermore, the study carefully dissects prior levels of diversity as indicators of later 










Given the on-going racial and ethnic diversification of the American society, it is important 
to understand how immigrants are viewed in light of these changes. While we can observe 
more tolerance towards racial and ethnic others and increasing inter-ethnic engagement 
(Alba, 2012; Marsden, 2012), a substantial part of academia argues that increasing diversity 
has detrimental effects for immigration-related attitudes (Enos, 2014; Lancee & Schaeffer, 
2015a). Numerous studies claim that higher diversity in a neighborhood or city is associated 
with negative attitudes towards and higher levels of stereotyping of immigrants. Contrarily, 
research relying on the contact hypothesis shows that contact across ethnoracial lines can 
foster positive attitudes and reduce between-group stereotypes (Fischer, 2011; Laurence, 
2014; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010). The majority of studies show that contextual diversity 
on the neighborhood level leads to more openness and tolerance between individuals of 
different races and ethnicities, while city-level diversity growth can be associated with 
feelings of threat and animosity towards out-group members (Kaufmann & Harris, 2015; J. 
E. Oliver, 2010).  
One popular response to immigrants is rooted in the belief that they will take away jobs that 
would have otherwise gone to native-born Americans. Fear of job loss is one of the major 
reasons that individuals oppose immigration. As I will show in the following, the 
immigrant-threat-to-jobs narrative in the job market strongly correlates with other opinions, 
such as tightening immigration policy and the beliefs that immigrants lower wages and 
burden the welfare system. In academia there are dissenting opinions as to whether 




Sparber, 2009) or not affecting native workers (Constant, 2014). Some argue that without 
immigrant labor, some of the jobs natives currently do not want to do would be upgraded 
and appeal to natives. Contrarily, immigrants have also been found to “push” low-skilled 
natives into better, less manually-intensive jobs (Foged & Peri, 2013). 
This paper attempts to take a step towards a causal explanation by using two time points of 
data in order to identify the association between changes in diversity and changes in a key 
dimension of immigration attitudes: the belief that immigrants take away “native jobs.” 
Keep in mind, that the analysis is constrained by what is available in the data, and only this 
item was available in both waves. Using two waves of panel data for individuals in the U.S., 
spanning a period of 6 years, this paper tests the effect of changes in diversity on changes of 
feeling immigration threat. With few exceptions (Enos, 2014; Fisher Williamson, Abigail, 
2013), most U.S.-based studies examine diversity’s effect on attitudes towards immigration 
using cross-sectional data. While there are European studies based on panel data (Kaufmann 
& Harris, 2015; Koopmans, Lancee, & Schaeffer, 2014; Lancee & Schaeffer, 2015b; 
Laurence & Bentley, 2015), the lack of causality and directionality in U.S. research on this 
topic is problematic for the understanding of the role of growing population diversity. 
Furthermore, selection bias and reciprocal causality has been shown to be a problem. 
Studies that rely solely on cross-sectional research lack certainty in whether differences in 
attitudes stem from contextual effects or whether certain individuals self-select into 








The focus of this paper is on respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants in the U.S. captured 
through the reaction to following sentence: “Immigrants coming into the U.S. are taking too 
many jobs away from other American citizens.” Respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants 
in the U.S. job market were captured both in 2006 and 2012 and serve as a substitute 
measure for openness and tolerance to immigration.  
While this statement mainly addresses attitudes towards immigrants in the labor market and 
could therefore be seen as a rather narrow dependent variable, I use immigration-related 
attitudes in the General Social Survey (2014) to demonstrate that these perceptions are 
strongly positively correlated with each other. In the following cross-tabulation (Table 21), I 
included following three additional GSS statements: (a) America should exclude illegal 
immigrants, (b) Immigrants lead to higher crime rates, (c) Number of immigrants to 
America nowadays should be decreased.  
I test whether or not a statistically significant link exists between attitudes towards the 
statement “Immigrants take jobs away” and above named three variables. As we can see 
there is a highly significant relationship between the dependent variable and each of these 
factors. For instance, of all the respondents agreeing that immigrants take away native jobs, 
43.56 percent believe immigrants increase crime, 78.32 percent believe the U.S. should take 
stronger measures to exclude undocumented immigrants and 68.32 percent think the number 





Table 21. Percentages of Respondents in each category “Immigrants take jobs away” 
by independent variables and Chi2-Test 
 Immigrants Increase Crime Exclude Undocumented 
Immigrants 
Reduce Number of Immigrants 
Immigrants Take 
Jobs away 
Agree Disagree Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Disagree Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Reduce Increase Remain 
the same 
Agree 43.56 30.91 25.53 78.32 11.89 9.79 68.32 9.24 22.44 
Disagree 7.39 76.65 15.95 46.02 37.05 16.93 25.4 24.44 50.16 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
9.62 47.31 43.08 59.39 13.41 27.2 34.13 11.98 53.89 
 Pearson chi2(4) = 310.3896 Pearson chi2(4) = 146.578 Pearson chi2(4) = 132.5769 
 Pr=0.00 Pr=0.00 Pr=0.00 
 
Table 22. Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness 
America should exclude illegal immigrants 0.60 -0.22 0.15 0.77 
Number of immigrants to America nowadays should be 
decreased 0.65 -0.26 -0.07 0.62 
Immigrants lead to higher crime rates 0.59 0.32 0.10 0.74 
Immigrants take jobs away 0.73 0.17 -0.09 0.56 
 
A highly significant factor analysis in Table 22 confirms the strong relationship between 
these different attitudes towards immigrants. Factor 1 (with an eigenvalue of more than 1) 
shows that only one dimension is necessary to explain a large part of the relationships (77 
percent of the variance) among the variables. Furthermore, the main variable of interest in 
this study (“Immigrants coming into the U.S. are taking too many jobs away from other 
American citizens”) loads highest.  
Answers range from 1 to 5, 1 being “Strongly disagree” and 5 being “Strongly agree”. For 
the cross-sectional multinomial logistic regression model, the dependent was recoded into 




For the change models, the changes were based on these three cross-sectional outcomes and 
recoded as: (a) negative attitudes in 2006 and 2012, (b) neutral attitudes in 2006 and 2012, 
(c) positive attitudes in 2006 and 2012, (d) negative attitude in 2006 changed to neutral or 
positive attitude in 2012, and (e) positive attitude in 2006 changed to neutral or negative 
attitude in 2012 (see Table 23).  
Table 23. Attitudes “Immigrants coming into the U.S. are taking too many jobs away 
from other American citizens” in Wave 1 and 2 
 
WAVE 2 
   
WAVE 1 
Positive 
Attitude  Indecisive 
Negative 













Total 547 231 402 1,180 
LEGEND   Negative in Both 
 
 
  Neutral in Both 
 
  Positive in Both 
 
  Negative to Neutral/ Positive 
 
  Positive to Neutral/Negative 
 
Similar to the construction of the dependent variable in Chapter IV, arriving at this outcome 
variable was not smooth sailing. Before implementing the model design below, I tried a 
change-score model with three outcomes: (a) improving attitudes, (b) no change and (c) 
worsening attitudes. The main problems with this operationalization were the floor and 
ceiling effects. For instance, if someone had very strong negative feelings about immigrants 
in 2006, the attitude cannot intensify in 2012 as the response is already at a maximum. 
Conflating those people at a minimum and maximum with each other would have meant a 




Table 24. Change in Attitude towards Immigrants between 2006 and 2012 
 Freq. Percent 
Negative Attitudes in Both Years 234 19.84 
Neutral Attitudes in Both Years 81 6.86 
Positive Attitudes in Both Years 327 27.77 
Negative Attitude Changed to Neutral or Positive Attitude 298 25.25 
Positive Attitude Changed to Neutral or Negative Attitude 240 20.33 
Total 1180 100 
 
As I have explained before, it could be misleading to equate the experience of diversity 
growth and decline over time in the same neighborhood with that of moving to a new 
neighborhood. When studying these relationships across time 1 (t-1) and time 2 (t), 
interaction effects for stayers and movers will be included in the model. Furthermore, it is 
important to include interaction effects and introduce separate analysis for individuals in 
neighborhoods with different levels of prior exposure to others (origin-effect), as 
respondents with prior living experience in diverse neighborhoods may react more 
positively to increasing diversity then individuals who have had no prior exposure to racial 
and ethnic out-group members and are expected to experience rising local diversity as a 
threatening event. 
Another issue to be addressed in the analysis concerns geographical level. Since both tract- 
and city-level data are available, separate models for both geographical levels of analysis 
will be estimated to see if Kaufmann and Harris’ observation (diversity increases out-group 





All subsequent models are multinomial logistic regressions using 2012 individual-level data 
paired with 2010 diversity score (and change in diversity for the panel models) and 
immigration percentage. While the focus of this study is on the Simpson diversity index, 
attitudes towards immigrants might also be influenced by the local percentage of 
immigrants.  
In the following, all of the outcomes (attitudes towards immigrants and change in attitude 
toward immigrants) are treated as categorical variables under the assumption that there is no 
natural ordering of categories within the variables. Instead of listing the logits of the 
outcomes, relative risk ratios (RRR) are reported (which are the same as exponentiated 
multinomial logit coefficients), because it is more intuitive to interpret them. Relative risk 
ratios describe the relative likelihood of belonging to one cluster versus another associated 
with a linear increase in the predictor, while holding all other predictors constant. In the 
cross-sectional models, RRR’s are interpreted as the effect on the odds of showing negative 
or indecisive attitudes relative to positive attitudes. In addition to the overall cross-sectional 
model (Table 26), the Table 28 includes an interaction effect for non-Hispanic whites and 
non-whites. As discussed earlier, whites and non-whites have different attitudes towards 
immigrants in the first place (see table below). As shown in Table 25, almost half of non-
white respondents have positive attitudes towards immigrants (believe that immigrants do 
not take jobs away), while 43 percent of whites share this belief.  
Table 25. White and Non-White Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2000 (%) 
 OVERALL WHITE NON-WHITE 
Indecisive 19.46 20.16 18.72 
Positive Attitude Immigration 46.22 43.25 49.39 





In the panel models, RRR’s are interpreted as the effect on the odds of having 
negative/positive attitudes in both years, or having more immigrant-friendly (negative to 
neutral or positive) and -hostile (positive to neutral or negative) attitudes relative to “neutral 
attitudes in both years”. If the relative risk is smaller than 1, then the odds of outcome m is 
expected to fall with respect the reference category 11. After careful consideration, I decided 
to use “neutral in both years” as the base category even though it is not the most frequent 
event. First of all, I tried using “positive in both years” as the base category because it is the 
most frequent group. As the models did not differ much in their main message and my main 
interest lies in either positive/ negative attitudes and changing attitudes in comparison to a 
neutral “middle ground”, “neutral in both years” seemed like the best base group.  
In order to control for the underlying theories of what determines attitudes towards 
immigrants on the individual as well as the collective level, the multinomial logistic 
regressions control for human capital, feeling of threat, trust and contextual diversity as 
major drivers of immigration-related attitudes. Furthermore, an interaction term is included 
to capture differences for movers and stayers. As described in Chapter III, 65 percent of the 
sample contains stayers, and 35 percent are movers. Based on the discussion in Chapter II, 
we know that whites and non-whites have inherently different experiences with diversity 
and have been shown to react differently to diversity and diversity growth. Therefore, in line 
with the cross-sectional model, separate analysis are also conducted for whites and non-
whites. 
																																								 																				






a) Cross-sectional Models 
Table 26. Relative risk ratios (Cross-sectional), Effect Simpson Diversity (2010) on 
attitudes towards immigrants (2012)*	
   
Multinomial Logistic Regression: Positive 
attitudes towards immigrants as base outcome 
versus 
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Feeling Own Race is 


















          Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.  
            Summary statistics: Pseudo R2 = .048, N = 952 
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but were not included in this table: years 
in the neighborhood, homeownership, race and ethnicity (both measured as 
White/Asian/Hispanic/Black and White/Non-White), neighborhood socioeconomic status.                 





Table 27. Relative Risk Ratios (Cross-sectional), Effect tract-percentage immigrants 
(2010) on attitudes towards immigrants (2012) * 
	
		 		
Multinomial Logistic Regression: Positive 
attitudes towards immigrants as base outcome 
versus 
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Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.  
            Summary statistics: Pseudo R2 = .052, N = 998 
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but were not included in this table: years 
in the neighborhood, homeownership, race and ethnicity (both measured as 
White/Asian/Hispanic/Black and White/Non-White), neighborhood socioeconomic status.  











Table 28. White and Non-White Relative Risk Ratios (Cross-sectional), Effect 




Multinomial Logistic Regression: Positive 






Negative Attitude  
	 	 	




Simpson Diversity (2010)   1.045   0.06   0.895*   -1.97  
 
Simpson Diversity (2010) * 
White (Interaction) 
0.781   -0.24   0.387*   -2.17 
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decreasing in 



















          
Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.  
            Summary statistics: Pseudo R2 = .058, N = 998 
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but were not included in this table: years 
in the neighborhood, homeownership, neighborhood socioeconomic status.  
* Foreign-born respondents were excluded (18 percent of the sample). 
 
As seen in Table 26 and Table 27, higher levels of diversity at the tract level are associated 




true for Table 28, which includes an interaction effect for whites and non-whites. Both 
groups are less likely to be indecisive or fear immigrants. In other words, rising diversity 
can be linked to significantly lower chances of having negative attitudes towards 
immigrants.12 Overall, the results were very similar for effects stemming from growth in 
Simpson diversity (Table 26) and neighborhood immigration share (Table 27). In Table 27, 
heightened tract-level immigrant percentage also lowered the likelihood of having an 
indecisive stance towards immigrants. While this could mean that higher diversity levels 
actually lead individuals to have more positive perceptions of immigrants, it could also 
reflect selection rather than causality: both whites and non-whites, who live in diverse tracts, 
tend to have more liberal views because those without a taste for diversity have migrated 
away and others with a taste for mixed neighborhoods have migrated in.  
Adjusting for above-listed controls, human capital shapes attitudes towards immigrants. A 
person with a bachelor or master’s degree compared to no high school degree is expected to 
have better attitudes towards immigrants rather than exhibit antipathy. More specifically, for 
bachelor and master degree holders relative to those without a high school degree, the 
relative risk for individuals with negative attitudes to positive attitudes would be expected to 
decrease by a factor of 0.589 and 0.383 respectively given the other variables in the model 
are held constant. This finding is in line with existing studies that have shown a relationship 
between an individual’s education/income and attitudes towards immigration (Brenner & 
Fertig, 2006; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). 
																																								 																				
12 Results of multinomial logistic regressions are always relative risks of having either 





In addition to collective threat (macro-level diversity) and individual capital theory 
(education), individual-level threat theory was included but found to be insignificant: 
whether someone felt safe in his or her neighborhood and the feeling that the own race is 
decreasing were not significantly linked to the outcome. Furthermore, complete trust 
towards neighbors and strangers is also associated with improved perception of immigrants 
in the U.S. job market.  Trust in members of closer circles like friends and family was not 
significantly related to improved attitudes.  
In order to test whether these results are robust to a different measure of diversity, the same 
analysis (including the interaction effect for whites and non-whites) was conducted using 
the 2010 Entropy score. As discussed in the demographic section of this study, the diversity 
maps using the Simpson diversity and Entropy score are very similar and the level of 
correlation between the two indices indicates high collinearity. As shown in Table 29, white 
and non-white individuals living in areas with higher levels of Entropy are more likely to 









Table 29. White and Non-White Relative Risk Ratios (Cross-sectional), Effect 
ENTROPY Score (2010) on Attitudes towards Immigrants (2012) * 
		
		 		
Multinomial Logistic Regression: Positive 







RRR 		 (z)  RRR 	
(z) 
 
Entropy Score (2010)   0.998   0.15   0.932*   -2.08 
 
Entropy Score (2010) * White 
(Interaction) 
0.467   -0.33   0.425**   -2.21 
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* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but were not included in this table: years 
in the neighborhood, homeownership, neighborhood socioeconomic status.  
* Foreign-born respondents were excluded (18 percent of the sample). 
 
Summing up, we can say that there is a positive association between neighborhood 
diversity/ immigrant share and immigrant attitudes, indicating that individuals who live in 




in low diversity are more prone to feel threatened by immigrants, in particular when it 
comes to their jobs. Does this mean that diversity decreases out-group hostility? Due to 
selection bias, which has been extensively covered in the earlier chapters, such a conclusion 
is oversimplified. That is, by self-selecting to live in various levels of contextual diversity, 
individuals sort themselves into neighborhoods which may differ on the underlying factors 
which initially influenced their decision. For instance, people who prefer heterogeneity 
“self-select” into heterogeneous contexts; and this preference for diversity, rather than their 
habitation in diversity, actually accounts for their subsequent immigrant-friendly behavior. 
Even though randomized control experiments are considered the gold standard research 
design, the unavailability of randomized data leads me to study changes within individuals 
over time in the following. By doing so, I hope to eliminate the risk of self-selection 
stemming from inherent differences in respondents.   
 
b) Panel Model  
i. Preliminary Analysis 
While Tables 26, 27 and 28 reveal cross-sectional associations, the major contribution of 
this chapter lies in trying to understand effects of changes in diversity by capturing 
dynamics of opinion formation over two time points. As pointed out in Chapter IV, two time 
points of data will not rid the study of self-selection bias and establish causality, but will 
provide findings that are oriented towards the understanding of changes within individuals 




In order to test if there is significant change between the two time periods, a Stuart Maxwell 
Test was conducted testing for significant differences in outcomes between 2006 and 2012 
(Table 30). These results indicate that the change is statistically significant. For instance, of 
the 299 who strongly disagree in 2006 (299), only 160 still fall into this category in 2012.  
Table 30. Stuart-Maxwell Test, Attitude towards immigration 
 
 
ii. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Effect of Changes in Diversity on Changes in 
Attitudes towards Immigrants 
 
The next set of analyses concerns the role that diversity changes between 2000 and 2010 
play in predicting variations in attitude change between 2006 and 2012 panels. In 
accordance with the theoretical and methodological discussion, the analysis was dissected 
Immigrants take 
Jobs away 
















WAVE 1       
Strongly disagree 160 41 43 26 29 299 
Somewhat disagree 66 71 32 37 18 224 
Neither 52 64 85 59 22 282 
Somewhat agree 27 41 55 87 58 268 
Strongly agree 31 14 27 38 91 201 
Total 336 231 242 247 218 1274 
  chi2 df Prob>chi2   
Symmetry 22.97 10 0.0109   




by mover status, initial level of diversity, geographic level of analysis and white/non-white 
status.  
In order to obtain measures of change in attitude between 2006 and 2012, the following 
multinomial logistic regressions include five categories that describe respondents’ attitudes: 
negative attitudes in both years, neutral attitudes in both years, positive attitudes in both 
years, negative attitude in 2006 changed to neutral or positive attitude in 2012, positive 
attitude in 2006 changed to neutral or negative attitude in 2012. All results need to be seen 
in reference to the category “neutral in both 2006 and 2012.” Significant results above one 
imply that an individual would be more likely to fall into the selected category than in the 
reference category, while significant coefficients below 1 indicate that the individual would 
be expected to fall in the category “neutral in both 2006 and 2012.”  
Net of all the other factors that might be influencing changes in attitude towards immigrants 
(in particular human capital, threat and trust), the higher the overall diversity change rate, 
the more likely one is to fall into either "positive in both years" or "negative to 











Figure 24. Multinomial logistic regression: diversity growth rate and changes in 
attitudes towards immigrants (Table D in Appendix) 
 
Remarks about following figures: 
* The following models only show major results of interest. In addition, the following 
characteristics were controlled in all of the models: age, gender, race, individual 
education, income, general trust towards others and towards family and relatives, 
feeling of safety in neighborhood, feeling that own race is decreasing in neighborhood, 
times visited home of friend of other race, length of residence, homeownership, tract-
level socio-economic status. 
* For full models of any of the following figures, please see appendix.  
* Immigrants were excluded from all the following models.  
Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.  
* N= 985, Pseudo-R2= .058 
 
 
Figure 25 shows overall effect of percent changes in Simpson diversity on changes in 
attitudes towards immigrants, interacted with the mover/stayers status. The figure includes 
bars labeled “Overall”, “Stayer” and “Mover”. The “overall” bar was included for 




labeled with an asterisk are significant. As indicated in the prior Figure 24 and the red bars 
in Figure 25, changes in diversity are significantly associated with being positive in both 
years and moving from a negative attitude towards a neutral or positive immigration stance. 
While the same observation holds true for stayers (increases in diversity are associated with 
persistently positive or increasingly positive attitudes towards immigrants), effects were 
insignificant for movers.  
The overall change rate is insignificant in the "negative in both years" category, which also 
held true for stayers. Only among those who moved do we find that the higher the change 
rate, the greater the likelihood of being in the category "negative in both years." This 
indicates that movers experiencing diversity growth might be more likely to have negative 
attitudes in the first place, while stayers experiencing diversity growth are more likely to 
have been positive in both years. An attempt to explain this discrepancy between movers 
and stayers will be made at the end of the chapter. 
 
Looking at the full models (see appendix, Table D) we see that individuals with a college 
degree or more than a college degree have higher odds of becoming more immigrant-
friendly over time than those who did not finish high school. While only college graduates 
were more likely to develop better-disposed attitudes, all the educational groups were more 
likely to feel good about immigrants in both years when compared to individuals without a 
high school diploma. General trust towards others is highly significant and positively related 
to improving attitudes towards immigration: respondents, who trust non-familial others 
(strangers, neighbors and friends) in 2006 are less likely to exhibit worsening attitudes, 




changing or worsening attitudes. This is in line with prior research showing that individuals 
who mainly trust family and close friends tend to form fewer relationships with outsiders, 
while those that actually bridge socioeconomic, racial or ethnic divides through trusting 
those they do not know end up forming more out-group bonds (Geys & Murdoch, 2010).  
The model only partially supports the individual-level threat hypothesis: while 
respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants are not influenced by how safe or unsafe they 
feel in their neighborhood, the demographic anxiety that the own racial group might be 
decreasing in relative size in their neighborhood spurs anti-immigrant sentiment. As various 
scholars have demonstrated (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993), this is a common reaction for 
individuals who base much of their self-worth on belonging to a racial group with clear 
spatial and social boundaries and have strong racial and ethnic identities. Individuals who 
are perceived as outsiders automatically threaten these racial and ethnic identities once 




















Figure 25. Multinomial logistic regression: diversity growth rate and changes in 




* Overall Model: N= 985, Pseudo-R2= .058 




The same model was conducted with change rates derived from shifts in immigrant 
percentage (Figure 26). As pointed out before, attitudes towards immigrants are likely 
influenced by the percentage of immigrants as well. While this study focuses on Simpson 
diversity as a more comprehensive measure of heterogeneity, changes in local immigrant 




Figure 26. Multinomial logistic regression: Percentage change in immigrant population 
and changes in attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by movers and stayers 
(Table F in Appendix) 
 
* Overall Model: N= 972, Pseudo-R2= .058 




First of all, it is important to notice that, without the mover/stayer distinction, neighborhood 
changes in immigrant presence are not significantly related to changes in attitudes. This is a 
contrast to the Simpson diversity changes, which entailed overall positive results. However, 
once the mover/stayer distinction is introduced, higher levels of immigrant percentage 




2012, while stayers were significantly less likely to fall into this category. Stayers had 
higher odds of developing complaisant attitudes between 2006 and 2012, while movers were 
more likely to develop feelings of threat between the two time points.  
Summing up the results from Figure 25 and 26, Simpson diversity growth is associated with 
more positive overall and stayer attitudes towards immigrants, while increases in 
neighborhood percentage of immigrants show more positive attitudes for stayers and more 
















iii. Panel Models by Level of Initial Diversity 
Figure 27. Multinomial logistic regression: diversity growth rate and changes in 
attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by movers/stayers and initial level of 
diversity (Table G in Appendix) 
 
* Overall Model:  
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 362, Pseudo-R2= .042 
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 329, Pseudo-R2= .099 
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 280, Pseudo-R2= .091 
* Mover/Stayer Model:  
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 362, Pseudo-R2= .058 
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 329, Pseudo-R2= .143 







As Lancee and Schaeffer (2015) demonstrate, the level of initial diversity matters for the 
effect of changes in neighborhood diversity on attitudes towards immigrants.  
Six separate models were conducted in Table 27: overall effect percentage change in 
Simpson diversity on changes in attitudes towards immigrants for (1) low-initial diversity, 
(2) medium-initial diversity and (3) high-initial diversity; effect percentage change in 
Simpson diversity on changes in attitudes towards immigrants for (4) stayers and movers in 
low-initial diversity, for (5) stayers and movers in medium-initial diversity and for (6) 
stayers and movers in high-initial diversity. Lighter bars visualize low initial diversity, 
while darker bars exemplify higher levels of initial diversity. As a reminder, the continuous 
variable measuring initial diversity scores in 2000 was separated into three equally sized 
subgroups. Consistent with the analysis in Chapter IV, the first group has diversity scores 
ranging from 0 - 24.3 (low origin-diversity), the second from 24.4 - 49.04 (medium origin-
diversity) and the final group ranges from 49.05 – 74.5 (high origin-diversity). 
Centering on the overall model (depicted by the red bars), which does not include a 
mover/stayer distinction, we can see that an increase in Simpson diversity is only positively 
associated with improved attitudes in high-diversity neighborhoods. Briefly put, diversity 
only seems to have a positive effect on tracts with high initial diversity in 2000. This 
confirms the hypothesis that individuals with prior exposure to heterogeneous 
neighborhoods will react positively to further diversity growth. 
The interaction term with the mover/stayer variable is significant showing the slopes for the 
outcome on diversity growth are significantly different for movers and stayers. Interestingly, 




through their relocation show worsening attitudes towards immigrants in the job market, 
while those individuals who moved from high diversity contexts to higher diversity 
improved their attitudes. Thus, it is mainly those movers that had relatively little prior 
exposure to diversity that responded negatively to changes in diversity.  
For stayers, the picture looks slightly different as their attitudes do not become more prone 
to threat over the course of time. Largely reflecting the overall model (red bar), it is 
particularly those individuals living in high-diversity neighborhoods who respond positively 
to changes in diversity surrounding them, while there is no significant effect for respondents 
in low- to medium-diversity neighborhoods.  
 
iiii. Panel Models for CBSA-level diversity changes 
As Kaufmann and Harris (2015) show, it is crucial to distinguish whether diversity growth 
effects are measured for higher-level contexts such as cities or counties, or for more fine-
grained neighborhoods. As pointed out before, most studies find higher levels of diversity to 
be associated with threat at higher geographic levels, while lower level diversity often seems 
to evoke friendlier attitudes and spurs inter-racial and inter-ethnic contact.  
In Figure 28, any positive effects of increasing diversity at the tract-level are reversed when 
measured at the city level: As diversity increases at the city-level, individuals with low and 
medium initial diversity levels get significantly more concerned about immigration. In fact, 
individuals experiencing heterogenization in low- and medium-level diversity cities between 




reaction to diversity growth over time. Part of the explanation for this difference in 
geographic level of diversity is that neighborhoods might offer more opportunity for 
contact. In this study, local diversity growth seems to reduce hostile feelings towards 
immigrants if respondents already live in diverse places. Higher geographic levels of 
analysis, however, might not capture actual contact, but rather reflect competition for jobs, 
housing and other resources (E. Oliver, 2010).  
 
Figure 28. Multinomial logistic regression: CBSA-level diversity growth rate and 
changes in attitudes towards immigrants, broken down initial level of CBSA-diversity 
 
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 362, Pseudo-R2= .058 
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 329, Pseudo-R2= .123 





Overall, we can conclude that tract-level changes in diversity elicit different reactions 
among respondents as they positively influence both movers’ and stayers’ attitudes in 
contexts of high initial diversity but negatively impact movers relocating from low-
diversity. In comparison, a negative relationship was observed between city level diversity 
and attitudinal changes at low- and medium- levels of initial diversity.  
 
iiiii. Panel Models by White/Non-White dichotomy  
In the following section I will test whether whites and non-whites differ in their reactions to 
rising levels of diversity and how these findings intersect with the mover/stayer distinction. 
Therefore, the earlier models will be replicated but broken down by white and non-white 
subgroups. As I have pointed out before, a dissection into movers and stayers will not be 
carried out for CBSA-level diversity. 
This model partially confirms the earlier observation that tract heterogenization leads to 
more complaisant attitudes towards immigrants. As shown in Figure 29 below, it is mainly 
non-white stayers that show significantly higher odds (1.072) of moving from negative to 
positive attitudes between 2006 and 2012. There was a marginally significant effect 
showing that respondents experiencing growing diversity between 2000 and 2010 are more 
likely to become more immigrant-friendly over time and less likely to be negative in both 
years. Based on the knowledge gained from prior models, the positive effect of increased 




diversity than whites. As a reminder, in 2000 whites lived in neighborhoods where the 
likelihood of randomly selecting two people with different racial or ethnic background was 
29 percent, while non-whites likelihood was 43 percent.  
While the mover/stayer model (Figure 25) evidenced that movers were more prone to move 
from positive/neutral attitudes to less immigrant-friendly attitudes as diversity grows, this 
observation only seems to hold true for white movers. This is consistent with other findings, 
since white respondents tend to live in lower-diversity contexts, and as we have seen in 
Figure 27, it is mainly those respondents in low- to medium- diversity neighborhoods that 














Figure 29. Multinomial logistic regression: diversity growth rate and changes in 
attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by movers/stayers and white/non-white 
 
Tract-Level Analysis 
* White Model: N= 590, Pseudo-R2= .043 
* Non-White Model: N= 398, Pseudo-R2= .079 
 
In line with prior results, both whites and non-whites were more likely to show negative 
changes in attitude over time as diversity rises on the CBSA-level (Figure 30), broadly 
confirming the earlier results. Thereby, the effect is stronger for stronger for whites, who 
exhibit 1.087 times the odds of developing threat-based attitudes over time. In line with the 
theory of ethnic competition, both whites and non-whites seem to feel as though they were 













































































































transfers. On the CBSA-level, these resentments versus immigration are therefore 
considered a defensive response to a perceived competition for scarce goods between 
different groups. 
Figure 30. Multinomial logistic regression: CBSA-level diversity growth rate and 
changes in attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by white/non-white 
 
CBSA-Level Analysis 
* White Model: N= 590, Pseudo-R2= .129 


































Making Sense of the Differential Findings for Movers and Stayers  
 
This Chapter stresses how attitudes towards racial and ethnic outsiders are affected by 
increases in diversity. However, Chapter III and V along with prior research on this topic 
(Koopmans et al., 2014; Laurence, 2011, 2014; Laurence & Bentley, 2015) have stressed the 
importance of dividing respondents into movers and stayers in order to capture dynamic 
processes underlying the reaction to residential neighborhoods. As demonstrated in Chapter 
III, diversity growth is different for movers and stayers –both in terms in quantity and 
quality- hence, leading to different reactions to outsiders in local communities.  
In order to understand why movers’ and stayers’ attitudes are so differently affected by 
diversity growth, it is important to study if movers’ relocations and stayers’ continued 
residence are in fact voluntary or whether these decision were driven by financial 
constraints. I hypothesize that is mainly movers with high-income backgrounds that self-
select into the neighborhoods they want to live in, because they have the financial means to 
do so.  
Residential mobility can be framed as an opportunity for social upward mobility. Contrary 
to the mixed results from studies surrounding the Moving to Opportunity experiment 
(Briggs, Popkin, & Goering, 2010; Clark, 2008; Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2001), recent 
research, that followed up on children involved in the MTO experiment, has found that 
improving living contexts for children have positive effects on their later success in life 
(Chetty & Hendren, 2016). The considerable attention to whether improved living contexts 




educational attainment stems from the belief that relocations into neighborhoods with more 
resources and better overall living standards can affect individuals’ life trajectories.  
However, the demographic analysis in Chapter III points out that not all moves are 
voluntary. Individuals do not necessarily pick neighborhoods to live in consciously, but 
might decide where to move in a reactive way (Sharkey, 2012) under substantial pressure. 
Decisions that lead individuals and their households to relocate might be largely 
overshadowed by income constraints. In fact, prior research has shown that poor families 
often relocate to neighborhoods with similar socio-economic characteristics as their current 
living context (Rosenblatt & DeLuca, 2012). Scholars have demonstrated that that it is 
mainly whites who move consciously and voluntarily based on their preferences and needs 
(McAllister, Kaiser, & Butler, 1971). Minority families, in contrast, have been shown to 
move based on involuntary shocks like displacement, foreclosure, unbearable contextual and 
living conditions and domestic violence, among other reasons (Newman & Owen, 1982). 
Furthermore, vulnerable families are more likely to experience downward mobility by 
relocating into less resourceful neighborhoods.  
Given the assumption that low-income individuals have less room for maneuver in their 
decision where to move, it is necessary to understand these scopes of action through a 
financial lens. Movers might find themselves unable to move to lower-diversity living 
contexts. While movers face constraints in form of income and cost, stayers might face 
similar problems: Faced with increasing diversity, stayers, who are not content with their 




while some stayers might like their neighborhoods and therefore remain between 2006 and 
2012, others might find themselves unable to move due to financial or familiar restraints. 
Hence, it is worthwhile to analyze the role of constraints for my stayer and mover findings. 
While PALS respondents are not randomly assigned to new neighborhoods (movers) and do 
not randomly live in certain neighborhoods over time (stayers), I hope that studying the 
reactions towards diversity growth of involuntary movers and stayers reduces self-selection 
bias. I believe that most moves are voluntary and for positive reasons.  However, since the 
study period includes the housing bubble and great recession, there may be more 
involuntary moves. For those parts of the population that did not have choice of where to 
relocate selection bias might play a lesser role. Unfortunately, there is no information of 
how voluntary a move was and how much agency individual’s had in choosing a new 
neighborhood. As evidenced by prior analyses, moves to new neighborhoods resulted in 
more diverse living contexts (in fact, Chapter III shows that diversity for movers increased 
by 57 percent between 2000 and 2010), and neighborhood socioeconomic status (as 
measured by the share of people above the age of 25 who did not attend college) did not 
increase much (45 in 2000 to 46 percent in 2010).  As a proxy, income is used as a 
determinant of how flexible someone is in moving or staying. I hypothesize that low-income 
movers are more likely to show deteriorating attitudes towards outsiders, as diversity growth 
might not happen on account of a voluntary decision to relocate, but might result from the 
inability to move to a “better” neighborhood. High-income movers, in theory, have more 
flexibility in choosing a neighborhood of their liking. The same kind of subgroup analysis 
will be conducted for stayers with similar hypothesis: Low-income stayers are expected to 




keeping them from moving away once diversity rises. High-income stayers, in contrast, are 
expected to show positive or no reaction, as they “chose” to remain. I am fully aware that 
this is an oversimplified statement, but it is an attempt to address the ambiguity in the 
mover-stayer findings through constraints. 
Income groups range from under 5000 Dollar per year by household up to 200,000 Dollars 
and more (Figure 31). The sample was divided into three non-overlapping groups of 
relatively equal size for movers and stayers: 
a. Low-Income Household ((< $5,000) - ($30,000-$35,000)), N=410 
b. Medium-Income Household (($35,000-$39,999) -	($60,000-$69,999)), N= 339 
c. High-Income Household (($70,000-$79,999) – ($200,000 or more)), N=357 
 
















In the following models, we see two-way interaction models (diversity growth interacted 
with mover/stayer distinction).  
As demonstrated in following figures, it is primarily low-income movers that feel either 
negatively about immigrants in both years or develop negative attitudes throughout the 
course of the six years. While prior models have demonstrated that income is positively 
associated with better attitudes, the below analysis by subgroup aids us in understanding 
how members of different income categories react to changes in local diversity.  
As shown in Figures 33 and 34, movers with medium- or high-income backgrounds react 
less harshly when confronted with diversity growth in their new neighborhood. In fact, 
movers with medium-high incomes are only marginally more likely to change their attitudes 
for the worse when they move to a more heterogeneous neighborhood. There is no 
significant effect for high-income movers. These results confirm the initial hypothesis that 
movers from low-income backgrounds might not move voluntarily, but actually find 
themselves forced to move to a diverse community. While there was no significant effect for 
high-income stayers, medium-income stayers are more likely to be positive both in 2006 and 









Figure 32. LOW-INCOME: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect Percentage Change in 
Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012, by Movers and 
Stayers * 
 
* N=274, Pseudo R2= 0.0853 
** Immigrants removed from the analysis, native-born only 
 
Figure 33. MEDIUM-INCOME: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect Percentage Change in 
















































* N=225, Pseudo R2= 0.1347 
** Immigrants removed from the analysis, native-born only 
 
Figure 34. HIGH-INCOME: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect Percentage Change in 
Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012, by Movers and 
Stayers 
 




Based on two time points of data (2006-2012) from the Portraits of American Life Survey 
the present paper analyzes the effect of changing levels of ethnic and racial diversity on 
attitudes towards immigrants in the U.S. by drawing on conceptual frameworks from the 
group threat and inter-group contact theory. In other words, this study estimates the 
association between diversity in 2000 and its change scores (2000-2010) and variations in 



















By relying on two time points of data, the present study was able to include residential 
mobility and neighborhood sorting as mechanism underlying attitudes towards ethnic 
outsiders. In addition, this study can address selection bias by separating movers from 
stayers and taking into account prior levels of diversity. This chapter investigates the role of 
income in influencing movers’ and stayers’ attitudes towards immigrants, arguing that self-
selection bias will be more inherent to richer people than to those with limited financial 
means, who might be able to choose which neighborhood to move into or to stay in. 
Measures of human capital, threat and trust were included into all of the models as key 
indicators of immigrant-related attitudes. 
While models based on two time-points need to be interpreted carefully and do not 
necessarily demonstrate causal processes under way, certain directionalities in shaping 
individual behavior are identified. First and foremost, the results point to the need to 
differentiate between movers and stayers in their reaction to changing diversity patterns in 
their neighborhood. Similar to Laurence and Bentley (2015) and Lancee and Schaeffer 
(2015a), who investigate similar questions in the European context, this study highlights that 
diversity growth has different effects for movers and stayers. Thus, an individual’s reaction 
to rising diversity interacts with the conditions under which they experience diversity 
changes.  
Overall, increases in diversity are associated with improved attitudes over time. However, 
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate that movers and stayers inherently experience different 
conditions influencing their reaction to rising heterogeneity. There is a significant 




Results from the multinomial logistic regression show that an increase in Simpson diversity 
is positively associated with attitudes towards immigrants for stayers, while indicating no 
relationship for movers. More generally, if stayers were to experience increasing diversity, 
they would be expected to improve attitudes towards immigrants. When diversity is 
measured through changes in immigrant percentage, increases in neighborhood percentage 
of immigrants show improving attitudes for stayers and worsening attitudes for movers.  
Furthermore, these results need to be analyzed in the light of different initial levels of 
diversity. The role of initial diversity is particularly interesting for the mover/stayer 
distinction. It was hypothetically argued that movers who relocated from homogeneous to 
more diverse neighborhoods or stayers who experienced diversification in low-diversity 
tracts would get more concerned about immigration, while those that were already living in 
diverse neighborhoods and were therefore more acquainted with out-group members, would 
not change their views or even improve them. These hypotheses were confirmed in the 
findings. The results indicate that respondents that have little to medium-level of initial 
exposure to diversity mainly drive the worsening in attitudes for movers. As diversity grows 
between 2000 and 2010, movers from relatively homogenous neighborhoods seem to 
experience immigrants as a threat to their jobs, while those that already live in high diversity 
neighborhoods respond positively, results that support both the contact and threat 
hypothesis. Positive attitudes among stayers seem to be largely driven by those individuals 
who already live in highly diverse neighborhoods (medium-level neighborhoods were 




The white/non-white subgroup model that included interaction effects for movers and 
stayers corroborated and refined these results: Higher odds becoming more immigrant-
friendly over time were mainly observed for non-white stayers, who are more familiar with 
heterogeneity and therefore find diversification less threatening. White movers, who tend to 
live in lower-diversity neighborhoods, respond negatively to heterogenization. 
What is surprising about these findings is that one might expect that respondents who move 
to higher-diversity contexts might be in search for more racial and ethnic heterogeneity and 
therefore less likely to perceive immigrants as a threat to the American worker. However, 
the results suggest that movers from medium- and low-diversity neighborhoods might be 
less trusting in general or could exhibit other underlying characteristics that influence their 
attitudes. In particular, movers to higher diversity could be constrained in the ability to 
move to a neighborhood of their choice. In order to address self-selection bias, I conducted 
separate analyses for three different income tertials, whereby it became apparent that it is 
mainly low-income movers who show fearful reactions towards diversity growth. Thus, it is 
not moving as such that elicits this feeling of threat; instead, the circumstances under which 
people move and how voluntarily they decide where to move shapes latter attitudes.  
Furthermore, this study finds that it is crucial to draw distinctions between different levels 
of geography. While most of the results reported above pertain to tract-level changes in 
diversity, bigger-scale diversity (in this case measured through micro- and metropolitan 
areas) evokes different reactions among respondents. Across low-and medium levels of 
initial community heterogeneity, concerns towards immigrants seem to rise with higher 




competition for resources like housing, employment and political power, it is likely that the 
threat hypothesis holds true when diversity outcomes are observed at the city level.  At the 
tract level, the results reflect the contact hypothesis for stayers, with the threat hypothesis 
applying to individuals in lower diversity neighborhoods that have low interaction with out-























OVERALL CONCLUSION  
 
The growing antipathy towards strangers in general has become evident in the election of 
Donald Trump as the new president and the panic surrounding the entrance of immigrants 
and refugees from Muslim countries, in particular. Also outside the U.S., recent political 
shifts have stressed the western divide in reactions to diversity growth: On the one hand we 
see that right-wing conservatism has risen, and on the other, the influx of immigrants and 
refugees has encouraged citizens’ commitment to welcome ‘strangers’. This study 
investigates the reactions of people faced with rising levels of diversity. Deliberately 
focusing on diversity growth rates instead of percentage point increases, this study attempts 
to understand how relative diversification affects individuals’ feelings about immigrants and 
their out-group bridging behavior. As the demographic analysis in Chapter III evidences, 
diversification is no longer an urban phenomenon: instead, diversity growth mainly takes 
place in low-immigration and low-diversity tracts and cities. While patterns of immigration 
and diversity are by no means congruent in their spatial distribution, a large chunk of 
diversity growth is driven by immigrants’ relocation into non-traditional areas of 
immigration.  
As diversity continues to grow, especially in parts of the country that are relatively 
unacquainted with diverse populations, it is important to understand how various groups of 
people react to the demographic changes. These distinctive reactions are reflected in the 




interethnic attitudes, and interethnic and interracial behavior. On the one hand, the contact 
hypothesis argues that diversity growth leads to improved attitudes and higher chances of 
interaction with racial and ethnic others at schools, at the work place or in the neighborhood. 
On the other, there are threat-based explanations such as inter-group competition, defended 
neighborhoods and disorganizations theories. Succinctly, more cultural diversity equals less 
social capital, less trust and cohesion and most importantly for this study, worse attitudes 
and less interaction with racial and ethnic outsiders –this is the central statement formulated 
by Robert Putnam ( 2001).  
The forms and motives surrounding individuals’ behavior towards racial and ethnic others 
deserve stronger attention because they have short-term and long-term consequences for the 
social cohesion and trust in an increasingly diverse society. As a possible outlook for the 
years to come, Alba and Tsao argue that the perception of immigrants as a threat and an 
alien element might actually decrease in the future as the United States face labor shortages 
due to the aging of the population; consequently, the years to come offer “extraordinary 
opportunity for minority mobility” (Alba & Tsao, 2010, p. 5). According to Alba and Tsao, 
the U.S. is entering what he refers to as a period of “non-zero-sum mobility”, where the 
upward mobility of racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants might not impact the 
majority population due to vacant job opportunities and a growing age structure. While the 
diversification of the U.S. gives reason for hope, a major concern remains the growing 
unrest and disunity regarding heightened levels of diversity (Lichter, 2013c). As children 
grow up in a diversifying country, they face challenges of inclusion, racism and xenophobia 
that will essentially influence their chances of becoming productive and integrated members 




heterogeneity impact societal perception of and interaction with out-group members.  
The present study focuses on two major features of social cohesion and bridging behavior to 
ethnoracial minority members: the changes in willingness to spend time with racial out-
group friends, and the changes in attitudes towards immigrants. This study addresses the 
impact of changes in dynamic neighborhoods on changes in attitudes and propensity to 
interact with racial and ethnic out-group friends over time rather than solely capturing cross-
sectional associations. While impressive efforts have been made outside the U.S. to capture 
such changes (Kaufmann & Harris, 2015; Lancee & Schaeffer, 2015a; Laurence & Bentley, 
2015), most U.S. studies rely on national-level repeated cross-sections. They offer 
interesting insights into tendencies and associations, but their methodology impedes 
conclusions on changes in attitudes towards immigration and interaction with out-group 
members.  
In fact, the cross-sectional part of this study corroborates the positive association between 
diversity and attitudes and interactions: the higher local diversity is, the more likely an 
individual is to have a complaisant attitude towards immigrants, and the higher the 
propensity of a white individual to visit a racial out-group friend at home. However, these 
results are not causally interpretable. In fact, these results mainly show that higher 
heterogeneity attracts (white) individuals who feel comfortable living in diverse 
neighborhoods and cities. These results also imply that those (white) individuals who do not 
approve of diversity, and diversity growth in particular, could have out-migrated, leaving 




who faced increases in diversity had a higher propensity to move between 2006 and 2012 
even though these relocations do not end in lower-diversity neighborhoods. 
To my knowledge, this is one of the first U.S. studies using survey data to look at how tract- 
and city-level diversity growth is related to changes in attitudes towards immigrants over 
time by relying on two time points. Repeated observations taken on the same subject prove 
to be beneficial in understanding the effects of rising diversity by uncovering causally 
directed diversity effects. Furthermore, the step-by-step approach chosen in the analytical 
section of Chapter II (overall models ! broken down by movers and stayers ! broken 
down by whites and non-whites ! broken down by initial level of diversity) helps us 
understand how these different aspects build on each other, are interrelated and, in some 
cases, create different realities.  
As a reminder, the analysis was broken down into movers and stayers only for Chapter V 
(changes in attitudes), while Chapter IV (changes in cross-racial friendship) only focuses on 
stayers. Summing up the findings from Chapter IV and V, it is helpful to look at Table 31 









Table 31. Summary of Main Findings (Chapter IV and V) 
 CHAPTER IV 
“Out-Group Bridging” 
CHAPTER V 
“Attitudes towards Immigrants” 
A) Cross-sectional Models 
 
 • Positive association between Simpson diversity 
and out-group bridging frequency 
• Out-group friendships depend strongly on 
contextual diversity for whites.  
• No association of diversity and bridging for non-
whites. 
• Positive association between Simpson 
diversity/immigration percentage on 
attitudes towards immigrants 
• Significant association between  
diversity and positive attitudes for 
whites and non-whites 
 
B) Panel Models 
 
 Overall • As diversity rises, individuals 
most likely to “never visit or 
invite in both years” 
• As diversity rises, individuals more 
likely to feel better about immigrants 
over time 
Mover/Stayer ----- As diversity rises… 
• Stayers: “positive in both years”, 
“negative to positive” 
• Movers: “negative in both years” 
• Low-income movers feel either 
threatened by immigrants in both 




• No effect for whites 
• “No visits in both years” for non-
whites 
• Non-white stayers react positively to 
diversity growth 




• Both whites’ and non-whites’ 
friendships suffer from low-initial 
diversity 
• Negative effect also for non-
whites in medium-level diversity 
• Non-whites and whites in high 
diversity spend more time with 
out-group bonds as diversity 
increases 
 
• Movers in low initial diversity develop 
feeling of threat when diversity grows  
• Movers and stayers in high initial 
diversity improve attitudes 
 
CBSA • No significant effects at all levels 
of initial diversity 
 
• Individuals in low- and medium initial 






I find evidence that neighborhood- and city-level diversity is determinant in shaping 
individual’s out-group attitudes and interaction, which is in line with prior research on this 
topic. The main results using PALS panel data at the tract-level suggest that  
A) Growing Simpson diversity leads to higher odds of visiting or inviting out-group 
friends for non-whites and whites already living in high initial diversity (a 
neighborhood with a more than 50 percent chance of randomly selecting two racially 
or ethnically different people). However, low-diversity residential contexts affect 
out-group bonds detrimentally for whites and non-whites, but it takes a larger toll on 
non-whites. 
B) In general, diversity growth is associated with attitude improvement between 2006 
and 2012. However, the study including interaction effects also shows that this 
positive relationship only holds true for stayers (in particular stayers experienced 
with diversity). More specifically, movers living in low- and medium-heterogeneity 
contexts and those movers with limited financial means actually show worsening 
attitudes over time, while movers that have initial experience with high-diversity 
show attitude improvement.  
 
It is important to point out that diversity growth has both beneficial and detrimental effects 
on attitudes depending on the circumstances. Both out-group bridging and attitudes are 
highly sensitive to outside influences, and both can be advantageously and 




following section, factors influencing out-group bridging and attitudes are discussed in more 
detail.  
The assessment of this study should begin with an optimistic outlook: Contrary to Putnam's 
interpretation that diversity leads to a general decline in trust and withdrawal into private 
life, the study demonstrates that parts of the U.S. feel increasingly more comfortable with 
the diversification of the American population. However, the findings show that unfavorable 
changes in attitudes and out-group interaction are not inevitable. Instead, the study 
concludes that careful distinctions by movers and stayers, initial level of diversity, 
geographic level of diversity measurement and racial background need to be taken into 
account in order to fully understand what fosters and what hinders interracial connections 
and immigrant-friendly attitudes. 
The panel data proved to be useful in addressing initial levels of diversity by modeling 
different outcomes for respondents from low-diversity neighborhoods and how they react to 
diversity relative to individuals from medium- or high-level diversity. Individuals who had 
high levels of diversity in their neighborhood in 2000 and experience further diversity 
growth over time are more used to heterogeneity and react positively to heterogeneity 
growth. Thus, diversification seems less threatening and might actually be understood as an 
opportunity for other inter-group contact.  
On the other hand, individuals from low-diversity (and in some cases medium-level) 
backgrounds did not show positive reactions to diversification in terms of out-group 
bridging, and in the case of out-group attitudes, low-diversity movers showed deteriorating 




were dissected by above-mentioned covariates, it became apparent Putnam’s general 
“hunkering down” is not an exaggeration, especially if respondents initially live in low-
diversity neighborhoods. This study finds that increasing diversity is threatening for those 
movers who previously lived in homogeneity and move to higher-level diversity, because 
little inter-group contact was made in homogenous areas.  
It remains unclear why stayers react differently to diversity than movers. It can be argued 
that the loss of neighborhood ties and friendships has detrimental effects on out-group 
attitudes and interaction in general, which in turn leads to a worsening of attitudes between 
2006 and 2012. Several studies have demonstrated that while movers might, in some cases, 
voluntarily relocate to areas that fit their needs and expectations, movers themselves exhibit 
fewer social ties (Fauth, Leventhal, & Brooks-Gunn, 2008). It could be that the relative lack 
of bridging and bridging ties made movers more prone to relocate in the first place when 
compared to people with more social connections, who are more hesitant to move (Coulton, 
Theodos, & Turner, 2012). In fact, the logistic regression in Chapter V demonstrates that 
individuals that decide to relocate between 2006 and 2012 show lower levels of trust 
towards family members and relatives, but also towards their social network (friends, 
neighbors and strangers). All in all, moving to a new city or neighborhood might interrupt 
community ties in general. I also pointed out that movers might experience anticipation 
effects when relocating to a new neighborhood with higher levels of diversity. 
For this study, I focused on individual-level income to tease out if involuntary relocations 
(due to evictions, foreclosures or the inability to afford a “better” neighborhood) might lead 




over time. Movers tend to have lower incomes when compared to stayers and might feel 
more unsafe in their 2006 neighborhood, which might serve as a incentive to move. I argue 
that not all movers who end up in more heterogeneous neighborhoods relocate voluntarily. 
In fact, this hypothesis was confirmed showing that it might not be moving as such that 
drives down immigrant-friendly attitudes but instead low-income movers that drive the 
overall negative findings for movers. Breaking the analysis down into subgroup models 
proved very useful in understanding discrepancies in outcomes for movers and stayers: 
Findings show that movers’ changes in attitudes towards immigrants are susceptible to 
income restraints. Negative attitudes among movers are mainly driven by low-income 
respondents who might not be free in deciding where to move, but instead relocate in a 
reactionary manner.  
As the demographic discussion in Chapter III showed, diversity experiences vary 
dramatically for whites and non-whites and were therefore broken down along this line. At 
first, it seems that the main narratives in the white/non-white interaction models are very 
different for Chapter IV and V: in Chapter IV, increased diversity did not have any effect on 
whites but it did on non-whites. Strangely, as diversity increases non-whites are more likely 
to fall into the category “No visits in both years”. It could be argued that non-whites are 
more inclined to see their neighborhood as a sanctuary from the “white world,” and thus 
value same-race neighborhood interactions more. This contradicted my initial hypothesis as 
I expected non-whites to show increased out-group bridging as non-whites have been shown 
to live in higher levels of diversity and would therefore be expected to be more accustomed 
to heterogeneity. While these results are puzzling they are a result of the overall model not 




In Chapter V, initial diversity was found to play an important role for whites and non-whites 
alike. It was shown that white movers in low initial diversity develop feelings of threat over 
time when neighborhoods diversify. In contrast, white movers in high initial diversity 
showed improving attitudes between 2006 and 2012. The positive effect of heterogenization 
only held true for non-white stayers in high initial diversity.  
Summing up we can say that non-whites and whites who were accustomed to high-diversity 
neighborhoods showed heightened out-group bridging. The negative non-white relationship 
between diversity growth and out-group friendship found in the overall models seems to 
stem from low- and medium initial diversity. 
Since prior research has argued that varying geographical levels might also influence the 
outcomes, separate analysis were conducted for neighborhoods (measured through Census 
tracts) and Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA), which approximate cities. I conclude that 
it is crucial to distinguish between different levels of geography. While the CBSA-level 
analysis did not prove to be meaningful for predicting out-group bridging it was a 
significant in predicting attitudes. There is no certainty in how to interpret this finding. I 
suspect that growing city-level heterogeneity is too removed and distant to have actual 
effects on individual’s propensity to form or intensify out-group friendships, while attitudes 
are more easily impacted. Diversity growth on the CBSA-level diversity exerts strong 
negative effects on individuals’ perceptions of out-group member supporting one of today's 
most influential perspectives on immigrants: Immigration is believed to put a risk to social 
standards, social resources and jobs, because immigrants are willing to work for dumping 




the tract-level analysis are not as negative and one-sided and point to the need to separate by 




As common to most quantitative studies, there are limitations to the research and 
interpretation of the results.  
Most pressingly, the interpretation of the findings is limited due to the reliance on only two-
time points. First of all, it is important to keep in mind that two time points offer only a 
limited statement on the course of the change in behavior since intermittent events are not 
recorded. Furthermore, due to the lack of an experimental design with randomized control 
groups, the present analysis does not constitute a true longitudinal study that can be causally 
interpreted. It is important to make note that results in this study only reflects how changes 
in contextual features are related to changes in behavior and attitude, but do not depict a 
causal relationship.  
Strictly speaking, in a correlative relationship between two features A (diversity growth) 
and B (change in behavior or attitude), four interpretations are possible with regard to the 
causal interpretation: 
1. A causes causal B. 
2. B causes causal A. 
3. A third variable C causes causally both A and B in the same way, while between A 




4. A and B are mutually interrelated in a circular process. 
 
Based on the theoretical assumption, the results show how changes in diversity (A) affect 
changes in individual behavior and attitude (B). It is highly unlikely that changes in 
behavior or attitudes cause diversity growth. However, it is not possible to rule out the 
effects of "third variables" within the scope of the panel analyses or a certain circular 
interchange between A and B. Thus, a study that is not limited to two time points but 
includes several different time points would be preferable for future research.  
A true causal effect cannot be observed for just two time points because the selection into 
certain neighborhoods does not take place randomly. Ideally, it would have constituted a 
true causal approach if random people had experienced increases in diversity versus a group 
that underwent decreases and no changes. What I do, instead, is to compare the observed 
reactions and behavior of the treated (individuals in diversifying tracts and cities) to the 
reaction and behavior of the untreated.  
Secondly, six years (2006 to 2012) might cover too short a time span to observe changes in 
individuals’ behaviors and attitudes. It would be interesting to see what happens when more 
time passes. Do people experience a “shock” to their attitudes and interactional behavior 
when diversity increases, which then levels off? Or do improvements or impairments to 
attitudes take more time to manifest?   
Due to the limited availability of variables measuring out-group attitudes and inter-group 
bridging in 2006 and 2012, I was bound to two outcome variables that might seem too 




combining several indicators of attitudes (belief that immigration should be limited, 
immigrants increase crime rates etc.) through factor analysis. The number of times a person 
visited a racial out-group friend is one way of studying out-group bridging. Had there been 
more panel variables, I could have used a more generic outcome measuring whether an 
individual had out-group friends, how the composition of friends changes over time and so 
on. However, I still believe that these variables are acceptable proxies for overall attitudes 
towards immigrants and the willingness to interact with racial out-group members. As I 
demonstrated using the General Social Survey, the feeling of threat on the job market is 
highly correlated with other indicators of a threat-based perception of immigration.  
Furthermore, a larger sample size might have enabled greater confidence in the results. The 
sample was on the verge of being too small. As pointed out earlier, the sample could not be 
subdivided into subgroups of more than one or two parameters. In other words, different 
subgroup models had to be implemented measuring the effect of diversity changes on 
behavior through a white/non-white lens, for instance, followed by a separate subgroup 
analysis broken down movers and stayers by level of initial diversity.  
I decided to focus on the Simpson’s Diversity Index instead of the percentage of minorities, 
because the Simpson diversity measure is that it incorporates five different racial groups 
(white, black, Asian, Hispanic, other) into one score, which reduces the number of 
parameters that would have needed to be considered. Rather than singling out a specific 
racial or ethnic group, the Simpson diversity index offers a leveled ground for the 
comparison across geographic entities. However, while it takes into account both richness 




ethnic group in a sample rather than presenting a measure of overall evenness. Critics have 
argued that ethnic and racial groups with smaller numbers of group members (other, Asians) 
only affect the overall diversity score marginally (Magurran, 2003).  
I still believe that is the best measure to use, because it conveys a general sense of how 
many races and ethnicities are prominent. In prior research scholars have suggested to use 
alternative measures of diversity in the same study as a sensitivity analysis even though 
different indices where found to be practically indistinguishable from each other (Schaeffer, 
2013). I have cross-validated the maps and results using the Entropy score, which is highly 
correlated with the Simpson diversity index. As expected, there is great overlap in the 
findings suggesting that the Simpson diversity measure is indeed an adequate way of 
quantifying heterogeneity.  
Both parts of this dissertation focus on contextual effects shaping individual level racial and 
ethnic out-group attitudes and friendships without considering local policy and local policy 
changes that might influence these outcomes (Bart Meuleman, 2009; Koopmans & 
Schaeffer, 2015). Future research should analyze the influence that different instruments of 
policy and different local politics (government culture of welcoming immigrants, for 
instance) have on individuals with different racial and ethnic backgrounds living together 
and working in heterogeneous contexts. For example, should it be true that living in 
diversifying context leads to a deterioration in attitudes for those in low-diversity 
neighborhoods, the following questions arise: Are there local integration policies in cities 





Another concern or information to keep in mind is that measuring diversity (and percentage 
of immigrants) at the tract- and city level helps us understand how individual perceptions 
are shaped by the environment, but can deviate fundamentally from the ratios measured by 
statistical indices. Since one of the central questions is whether there is an influence of 
regional and local diversity on out-group interaction and attitudes, there is a focus on the 
contextual characteristics that give us information on the ethnic composition of the 
population in the regions under study. However, statistical ratios do not exactly reflect the 
socio-spatial living worlds of respondents. For instance, an individual might live on a highly 
segregated block within a diverse neighborhood, but does not actually interact with racial or 
ethnic out-group members. While this study includes an attempt to take into account various 
levels of geography, future research should explore the micro-level individual experiences 
of respondents as well. Even though the present study includes both CBSA- and Census-
tract-level analysis, which provides an advantage over other studies, we need to keep in 
mind that these administratively drawn boundaries represent only approximations of actual 
neighborhoods and living contexts. In fact, individuals’ attitudes might be influenced 
beyond or within these boundaries, or patterns of inter-group contact could be affected 
outside of these geographic zones. As pointed out before, respondents’ attitudes are not only 
shaped by where they live, but whom they interact with at work, at their children’s schools, 
and so on. In some cases, individuals travel outside of their tracts and even metropolitan 
areas to reach these destinations. Thus, this paper only addresses a limited context of 
residential exposure to diversity changes. 
While I would have liked to analyze subgroups for Whites, Blacks, Asians and Hispanic, 




Whites constitute the biggest group (N=630), Blacks (N=250), Asians (N=94) and Hispanics 
(N=196) are somewhat underrepresented. I therefore had to refrain to a broader 
categorization of White and Non-White, which offered meaningful implications. For future 
research, a more fine-grained subgroup analysis should be implemented to tease out 




Prejudice and stereotyping are common to most societies. So is the proverbial tendency for 
birds of a feather to flock together. However, the problem of xenophobic and racist attitudes 
becomes highly problematic when it develops into discriminatory behavior. In this context, 
ethnic and racial diversification is a widely used method in policy-making to ensure the 
equal distribution of resources and to stimulate and support inter-group contact and the 
decrease of xenophobia and racism. There are a variety of programs within organizations 
and institutions that try to foster interethnic and interracial communication. In addition to 
civic associations, many public institutions (ranging from kindergartens to colleges, and 
from police facilities to clinics) and companies (catchword "diversity management”) have 
implemented strategies that focus on diversity and try to encourage not only diverse 
demographics but also actual cohesion and interaction. Since racial and ethnic diversity is 
not only a demographic fact but also a social value added in terms of education (Gurin, Dey, 
Hurtado, & Gurin, 2002), innovation (O. Richard, McMillan, Chadwick, & Dwyer, 2003) 
and economic advantages (O. C. Richard, 2000) amongst other benefits, the formation of 




diversification among students and in the workplace have been established (despite 
considerable resistance to workplace and educational diversity policies that supposedly give 
some groups unfair advantages), it still remains unclear whether diversity growth in 
communities and cities across the U.S. fosters out-group understanding and bridging.  
One of the major questions I intended to answer was whether representational diversity 
measured through the Simpson Diversity score actually leads to changes in out-group 
perception and interaction. While group-threat and inter-group-contact theories offer 
alternative scenarios of what happens when diversity grows, local diversification need not 
necessarily lead to more interaction at all. Daily lives in diversifying neighborhoods might 
not mean actual exposure to each other; instead, daily routines and activity spaces can be 
marked by microsegregation along lines of socioeconomic background, race and ethnicity 
(Browning, Calder, Krivo, Smith, & Boettner, 2017; Tach, 2014). Furthermore, researchers 
have recently shown that the proclaimed decrease in black-white does not hold true on 
micro-levels of segregation (Lichter et al., 2015). 
The main conclusion from this study is that diversity growth actually does influence 
attitudes and inter-group contact for stayers positively if they initially live in high-diversity 
neighborhoods. Whether attitudes are actually improved through diversified daily routines 
and communication is not certain, but clearly the presence of an increasingly heterogeneous 
population is associated with improving attitudes towards immigrants and racial out-group 
bridging. In contrast, individuals who reside in low-diversity neighborhoods and experience 
gradual diversification through relocation or in their neighborhood, show obverse or no 




that leads to the development of detrimental attitudes towards outsiders, or whether the mere 
presence suffices to trigger feelings of xenophobia. While this study uncovers interesting 
relationships between diversification and changes in out-group attitudes and bridging, future 
research should take a closer look at what diversity increases actually mean for individual 
residents on a day-to-day basis.  
While rising neighborhood diversity is associated with more out-group bridging and 
improved out-group attitudes in neighborhoods with established diverse populations, 
neighborhood diversity itself should not be considered as adequate in driving down 
xenophobic stereotyping and hesitant out-group bridging. As this study shows, it is mainly 
residents in areas that were already diverse to begin with that drive positive results. Actual 
encounters and actual contact between locals, racial out-group members and immigrants 
should be the core element of an open and tolerant society, particularly with regards to those 
people who have not been exposed to much diversity initially. The results from this study 
are troubling in that they show how white and non-white movers and stayers in low (and 
medium) diversity show immigrant-unfriendly reactions and a partial decrease in out-group 
bonds over time.  
How can the study’s findings be interpreted, and more importantly, which policy changes 
and neighborhood programs should be implemented in low-diversity areas to encourage 
improved out-group attitudes and bridging through heightened levels of interaction? How 
can a warmer inclusionary culture towards immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities be 




Rather than focusing on the educational or economic benefits of a diversifying population, 
the contact and participation in common day-to-day activities of people with different racial 
or ethnic backgrounds is of central importance for the success of peaceful coexistence under 
conditions of increasing cultural, religious and ethnic diversity in low-diversity 
neighborhoods and cities. An exchange between the different groups in early stages of 
people’s lives, for instance in institutional places like kindergartens and schools, could be 
crucial in reducing xenophobia and intolerance in later life. On top of interracial and 
interethnic contact in institutional and public settings, prejudices against members of other 
groups are reduced when the following optimal "contact conditions" are found: (1) the same 
status in the contact situation, (2) assistance by recognized authorities, (3) a joint superior 
goal, and (4) cooperation (Allport, 1979a). These optimal contact conditions, which are also 
referred to as "friendship potential" of an environment, are conducive to the formation of 
successful intercultural friendships.  
In addition to the common goals, similar status, support from authorities and cooperation, 
effective information programs are relevant to obliterate xenophobia and out-group fear, 
because they can take account of the perception process and counter prejudices by 
falsifying, expanding or differentiating existing racial and ethnic categories. Although in 
practice, information programs are quite common nowadays (e.g., media campaigns 
regarding the 'political correct' representation of foreigners, anti-racist and anti-fascist 
groups, presentations in school teaching), they are often linked to contact programs. The 
link between contact/interaction and information is essential, because every intercultural 




Americans today, I wonder if education in matters of immigration, race and diversity will 
have a large effect.  
On the policy level, the idea of managing, controlling and regulating migratory movements 
has been a clear priority. The current U.S. administration emphasizes the detriments of 
diversity and immigration rather than focusing on the advancement of inter-group ties and 
cooperation. The current practice of promotion of public cohesion mainly pertains to 
bonding social capital (the promotion of internal relations in a group) rather than bridging 
social capital (the relationship that a group takes to other social entities). Instead, structural 
bridging or incentives for bridging implemented by city governments and state level policies 
could help to promote friendships between different races and ethnicities by further steering 
the cultural and ethnic composition of schools, colleges and work places and encouraging 
interethnic group work. 
While I believe the government could take a more active role in stimulating interethnic and 
interracial interaction and improved attitudes towards each other, researchers at the WZB 
(Berlin Social Science Center) rightly point out that out-group attitudes and friendships 
cannot and should not be organized by the state or by social workers (Koopmans, Dunkel, 
Schaeffer, & Veit, 2011). Instead, the authors claim that the focus should lie on the 
promotion of the neighborhood, whose purpose should not be targeted directly as 
"intercultural encounter", but where spontaneous encounters can occur that then lead to 
intercultural understanding and respect. It is important to stress that diverse neighborhood 
infrastructure does not equal mere diversity growth. Instead, diversity growth in 




cultural communication. An excellent example of a place where such interethnic and 
interracial bonding can take place is community gardens, which have been shown to 
encourage such ties (Parry, Shinew, & Glover, 2004). In addition, the focus should be on 
parks, playgrounds and the promotion of a broad range of medium-sized businesses. While I 
agree that a harmonization through contact and interaction should happen in people’s natural 
living contexts, the powerful microsegregation in America’s communities and 
neighborhoods might prohibit such encounters (Lichter et al., 2015). While exposure to 
others might not create inter-group cohesion, it is certainly a prerequisite for the formation 
of out-group bridges and bonds.  
Finally, I believe that concerns and fears caused by economic and social changes at the local 
level have not been adequately addressed in the realm of politics, which has reinforced the 
fears of marginalized groups to be ignored and forgotten. As this study shows, it is 
oftentimes the low-income population in low-diversity communities that fears diversity 
growths. Furthermore, there is a longstanding bitterness of poor and working-class whites 
toward so-called “limousine liberals,” who try to impose integration but often live in very 
segregated environments. This anger and fear needs to be taken seriously. As we could 
observe in the past years, the feeling of being dismissed has led to the rejection of more 
established political parties and the values they represent, and given rise to populist, right-
wing parties. It is not enough to explain to people who are afraid of diversity growth that we 
need immigrants and diversification for demographic reasons in order to compensate for the 
decline in births and the professional deficit. Government, experts, employers and trade 
unions have done this in Switzerland and Germany for years, with minor success. Not taking 




entry of the far-right nationalist movement AFD into the German parliament, developments 
around the UK's decision to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the election of Donald 
Trump have shown. Concerns regarding personal living environments, high migrant rates in 
schools or increasing criminality - whether justified or not - can easily turn into open 
rejection or worse. Without a structural understanding of racism and xenophobic attitudes, 
any legal instrument, including a punishment for racist action, will only have marginal 
impact. It is only when the institutions and the legal state take the problem seriously that it 
can be combated. Instead of relying on the government’s role in welcoming immigrants and 
decreasing inter-racial tension, U.S. cities and municipalities need to take more initiative. 
Cities and communities need to create affordable housing, for the new citizens as well as for 
the locals, so that there is no repression contest. They must create more integration 
opportunities in schools and beyond. And they should do more to prevent migrants from 
being exploited as cheap labor and be perceived as competition by local workers. This 
impression encourages xenophobia. A particularly successful example of how such policy 
and community intervention could look like is “Welcoming America”, which has 
established a network of "welcoming cities" in the USA and is also working with the 
approach of strategically networking the various stakeholder groups in order to successfully 












































Table A. Relative Risk Ratios (Longitudinal), Effect Percentage Change in Diversity 
on Changes in Out-Group Interaction, 2006-2012 (Figure 18) 
Reference	Category:	NO	VISITS	OR	INVITES	IN	2006	AND	2012	








MES TO NEVER   




0.996 -2.520 0.996 -2.090 0.995 -0.870 0.997 -2.260 
Age 0.890 -4.240 0.954 -6.670 0.967 -5.520 0.962 -4.540 
Male 1.215 0.830 1.801 1.950 1.324 0.820 1.683 1.950 
Parents born in 
U.S. 
1.244 0.780 1.508 0.980 1.276 0.680 1.392 1.210 
High School 1.568 0.690 2.311 1.480 0.978 -0.130 1.119 0.540 
College 1.552 0.720 3.193 1.890 1.011 0.020 1.297 0.570 
More than 
College 
1.591 2.230 2.523 2.610 1.210 0.290 0.979 -0.150 
Income 1.352 -4.100 2.577 1.680 0.802 0.730 0.698 1.420 
General Trust 
towards others 




0.882 -0.890 1.098 0.510 1.035 0.250 0.913 -1.170 
Felt Unsafe in 
NH 
1.097 0.410 0.858 -0.720 1.121 0.310 0.945 -0.190 
Feeling that 
own race is 
decreasing 
0.553 -0.960 1.369 0.980 0.773 -0.850 0.888 -0.610 
Neighborhood 
SES 
1.251 0.830 0.915 -2.750 1.387 0.270 1.014 -2.850 
Constant 5.986 2.730 15.647 3.830 15.635 4.630 9.668 3.520 








Table B. By White/Non-White Status: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect % Change in 
















  RRR (z) RRR (z) RRR (z) RRR (z) 
Percentage Change Diversity 0.995 -1.38 0.993 -2.20 0.996 -1.93 0.994 -2.11 
White (0,1) 0.375 -2.75 0.212 -4.07 0.164 -4.99 0.304 -3.53 
Percentage Change 
Diversity- WHITE 1.003 0.74 1.006 1.58 1.003 0.97 1.004 1.19 
Age 0.966 -3.63 0.928 -6.99 0.958 -4.34 0.967 -3.75 
Male 1.269 0.81 1.835 1.99 1.301 0.89 1.702 1.93 
Parents born in U.S. 1.690 1.59 2.310 2.33 2.354 2.55 2.016 2.23 
High School 2.002 1.45 3.468 2.11 1.526 0.91 1.738 1.28 
College 2.073 1.41 4.906 2.60 1.600 0.93 1.823 1.28 
More than College 2.327 1.77 4.443 2.56 2.058 1.58 1.517 0.96 
Income 0.958 -2.84 3.235 2.19 1.635 0.84 0.888 1.48 
General Trust towards others 1.698 3.14 1.851 3.47 1.813 3.46 1.697 3.25 
Trust towards Family and 
Relatives 0.895 -0.71 1.137 0.74 1.104 0.60 0.892 -0.77 
Felt Unsafe in NH 1.109 0.36 0.818 -0.66 1.100 0.33 0.967 -0.12 
Feeling that own race is 
decreasing 0.850 -0.48 1.768 1.66 1.053 0.15 1.003 0.01 
Neighborhood SES 1.394 0.86 0.946 -2.65 1.946 0.42 1.028 -2.28 
Constant 5.049 2.31 12.153 3.25 9.977 3.35 7.541 3.09 




















(1) SOMETIMES IN BOTH 
YEARS 
RRR (z) RRR (z) RRR (z) 
Percentage Change Diversity-Non-
WHITE 
0.989 -1.720 1.027 1.770 0.975 -0.620 
White (0,1) 0.212 -1.900 0.491 -1.090 0.475 -0.890 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
WHITE 
0.999 -0.140 0.986 -0.760 0.975 -0.460 
Age 0.970 -1.840 0.966 -1.950 0.964 -1.620 
Male 0.409 -1.800 2.532 1.650 2.900 1.500 
Parents born in U.S. 6.021 2.840 0.404 -1.310 1.228 0.300 
High school 3.210 1.800 2.524 1.090 0.000 -0.020 
College 5.010 1.580 4.380 1.600 0.000 -0.020 
More than College 4.780 1.710 1.656 0.600 0.000 -0.020 
Income 0.856 -1.970 0.998 -2.550 0.926 -3.160 
General Trust towards others 1.372 1.360 5.633 3.690 1.819 1.240 
Trust towards Family and 
Relatives 
0.913 -0.380 0.956 -0.150 0.698 -0.890 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.492 -1.400 1.648 0.920 1.156 0.230 
Feeling that own race is decreasing 1.511 0.620 0.209 -2.430 0.719 -0.440 
Neighborhood SES 1.111 1.320 1.779 2.470 1.343 0.840 
Constant 3.425 0.960 11.767 1.740 141.000 0.020 
       
(2) OFTEN IN BOTH YEARS       
Percentage Change Diversity-Non-
WHITE 
0.876 -2.390 1.027 1.810 1.020 -1.790 
White (0,1) 0.086 -2.720 0.404 -1.350 0.631 -0.570 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
WHITE 
1.001 0.220 0.977 -1.190 1.020 0.350 
Age 0.931 -3.580 0.938 -3.440 0.921 -3.460 
Male 0.676 -0.710 2.642 1.700 5.325 2.390 
Parents born in U.S. 16.198 3.080 0.397 -1.300 2.182 1.140 
High school 0.000 0.020 2.645 1.040 0.000 -0.020 
College 0.000 0.020 4.418 1.500 0.000 -0.020 
More than College 0.000 0.020 2.159 0.860 0.000 -0.020 
Income 3.187 2.190 3.187 2.190 3.187 2.190 
General Trust towards others 1.720 2.070 6.263 3.840 1.809 1.230 





Felt Unsafe in NH 0.748 -0.510 1.185 0.310 0.430 -1.320 
Feeling that own race is decreasing 5.293 2.520 0.238 -2.190 0.901 -0.140 
Neighborhood SES 2.987 1.680 1.321 -1.180 0.956 -2.440 
Constant 0.000 -0.020 49.624 2.690 370.000 0.030 
       (3) NEVER TO SOMETIMES OR 
OFTEN 
      
Percentage Change Diversity-Non-
WHITE 
0.889 -3.170 0.915 -2.460 1.332 -2.060 
White (0,1) 0.038 -3.940 0.400 -1.540 0.214 -1.730 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
WHITE 
0.966 2.110 0.988 -0.670 1.146 2.390 
Age 0.965 -2.000 0.957 -2.680 0.964 -1.540 
Male 1.443 0.730 1.123 0.220 2.879 1.450 
Parents born in U.S. 7.883 2.980 0.381 -1.500 2.483 1.290 
High school 0.934 -0.070 2.528 1.190 0.000 -0.020 
College 2.345 0.840 3.669 1.500 0.000 -0.020 
More than College 2.615 1.090 2.287 1.090 0.000 -0.020 
Income 1.372 0.886 1.190 0.540 1.004 0.480 
General Trust towards others 1.779 2.470 4.212 3.100 2.440 1.840 
Trust towards Family and 
Relatives 
1.329 1.040 1.112 0.360 0.963 -0.090 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.729 -0.600 1.053 0.100 1.139 0.200 
Feeling that own race is decreasing 3.087 1.770 0.331 -1.900 0.401 -1.150 
Neighborhood SES 2.359 1.890 1.735 0.390 1.389 0.310 
Constant 5.493 1.340 47.162 2.890 173.000 0.030 
       
(4) OFTEN TO 
SOMETIMES/NEVER  
      
Percentage Change Diversity-Non-
WHITE 
0.970 -1.990 0.957 2.020 1.020 -0.710 
White (0,1) 0.209 -2.030 0.281 -2.160 0.613 -0.630 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
WHITE 
1.006 0.850 0.985 -0.820 1.016 0.290 
Age 0.965 -2.270 0.965 -2.180 0.977 -1.040 
Male 0.899 -0.240 2.418 1.700 3.583 1.880 
Parents born in U.S. 0.968 2.890 0.516 -1.030 1.597 0.720 
High school 1.684 0.700 2.252 1.090 0.000 -0.020 
College 3.342 1.420 2.695 1.180 0.000 -0.020 
More than College 1.331 0.370 1.460 0.510 0.000 -0.020 
Income 0.854 2.310 0.977 1.430 0.989 1.660 
General Trust towards others 1.404 1.540 5.290 3.640 2.130 1.620 
Trust towards Family and 
Relatives 
0.974 -0.120 0.950 -0.180 0.703 -0.900 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.903 -0.230 0.773 -0.500 1.009 0.020 




Neighborhood SES 0.746 -2.200 0.335 -1.870 1.010 -1.880 
Constant 5.726 1.500 33.439 2.620 127.000 0.020 
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 234, Pseudo-R2= .137 
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 229, Pseudo-R2= .108 
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 210, Pseudo-R2= .114 
	
	
Table D. Relative Risk Ratios (Panel), Effect Percentage Change in Diversity on 
Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012 (Figure 23) 
Reference Category: NEUTRAL BOTH IN 2006 AND 2012 
















1.001 1.360 1.008 2.290 1.014 2.350 1.001 0.890 
Age 1.015 2.740 1.001 0.110 0.992 -1.110 1.021 2.270 
Male 1.169 0.690 0.989 -0.030 1.453 2.670 1.810 0.390 
Parents born in U.S. 1.427 1.080 1.197 0.490 1.354 0.590 1.237 0.680 
High school 0.993 -0.020 4.243 2.100 0.823 -0.470 0.984 -0.040 
College 0.767 -0.750 3.696 1.920 1.121 0.280 0.803 -0.510 
More than College 0.632 -1.280 5.769 2.210 2.787 2.640 1.376 0.780 
Income 0.802 -1.990 2.213 2.750 1.013 1.970 0.833 -0.610 
General Trust 
towards others 
0.807 -1.980 0.989 -0.080 1.009 0.090 0.905 -0.850 
Trust towards Family 
and Relatives 
1.023 0.210 0.989 -0.070 1.210 2.650 0.943 -0.490 
Felt Unsafe in NH 1.208 0.840 1.075 0.220 0.789 2.200 1.054 0.200 
Feeling that own race 
is decreasing 
1.435 1.420 1.661 2.470 1.225 0.780 1.069 0.230 
Neighborhood SES 0.857 -2.370 1.453 2.240 1.766 -2.640 0.975 -0.520 
Constant 0.948 -0.100 0.075 -2.670 1.147 0.250 0.552 -1.000 






Table	E.	BY	MOVER/STAYER:	Relative Risk Ratios (Panel), Effect Percentage Change in 
Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012 (Figure 24) 
Reference	Category:	NEUTRAL	BOTH	IN	2006	AND	2012	















 RRR (z) RRR (z) RRR (z) RRR (z) 
Percentage Change 
Diversity-STAYER 
1.001 0.900 1.009 1.960 1.023 2.600 1.001 0.310 
Percentage Change 
Diversity- MOVER 
1.014 2.340 0.999 -0.420 0.999 -0.530 1.000 0.250 
Mover (0,1) 0.857 0.670 0.538 -1.410 0.942 -0.180 0.932 -0.150 
Age 1.015 2.100 1.011 1.070 1.009 1.210 1.013 1.970 
Male 0.810 -2.020 0.686 -1.250 0.693 -2.640 1.252 0.980 
Parents born in U.S. 1.377 1.090 1.253 0.530 1.233 0.680 1.175 0.510 
High school 1.256 0.600 5.425 2.070 1.261 0.550 1.249 0.500 
College 0.698 -2.960 3.385 2.490 0.910 -0.230 0.733 -0.700 
More than College 0.231 -4.120 2.132 2.950 1.366 -2.580 0.502 -1.680 
Income 0.899 -1.870 2.213 1.760 1.075 0.220 0.803 -0.590 
General Trust towards 
others 
0.802 -1.990 0.981 -0.140 0.991 -0.090 0.802 -1.930 
Trust towards Family 
and Relatives 
0.847 -2.470 0.815 -0.330 1.826 2.650 0.783 -2.030 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.933 -0.330 0.830 -0.600 0.767 -2.150 0.818 -0.830 
Feeling that own race 
is decreasing 
1.170 2.680 1.353 1.940 0.815 -0.790 0.875 -0.500 
Neighborhood SES 0.799 -2.350 1.550 1.780 1.691 -2.370 0.989 -0.490 
Constant 0.692 -0.670 0.054 -2.910 0.756 -0.470 0.390 -1.510 











Table	F.	BY	MOVER/STAYER	and	WHITE/NON-WHITE:	Relative Risk Ratios (Panel), 
Effect Percentage Change in Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 









RRR   (z) RRR (z)
NEGATIVE IN BOTH YEARS 
    Percentage Change Diversity-
STAYER 1.000 0.010 0.966 -2.360 
Mover (0,1) 0.716 -0.770 1.876 1.070 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
MOVER 1.000 0.040 1.011 1.250 
Age 1.284 2.330 1.062 2.680 
Male 0.855 -2.420 2.458 1.490 
Parents born in U.S. 0.000 -0.020 0.481 -0.790 
High school 0.000 -0.020 0.273 -1.390 
College 0.000 -0.020 0.083 -2.540 
Income 0.657 -4.560 0.571 -3.780 
General Trust towards others 0.790 -1.310 0.845 -0.560 
Trust towards Family and Relatives 0.981 -0.090 1.276 1.020 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.957 -0.120 1.472 0.690 
Feeling that own race is decreasing 1.146 0.350 0.478 -1.120 
Neighborhood SES 0.869 -2.210 0.971 -1.950 
Constant 0.987 0.020 0.774 -0.200 
     POSITIVE IN BOTH YEARS 
    Percentage Change Diversity-
STAYER 0.999 -0.290 0.979 -2.430 
Mover (0,1) 0.548 -1.370 1.362 0.540 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
MOVER 0.998 -0.560 1.020 2.270 
Age 0.972 -2.290 1.043 1.870 
Male 1.058 0.150 3.012 2.100 
Parents born in U.S. 0.000 -0.020 0.522 -0.680 
High school 0.000 -0.020 0.906 -0.100 
College 0.000 -0.020 1.773 3.370 
Income 1.337 2.560 1.331 2.780 
General Trust towards others 1.085 0.490 1.044 0.150 
Trust towards Family and Relatives 1.372 1.470 1.430 1.500 




Feeling that own race is decreasing 0.918 -0.220 0.665 -0.640 
Neighborhood SES 1.278 1.920 1.110 2.110 
Constant 0.896 0.020 0.892 -0.090 
     NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE OR NEUTRAL 
   Percentage Change Diversity-
STAYER 0.999 -0.320 1.072 2.580 
Mover (0,1) 0.939 -0.140 1.086 0.140 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
MOVER 1.000 0.010 0.999 -0.170 
Age 0.989 -0.860 1.035 1.490 
Male 0.978 -0.060 1.183 0.270 
Parents born in U.S. 0.000 -0.020 0.503 -0.720 
High school 0.000 -0.020 0.560 -0.610 
College 0.000 -0.020 0.255 -0.410 
Income 1.118 2.310 1.897 3.890 
General Trust towards others 1.037 0.210 0.955 -0.160 
Trust towards Family and Relatives 1.037 0.170 1.123 0.490 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.908 -0.240 0.950 -0.090 
Feeling that own race is decreasing 0.834 -0.440 0.266 -2.850 
Neighborhood SES 1.342 1.980 1.015 2.335 
Constant 0.789 0.020 2.472 0.690 
     POSITIVE TO NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE 
   Percentage Change Diversity-
STAYER 0.999 -0.420 0.996 -0.550 
Mover (0,1) 0.912 -0.190 1.237 0.350 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
MOVER 1.057 2.220 1.004 0.580 
Age 0.990 -0.730 1.047 2.000 
Male 1.763 1.400 2.388 1.440 
Parents born in U.S. 0.000 -0.020 0.728 -0.330 
High school 0.000 -0.020 0.578 -2.560 
College 0.000 -0.020 0.377 -2.000 
Income 0.857 -3.220 0.873 -4.950 
General Trust towards others 0.987 -0.070 0.875 -0.450 
Trust towards Family and Relatives 0.974 -0.120 1.146 0.560 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.758 -0.640 1.418 2.620 
Feeling that own race is decreasing 0.909 -0.220 0.388 -1.370 
Neighborhood SES 0.779 -2.540 0.775 -1.950 
Constant 0.673 0.020 0.684 -0.280 
WHITE: N= 526, Pseudo-R2= .0682 





Table G. BY MOVER/STAYER and INITIAL LEVEL OF DIVERSITY: Relative 
Risk Ratios (Panel), Effect Percentage Change in Diversity on Changes in 














(NEGATIVE IN BOTH 
YEARS) 
      Percentage Change Diversity-
STAYER 1.001 -0.070 0.991 -0.260 0.992 -1.030 
Mover (0,1) 1.097 0.160 0.368 -1.530 2.066 0.850 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
MOVER 0.999 0.040 1.003 0.480 0.993 0.610 
Age 0.991 -0.570 0.991 -0.460 1.026 1.070 
Male 0.892 -0.240 3.607 1.800 0.540 -1.000 
Parents born in U.S. 0.850 -0.140 0.000 -0.040 0.649 -0.350 
High school 0.260 -1.170 0.000 -0.030 0.492 -0.560 
College 0.208 -2.390 0.000 -0.040 0.143 -2.590 
Income 0.886 -3.460 0.839 -2.770 0.767 -2.220 
General Trust towards others 0.753 -1.220 1.115 0.370 0.765 -0.840 
Trust towards Family and 
Relatives 0.960 -0.160 1.106 0.390 0.898 -0.350 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.781 -0.500 2.611 1.640 0.748 -0.450 
Feeling that own race is 
decreasing 0.962 -0.070 0.796 -0.350 0.904 -0.160 
Neighborhood SES 0.789 -2.340 0.779 -2.470 0.943 -1.940 
Constant 17.917 2.000 36.483 0.040 3.089 0.760 
       (POSITIVE IN BOTH YEARS) 
      Percentage Change Diversity-
STAYER 1.002 -0.410 0.955 -0.640 1.025 -1.160 
Mover (0,1) 1.071 0.110 0.316 -1.740 2.222 0.970 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
MOVER 0.997 0.000 0.977 1.100 0.974 1.530 
Age 0.995 -0.280 0.973 -1.400 0.988 -0.500 
Male 0.691 -0.790 8.135 2.930 0.862 -0.250 
Parents born in U.S. 0.490 -0.580 0.000 -0.040 0.703 -0.280 
High school 0.277 -1.100 0.000 -0.030 0.914 -0.070 
College 1.144 2.030 0.000 -0.030 1.586 2.370 
Income 1.224 3.540 1.664 3.780 1.250 3.570 




Trust towards Family and 
Relatives 1.083 0.310 2.069 2.170 0.918 -0.280 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.751 -0.580 2.582 1.570 1.053 0.080 
Feeling that own race is 
decreasing 1.089 0.160 0.863 -0.220 0.476 -2.170 
Neighborhood SES 1.123 3.720 2.779 1.970 1.440 2.840 
Constant 14.100 1.810 18.743 0.040 7.250 1.320 
       (NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE OR 
NEUTRAL) 
      Percentage Change Diversity-
STAYER 1.000 -0.460 0.987 0.410 1.093 2.320 
Mover (0,1) 1.027 0.040 0.330 -1.630 2.900 1.250 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
MOVER 0.995 0.120 1.013 0.200 1.030 0.660 
Age 0.992 -0.430 0.993 -0.360 0.986 -0.580 
Male 0.843 -0.340 4.364 2.020 0.384 -1.510 
Parents born in U.S. 0.932 -0.060 0.000 -0.040 1.485 0.310 
High school 0.336 -0.890 0.000 -0.030 1.463 2.290 
College 0.299 -1.010 0.000 -0.040 1.617 2.380 
Income 1.118 2.320 1.112 3.470 1.323 -1.940 
General Trust towards others 0.795 -0.930 1.591 1.640 0.785 -0.750 
Trust towards Family and 
Relatives 1.108 0.360 1.005 0.020 0.783 -0.790 
Felt Unsafe in NH 0.252 -2.330 0.578 1.570 1.152 0.220 
Feeling that own race is 
decreasing 0.189 -2.170 0.555 -0.860 1.076 0.110 
Neighborhood SES 1.177 1.580 1.449 2.270 1.743 0.840 
Constant 15.003 1.750 27.464 0.040 4.279 0.950 
       (POSITIVE TO NEGATIVE OR 
NEUTRAL) 
      Percentage Change Diversity-
STAYER 0.988 0.710 0.956 -2.010 0.991 -1.030 
Mover (0,1) 1.523 0.660 0.332 -1.580 3.571 1.470 
Percentage Change Diversity- 
MOVER 1.044 -2.220 1.022 2.650 1.017 1.410 
Age 0.994 -0.320 0.990 -0.500 1.012 2.460 
Male 1.080 0.150 10.189 3.170 0.646 -0.670 
Parents born in U.S. 0.942 -0.050 0.000 -0.030 0.580 -2.420 
High school 0.226 -2.200 0.000 -0.030 0.573 -2.420 
College 0.465 -2.640 0.000 -0.030 0.437 -0.660 
Income 0.987 -4.560 0.761 -3.550 0.974 -2.340 




Trust towards Family and 
Relatives 0.879 -0.480 1.153 0.490 0.748 -0.920 
Felt Unsafe in NH 1.120 2.370 1.734 0.870 0.896 -0.160 
Feeling that own race is 
decreasing 0.491 -1.140 0.725 -0.460 0.737 -0.440 
Neighborhood SES 0.673 -2.950 0.789 -1.980 0.856 -1.988 
Constant 5.007 1.040 19.454 0.040 2.326 0.530 
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 234, Pseudo-R2= .058 
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 229, Pseudo-R2= .142 
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